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Abstract 
 
The primary aim of this thesis is the reconstruction of a development in the history of the philosophy of 
language, namely an understanding of hieroglyphic Egyptian as a language uniquely adapted to the purposes 
and concerns of late Platonist metaphysics. There are three main reasons for this particular focus.  
 
First, the primary interest of philological criticism has emphasized the apparent shortcomings of the classical 
hieroglyphic tradition in light of the success of the modern decipherment endeavour. Though the Greek 
authors recognize a number of philologically distinctive features, they are primarily interested in contrasting 
hieroglyphic and Greek semantics. The latter is capable of discursive elaboration of the sapiential content to 
which the former is non-discursively adapted.  
 
Second, the sole surviving, fully extant essay in the exegesis of Egyptian hieroglyphs, the Hieroglyphica of 
Horapollo can be situated within the broader philosophical project in which the Neoplatonic commentators 
were engaged. As such, it draws on elements of the distinct traditions of Greek reception of Egyptian wisdom, 
4th/5th century pagan revivalism under Christian persecution, and late Platonist logico-metaphysical 
methodological principles.  
 
Third, the rationale for Neoplatonic use of allegorical interpretation as an exegetical tool is founded on the 
methodological principle of ‘analytic ascent’ from the phenomena depicted, through the concepts under 
which they fall, to their intelligible causes. These three stages in the ascent correspond to the three modes of 
expression of which, according to Greek exegetes, hieroglyphic Egyptian, as composites of material images 
and intelligible content, is capable.  
 
Horapollo’s Hieroglyphica, I argue, maintains a tripartite distinction between linguistic expressions, their 
meanings, and the objects or name-bearers which they depict and further aligns that distinction with three 
modes of hieroglyphic expression: representative, semantic, and symbolic. I conclude, therefore, that a 
procedure of analytic explanatory ascent from empirical observation through discursive reason to 
metaphysical or cosmological insights is employed in the exegesis of the sapiential content of the hieroglyphs 
of which it treats.   
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Introduction 
 
The primary aim of this thesis is the reconstruction of a development in the history of the philosophy of 
language. The development in question is an understanding of hieroglyphic Egyptian as a language uniquely 
adapted to the purposes and concerns of late Platonist metaphysics. There are earlier conceptions of the 
particular superiority of hieroglyphic Egyptian for theological and philosophical purposes, both among the 
Egyptians themselves and in the Greek philosophical tradition. In the Greek philosophical sources the interest 
in hieroglyphs probably originates with the Stoic writer Chæremon, but it also appears in Platonic sources, 
including Plutarch. It is, however, with the specifically Neoplatonic development in the understanding of 
hieroglyphs that I am concerned here. There are two main reasons for this particular focus. The first is the 
scholastic and curricular inclinations of many of the representatives of Neoplatonism. This allows for far 
greater integration of their treatment of hieroglyphic Egyptian not only into philosophical linguistics more 
generally, but also into the broader philosophical project in which they were engaged. The second reason is 
that the only Greek text on the subject of hieroglyphs to survive complete, the Hieroglyphica of Horapollo, can 
profitably be read, so I shall argue, in the context of Neoplatonic theorizing about language in general and of 
hieroglyphics in particular.  
 
I describe the development as taking place in the philosophy of language because it identifies language – in 
this case, a particular language – as a topic of specific interest for the discipline of philosophy. My interest in 
that development concerns the philosophical status of that development, its methods and conclusions, and is 
therefore an essay in the history of philosophy of language. Of course, the reconstruction is to a large extent 
concerned with what are otherwise essentially historical aspects of the literature of late antiquity on the 
subject of hieroglyphic Egyptian. However, that concern extends only so far as the historical aspect supports 
a specifically philosophical interest and this is the basis of the secondary aim of the thesis, namely, an 
assessment of the presuppositions of the development as reconstructed. In this respect the project has more 
in common with Frede’s characterization of an earlier ‘doxographical tradition’ in the history of philosophy, 
than the later developmental tradition he distinguishes from it.1 On the other hand, it no more presupposes ‘a 
basic set of philosophical questions’, than it is written ‘from a particular philosophical position’ to which the 
history of philosophy has led us. Far less does it endorse the idea that ‘philosophical understanding is 
                               
1 Frede, M., ‘The History of Philosophy as a Discipline’ in The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 85, No. 11, Eighty-Fifth Annual Meeting American 
Philosophical Association, Eastern Division, (Nov., 1988): pp. 666-672. Frede, M., ‘Introduction: The Study of Ancient Philosophy’ in Essays 
in Ancient Philosophy (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987): pp. ix-xxvii.  
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essentially historical’.2 The project is philosophical, rather, because the historical development was thought by 
its proponents to do philosophical work, and the judgement I form is a judgement on their reasons for 
thinking so. In principle, then, the ‘basic set of philosophical questions’ addressed ‘from a particular 
philosophical position’ are those of the late Platonists themselves.  
 
Chapter One begins by examining the philological criticism which has focussed on the tradition’s apparent 
congruence or otherwise with the success of the decipherment endeavour. The primary interest of the 
decipherment endeavour was the reconstruction of the language of ancient Egyptian hieroglyphs. As a result 
of that endeavour a distinction was drawn between sound-signs and sense-signs into which hieroglyphic texts 
are typically analyzed. The introduction of this distinction is the product of an independent interest in the 
phonology and semantics of hieroglyphic Egyptian. It does not inform a purely orthographic analysis of sign-
groups which are lexically specific and must be learnt as such. It is in any case impossible systematically to 
maintain the distinction without qualification and equivocation.  
 
The classical hieroglyphic tradition, even where it recognizes the distinction between hieroglyphic sound-
signs and sense-signs, often with not inconsiderable sophistication, is almost exclusively interested in 
hieroglyphs as sense-signs, not, however, as graphic representations of sense (inhering in speech, ideas, or 
objects), but in themselves as bearers of sense. The use of Greek to provide a descriptive account of the 
representative features of hieroglyphs is contingent upon the rôle of the sense-bearing glyphs under 
description. The rôle hieroglyphs are thought to perform is to bear a particular kind of sense, typically 
conceived of as sapiential: hieroglyphs do not mediate wisdom representatively, they are themselves 
instances of wisdom.  
 
Chapter Two addresses further relevant aspects of the historical context, specifically 4th/5th century pagan 
revivalism under Christian persecution, as plausibly representing the most likely milieu for the composition 
of these texts and source criticism emphasizing the exegetical content of the texts as deriving from elements 
of the Greek reception of Egyptian wisdom (Chæremon-Plutarch-Porphyry) on the one hand, and the natural 
history tradition (Aristotle-Pliny-Ælian) on the other. There are, moreover, reasons for developing a dialectical 
understanding of this literature in the polemical relationship in which a number of Christian works stand with 
                               
2 Baker, G. P., Wittgenstein, Frege and the Vienna Circle (Oxford: Blackwell, 1988): p. xv cited in Morris, K. J., (ed.), Wittgenstein’s Method: 
Neglected Aspects: Essays on Wittgenstein by Gordon Baker (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004): p. 12.  
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respect to it. We have, for example, the corpus of the Coptic archimandrite Shenoute, especially on the 
question of the rôle of the generated world in licensing metaphysical speculation about the ungenerated 
world, and on the heterodox tendencies of pagan heresies in general. Shenoute identifies those tendencies as 
objectionable for two main reasons: first, the reliance on non-Scriptural sources, and second, the application 
of allegorizing or sophistical reasoning to those sources. The consequence of this for Shenoute is not merely 
the propagation of false knowledge, but the perversion of the faith. Certain contemporary heterodox sources, 
including treatises belonging to the Nagʿ-Hammâdi corpus, had pre-empted Shenoute’s two-fold objection by 
arguing that certain written characters (ostensibly the revelation of the Logos for the return of mankind to 
knowledge of the Father) provide a legitimate understanding of the truth by virtue of each character being a 
complete thought written by the ungenerated Unity. The apparent impasse between the ‘truth’ of Shenoute’s 
Christian encounter with scriptural revelation and the ‘falsehood’ of pagan enquiry into what is hidden is 
therefore mediated through a conception of a posteriori reasoning as a reflex of a priori reasoning.  
 
By contrast, certain pagan revivalists conceived of a form of hieroglyphic exegesis methodologically 
principled in accordance with late academic Platonist logico-metaphysical conceptions. As composites of 
material images of sensible particulars and the intelligible content by virtue of which those particulars exist, 
hieroglyphs as conceived by the Neoplatonists lend themselves to analytic inferential procedures through 
discursive reason to metaphysical insights. In order, then, to assess the dialectical contribution of pagan 
revivalism to the polemical engagement with Coptic Christianity and the strategy by which it answers the 
accusations of rationalist obscurity in the face of scriptural revelation an account of these logico-
metaphysical conceptions is necessary.  
 
Chapter Three, therefore, explores various rationales for Neoplatonic use of allegorical interpretation as a 
means to hieroglyphic exegesis. The aim is to establish hieroglyphics both as a proper topic for philosophical 
investigation, and as methodologically principled. My argument is that this methodological principle is what 
legitimizes the ‘analytic ascent’ in hieroglyphic exegesis from the phenomena depicted, through the concepts 
under which they fall, to their intelligible causes. I begin by outlining the three modes of expression of which, 
according to the Greek exegetes, hieroglyphic Egyptian is capable. The first, mediated by spoken language, is 
the capacity to represent sensible phenomena. The second presents those phenomena conceptually, but 
unmediated by speech. The third presents the intelligible causes of phenomena symbolically or 
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allegoristically. Neoplatonic semantics develops a tripartite theory of meaningful linguistic expressions and 
this tripartite account Neoplatonic exegetes explain by reference to a metaphysical framework of sensible 
phenomena, universal concepts, and intelligible causes to which the three modes of expression of 
hieroglyphic Egyptian correspond. This is possible because hieroglyphic signs are composites of sensible and 
intelligible elements which are therefore susceptible to interpretation as material images, as mediating 
concepts, or as intelligible realities.  
 
Chapter Four examines in detail Horapollo’s Hieroglyphica, an interpretative exegesis of almost two hundred 
hieroglyphs in two books. Horapollo’s Hieroglyphica is the sole surviving, fully extant essay in the exegesis of 
Egyptian hieroglyphs. On the one hand, it draws on elements of the Greek reception of Egyptian wisdom and 
the natural history tradition as described in Chapter One. As such it has the structure of a dictionary-
encyclopædia hybrid type of secondary literature common in the late Roman and early mediæval periods. 
This mixed provenance signals a distinguishable purpose and associated methodology: the interpretation of 
hieroglyphic signs by means of natural signs. It is not that originally lexicographical or physiological material 
have become mutually contaminated (a conclusion dependent on a hypothesis of historical development), but 
that the subjoining of resources indicates the presence of an increasingly productive hermeneutic.  
 
Moreover, the chapter is intended to provide some lines of argument intended to lend plausibility to the 
suggestion that the traditional lexicographical or physiological material is deployed in line with the 
discussion of Neoplatonic semantics and exegetics given in Chapter Three. This is partly established on the 
basis of historical context: the school in Alexandria in which Horapollo taught in the last third of the fifth 
century, his family’s ties to the leading Neoplatonic figures of the day (Damascius, Proclus), his persecution as 
a pagan under Christian auspices, reflecting historically prominent regional tendencies of the kind 
documented in Chapter Two. In view of this historical context there are, moreover, echoes of various strands 
of Neoplatonic logical, metaphysical, and hermeneutical thought to be found in scarce, but nonetheless 
theoretically loaded exegetical details and, perhaps more importantly, in a number of broad structural and 
methodological features of the text too. The evidence, I conclude, while insufficient to identify the text as 
conclusively Platonic in motivation or purpose, is sufficiently compelling to preclude any further assessment 
of its merits or demerits on exclusively Egyptological or pseudo-encyclopædic grounds.  
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Chapter One: The Hieroglyphic Tradition 
 
§1. Egyptian Hieroglyphs 
 
[T101]
  
Do truth | for the divine lord of truth, of whose truth the 
truth exists. | The pen, scroll, and palette of Thoth are apart 
from the doing of wrong; goodness is good, good toward 
him, | but truth is forever.3  
 
In his discussion of the varieties of written Egyptian Gardiner (1927) arranges his remarks according to each 
of four script-types: hieroglyphic, hieratic, demotic, and Coptic. These types variously connote several phases 
of the Egyptian language, a range of means and media of production, and the classically familiar distinction of 
secular or religious use. As a whole the scripts can be found carved or painted on stone (though only 
hieroglyphic is typically glyphic) or written in ink on papyrus using a reed stylus, and are, broadly speaking, 
employed either for ritual or literary and administrative purposes.  
 
The Egyptian language exhibits five diachronic variants: 
 
(i) Old Egyptian, used in Dynasties I-VIII, dating 3180 B.C. to 2240 B.C. 
(ii) Middle Egyptian, used in Dynasties IX-XI, dating 2240 B.C. to 1990 B.C. 
(iii) Late Egyptian, used in Dynasties XVIII-XXIV, dating 1573 B.C. to 715 B.C. 
(iv) Demotic, used from Dynasty XXV to the late Roman period, dating 715 B.C. to 470 A.D. 
(v) Coptic, used from the 3rd to the 16th centuries. 
 
Middle Egyptian is generally taught as the standard form of the language. Hieroglyphic Egyptian appears 
during the Archaic period (i.e. under Dynasties I & II), not later than 3000 B.C., and the latest example of 
hieroglyphic Egyptian at Philæ is dated 394 A.D. Egyptian constitutes a branch of the Afro-Asiatic or Hamito-
Semitic family of languages, and as such is related not only to Semitic Hebrew, Arabic, Aramaic, and Akkadian, 
but also the Berber, Chadic, Cushitic, Beja, and Omotic language-groups. In very general terms, this affinity is 
                               
3 Anonymus Rhet., sxy nfr-mdw = The Eloquent Peasant (Rusticus eloquens), 334–338.  
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shown not only in vocabulary, but in the tendency to effect semantic variation through vowel variation in 
fixed consonantal stems, reduplication, and affixes.  
 
Hieroglyphics are read either vertically (top to bottom) in columns or horizontally (usually right to left, but 
occasionally left to right) in rows. The front of a sign (e.g. the faces of signs depicting persons, animals, or 
birds) faces the beginning of the inscription in which they occur. Generally modern texts read left to right. In 
an effort to achieve symmetry and to avoid gaps signs are often grouped and read top to bottom within a 
sequence inscribed in rows. 
 
Hieroglyphic is one of three scripts developed in ancient Egyptian. The other two are: hieratic and enchorial 
(otherwise known as demotic). Hieratic is a cursive form of hieroglyphic. In other words, it consists of 
characters freely adapted from the hieroglyphic script which was originally primarily used as a script for 
inscriptions, rather than use on papyrus. Subsequently, both hieroglyphic and hieratic are found in papyrus 
manuscripts.  
 
In common with Hebrew and Arabic, Egyptian writing is unpointed, i.e. lacks vowels. The standard reference 
work on the subject lists 743 signs.  
 
The primary interest of the decipherment endeavour was the reconstruction of the language of ancient 
Egyptian hieroglyphs. As a result of that endeavour a distinction was drawn between sound-signs 
(phonograms) and sense-signs (ideograms) into which – for most pedagogical purposes (on which more 
below) – hieroglyphic texts are analyzed.  
 
The latter comprise 1-, 2-, or 3-consonant signs. There are the twenty-four uniliteral phonograms 
constituting an alphabet. Because hieroglyphics are unpointed, the consonants are conventionally vocalized 
using the vowel e in all cases, except after glottal stops, where a is used. In addition to uniliteral phonograms 
(the alphabet), there are also biliteral phonograms (with the phonetic value of two alphabetic consonants), 
and triliteral phonograms (with the phonetic value of three alphabetic consonants). Uniliteral phonograms 
are also used as phonetic complements in support of multiliteral signs, specifying one of its component 
phonetic values. Conversely, multiliteral signs are sometimes used as phonetic determinatives, specifying in a 
single sign the phonetic value of preceding uniliteral signs. 
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The types of hieroglyphic phonograms then are the following (signs in parentheses are not pronounced):  
 
1. uniliteral phonogram cf. x in x+n+(xn)+(MAN WITH HAND TO MOUTH) = ‘sentence’, ‘saying’.  
2. biliteral phonogram cf. iw in iw+y+t+(HOUSE) = ‘street’.  
3. triliteral phonogram cf. anx in anx+(MAN WITH HAND TO MOUTH) = ‘swear’, ‘oath’.  
4. (uniliteral phonetic complement) cf. (A) in SA+(A)+(PAPYRUS ROLLED UP, TIED, AND SEALED) = ‘appoint’, 
‘command’.  
5. (biliteral phonetic determinative) cf. (xn) in x+n+(xn)+(MAN WITH HAND TO MOUTH) = ‘sentence’, 
‘saying’.  
6. (triliteral phonetic determinative) cf. (iaH) in i+a+H+(iaH) = ‘moon’.  
 
Ideograms are typically taught as sense- rather than sound-signs. They comprise pictograms, ostensibly 
depicting the object that is meant by the sign, and ideograms, depicting an object the meaning of the sign for 
which semantically related to the meaning of the word in which the ideogram appears.  
 
7. pictogram cf. ra [= (SUN)] in ra+(STROKE DETERMINATIVE) = ‘sun’.  
8. ideogram cf. ra [= (SUN)] in ra+(STROKE DETERMINATIVE) = ‘day’.  
 
Associated with these are two further sign types. The first are stroke determinatives. These are a short stroke 
following pictograms and ideograms indicating that the latter signify individual samples of the item depicted. 
They are therefore used in distinction to a three stroke sign for plural forms. The second are generic 
determinatives, typically appearing at the end of hieroglyphic words in Middle Kingdom texts (though most 
likely the original orthographic form of the word historically), which indicate the general semantic field of 
preceding phonetically spelled word.  
 
9. (stroke determinative) cf. (STROKE DETERMINATIVE) in ra+(STROKE DETERMINATIVE) = ‘sun’.  
10. (generic determinative) cf. (PINTAIL DUCK) in s [for z(A)]+t+(PINTAIL DUCK) = ‘pintail duck’.  
 
In any case where a sign is used with no pictographic, ideographic, or determinative value, it is eo ipso a 
phonogram and a rebus. A sign is a rebus if the word for the item the glyph depicts has a phonetic value in 
Egyptian which is not being used pictographically or ideographically. If also lexically complete (i.e. forms a 
complete Egyptian word), it is eo ipso a logogram.  
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11. rebus cf. iw [= (NEWBORN BUBALIS OR HARTEBEEST)] in iw+y+t+(HOUSE) = ‘street’.  
12. logogram cf. sA [for zA = (PINTAIL DUCK)] in sA [for zA = (PINTAIL DUCK)]+(STROKE 
DETERMINATIVE)+(SEATED MAN) = ‘son’.  
 
Gardiner also lists the following non-standard features of orthography:  
 
i. abbreviations 
ii. graphic transpositions 
iii. transpositions with honorific intent 
iv. monograms 
v. defective and superfluous writings 
vi. group-writing 
vii. determination of compounds 
viii. avoidance of the repetition of like consonantal signs in contiguity 
ix. doubtful readings 
 
The distinction between sound-signs and sense-signs in hieroglyphic Egyptian is a product of the standard 
process of transliteration, whose object is to preserve in a normalized form only the unreduplicated phonetic 
information to be found in a hieroglyphic inscription. The transliteration of hieroglyphic Egyptian is not 
reversible. It is not intended that a transliterated word be reconstructable in accordance with hieroglyphic 
orthography solely by reference to its transliterated form. Transliteration does not involve one-to-one 
correspondence with hieroglyphic orthography, but provides the (unpointed and) normalized phonetic value 
of the hieroglyphs. Hieroglyphic transliterations, in other words, are conceived with the aim of teaching the 
student how to read, but do not make it possible to write hieroglyphic Egyptian. 
 
To illustrate this, compare the five hieroglyphs4 constituting standard Middle Egyptian orthography for a 
word meaning ‘strength’, depicting the following objects or name-bearers respectively: a ripple-of-water, a 
branch, a human-placenta, bread, and a forearm-with-hand-holding-stick. According to the standard account, 
the first four are phonograms (the second biliteral, with the third and fourth uniliteral phonetic complements 
                               
4 Gardiner sign-inventory references: N35 M3 Aa1 X1 D40. 
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which spell out the two elements of the preceding bilateral sign) and the fifth an ideogram (in this case, 
determinative).  
 
A non-Egyptian-speaking reader learns that M3, for example, depicts a branch, which has the phonetic value 
xt, and means ‘wood’, and determines through syntactic considerations that the phonetic value is here in use. 
Again, that D40 depicts a forearm-with-hand-holding-stick with a syntactically ideographic or determinative 
value signifying a class of words concerning force or effort. That is, with phonetically redundant detail 
appearing between <>, the full sequence reads: <ripple-of-water> (= n = <‘water’>) + <branch> (= xt = <‘wood’>) + 
<human-placenta> (= <x> = <‘placenta’>) + <bread> (= <t> = <‘bread’>) + <forearm-with-hand-holding-stick> (= 
<nxt> = <‘strong’>), i.e. nxt = <‘strong’>.  
 
I have outlined above how a non-Egyptian-speaking reader is taught to understand the five hieroglyphs 
comprising the word for ‘strength’. By contrast, the Egyptian-speaker, for whom the phonetic reading is 
straightforwardly nxt, the question is a matter of spelling. That is to say, what are identified in the Egyptian-
language readings of the glyphs are not, then, utterances, concepts, or objects so distinguished, but precisely 
the (non-arbitrary) Egyptian signs n, xt, x, t, and nxt, without having to employ any distinctions as to phonetic 
or ideographic usage. The answers to the questions, ‘how is the inscription pronounced?’ and ‘what does the 
inscription mean?’ are in each case the same, namely nxt.  
 
The question ‘what does the inscription depict?’, however, is answered by spelling out the inscription sign-
by-sign. In English this may be done by assigning sign-references or by describing the item depicted by each 
sign. For an Egyptian-speaker, however, the spelling of the inscription involves naming the sign, in Egyptian, 
as follows: n, xt, x, t, nxt.  
 
Standard hieroglyphic transliteration does not preserve this feature of hieroglyphic orthography. In order to 
do so without loss of phonetic information that is preserved by transliteration I shall adopt an augmented 
method which I shall call ‘transcription’.5 So, for example, the sequence described above for the Egyptian 
word for ‘strong’ (nxt) is transcribed: n-xt-<x>-<t>-nxt.6 This is not intended to be a hypothesis about how in 
                               
5 Thus reversing the use of the terms ‘transliteration’ and ‘transcription’ as applied to Akkadian cuneiform.  
6 For a full sample text, transcription, normalized transliteration, and translation see Appendix 1.  
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fact hieroglyphic texts may historically have been spelled out, only to preserve a sign-for-sign 
correspondence between text and transcription in the sense in which I here use the term.  
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§2. Greek Hieroglyphs 
 
Reading, with few exceptions, modern appraisals of their value, one might never suspect the significance of 
studies of hieroglyphic Egyptian, made in the classical sources.7 Classical (and in particular Greek) sources of 
evidence for knowledge and use of hieroglyphs are neither so abundant as to have ensured since Champollion 
(1822) their preservation from comparative neglect, nor so scarce as to explain the sparse attention they have 
received in modern classical scholarship.  
 
Linguistic artefacts, like the Rosetta stone, the Flaminian obelisk of Augustus, the obelisk of Constantius in the 
Circus Maximus, and the Isiac table,8 as belonging amongst the ‘Greek, Hebrew or Latin translations of 
hieroglyphic texts’9 of which Champollion made use, are not, despite the apparently crucial rôle they play in 
the pre-nineteenth century studies, of primary interest here10 (except insofar as both Egyptian and Græco-
Roman monumental and literary material can be shown to exemplify principles identified in the classical 
analyses).  
 
There is also an extensive classical tradition of histories of Egypt and αἰγυπτιακά. Though beginning with 
Hecatæus of Miletus (550-476 B.C.), the first major historical source is the second book of Herodotus (484-
430/425 B.C.), who establishes several of the major themes of subsequent accounts: flora and fauna, 
monumental architecture, cultic activity &c. Hellanicus of Lesbos (fl. 5th cent. B.C.), Eudoxus of Cnidus 
(410/408-355/347 B.C.), Lysimachus (360-281B.C.), Hecatæus of Abdera (fl. 4th cent. B.C.), and Manethon of 
Sebennytos (fl. 305-285 B.C.) are fragmentary, though elements of this early tradition are in part preserved in 
the first book of Diodorus Siculus (80-20 B.C.).  
 
The Αἰγυπτιακά of Manethon ought perhaps to be mentioned in particular, insofar as the chronology it 
contains provided evidence used by Champollion in the decipherment of the royal cartouches. Subsequently 
there are the works of Apollonius Molon (fl. c.70 B.C.), Strabo (64 B.C.-22 A.D.) Apion (fl. 1st cent. A.D.), Flavius 
Josephus (fl. c.70 A.D.), and the Roman historians: Gaius Cornelius Tacitus (56-117 A.D.) and Ammianus 
                               
7 See e.g. Deiber, A., (1904) and Van De Walle, B. & Vergote, J., (1943) & (1947); both pay particular attention to the passage from Clement 
in this context. 
8 For which see Pignoria (1605; 1669) and Kircher’s mid-seventeenth century Egyptological works. Despite further a handful of 
retrospective rehabilitations (see especially Leemans (1835), Van de Walle & Vergote (1943, 1947) and Sbordone (2002)), the ‘imaginative 
folly’ and ‘fruitless speculations’ of Kircher from 1636 for the next thirty or so years have generally been considered irredeemable by 
modern Egyptology. 
9 According to the biography of Champollion in the Egyptian newspaper مارهلأا (’al-’ahrām) in the centenary year of decipherment. 
10 Even the Greek on the Rosetta stone was likely translated from Egyptian into Greek by an Egyptian (see Harrison, Histos, 1999). 
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Marcellinus (325-391 A.D.). Despite, however, rather full accounts of several recurring Egyptian themes in the 
afore-mentioned, only Herodotus and Ammianus provide any substantial information on hieroglyphic 
Egyptian beyond noting the appearance of the two scripts identifiable.  
 
The evidence for knowledge of Egyptian φωνή and γράμματα respectively, as either attributed to (Pythagoras 
in Iamblichus) or evidenced by classical authors (e.g. Hermapion in Ammianus), implies a more sophisticated 
and detailed knowledge of the language than is generally acknowledged. Pythagoras had been credited with 
knowledge of Egyptian,11 and specifically Egyptian φωνή,12 but for particulars concerning the spoken language 
Herodotus and Plutarch are two of the fuller sources. Typically any material provided concerning the 
phonetic properties of Egyptian words is confined to proper and common nouns, of which a dozen or so 
examples can be found in Herodotus, and a further two dozen in Plutarch.13  
 
By the time the first references to Egypt appear in classical sources Egypt itself had been subject to multiple 
periods of non-native control (Libyan, Assyrian, Persian). That this was the case may have influenced the 
Greek debate about the relative priority of the Egyptians and the Æthiopians, particularly in connection with 
the origins of writing. The debate as to the precise antiquity and historical circumstances under which 
writing was invented acknowledged several competing sources: Assyrian, Egyptian, Syrian, Phœnician, and 
Babylonian.14 The passage from Diodorus Siculus cited above is of particular interest in this context because 
not only does he attribute both the origins of letters and also of language itself to Hermes without offering 
competing accounts, he also employs a very particular (though by no means unique) device for fixing the 
attribution: the etymology of the name Hermes in his teaching the Greeks the ἑρμηνεία of their thoughts.  
 
From the earliest classical discussions a basic distinction in written Egyptian is observed between ‘sacred 
letters’ (γράμματα ἱρά) and ‘demotic’ (δημοτικά), that is, ‘two types of letters, both those called sacred and 
those with the commoner learning’ (γράμματα διττά, τά τε ἱερὰ καλούμενα καὶ τὰ κοινοτέραν ἔχοντα τὴν 
μάθησιν).15 Greek interest in the written language is almost exclusively focussed on the former, as, for 
example, in Plutarch: ‘out of sacred letters’ (ἐκ τῶν ἱερῶν γραμμάτων) and ‘of the letters called hieroglyphic’ 
                               
11 Plutarchus Biogr., Phil., De Iside et Osiride, 10.  
12 Diogenes Laërtius Biogr., 8.3. 
13 E.g. πίρωμις in Egyptian is καλός κἀγαθός in Greek (Herodotus, 2.143.4); the transcription of the name ‘Ozymandias’ (Diodorus Siculus); 
Plutarchus Biogr., Phil.,, De Iside et Osiride, pass. 
14 Pliny, Natural History, 7.56. 
15 Herodotus Hist., 2.36 & Diodorus Siculus, 1.81.4. Both cited in Maréstaing (1913). There is in general a limited range of Greek and Roman 
terms for a hieroglyphic sign: σημεῖον-signum; γράμματα-literæ; σύμβολον; σχῆμα; ἱερογλυφικά; figura; species; simulacrum; ἀγάλματα. 
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(τῶν γὰρ καλουμένων ἱερογλυφικῶν γραμμάτων)16. If demotic script is little emphasized, however, according to 
Champollion,17 both hieroglyphic Egyptian (whether carved or painted) and hieratic Egyptian are to be 
understood as the γράμματα ἱερὰ of classical sources.  
 
In the Stromata of Clement of Alexandria, three scripts are distinguished: epistolographic, hieratic, and 
hieroglyphic. Though the classificatory schema Clement describes is perhaps the most sophisticated in the 
classical sources, it is also notoriously brief and consequently highly contentious.18 Several studies have been 
made intended to establish the relative success or failure of classical accounts of written Egyptian to 
correspond with the principles and findings of modern Egyptology. Though in general the verdict has not 
been favourable,19 both Deiber (1904)20 and Vergote (1939)21, for example, have established that several 
passages do contain a core of substantially well informed observations on genuinely Egyptian linguistic 
material. Clement is also the first to distinguish three scripts.  
 
 
  
                               
16 Plutarchus Phil., de Iside et Osiride, 6.353B & 10.354E. Amongst which he recognized an alphabet of twenty-five characters. Cf. also Pliny, 
Natural History, 7.57: cited in Maréstaing (1913). 
17 Champollion, Grammaire Égyptienne, (Paris: Didot, 1836): p.2. 
18 Le Boulluec, Les Stromates (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1981), adapting Méhat, Étude sur les ‘Strommates’ de Clément d’Alexandrie (Paris: Éditions 
du Seuil, 1966), treats Book V of the Stromata as comprising four parts: (i) Cap. I-III (§§.1-18): faith, research and knowledge; (ii) Cap. IV-VIII 
(§§.19-55): philosophy, theology and the symbolic style; (iii) Cap. IX-XIII (§§.56-88): esotericism; & (iv) Cap. XIV (§§.89-141): loans. The two 
passages in question  here occur in part (ii). They are: (1) Cap. IV. §§. 20-21, & (2) Cap. VII. §§. 41-43. Additional reflections by Clement on 
the relative capacities of the Greek and Egyptian languages for expressing philosophical truth are also found at Stromata I. Cap. XXI. §. 
143, 6 & Stromata, VI. Cap. IV. §§. 35-37. 
19 Gardiner, Egyptian Grammar (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1927), for example, notes ‘the tradition of the classical writers and the 
early Fathers, whose confused and mutually contradictory statements, if they point anywhere, point in a direction diametrically opposed 
to the truth’ (p.11). Elements of ‘sane testimony’ (ibid.), Gardiner claims, survive in the historians, but are contrasted with the ‘mystical 
assertions’, ‘grotesque allegorical reasons’ and ‘fantastic explanations’ of the Greek exegeses.  
20 Deiber, Clément d’Alexandrie et l’Égypte (Cairo: l’Institut Français d’Archéologie Orientale, 1904). 
21 Vergote, ‘Clément d’Alexandrie et l’écriture égyptienne’, Le Muséon 52 (1939): 199-221. 
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§3. Genres of Exegesis 
 
Based on an analysis of the (typically erratic) arrangement of word-lists such as the Ramesseum Onomasticon 
and the Onomasticon of Amenope by category (‘birds, animals, cereals, parts of an ox, geographical names, and 
the like’)22 Gardiner draws the conclusion that these texts represent the “first steps in the direction of an 
Encyclopaedia”.23 Reporting this conclusion, Fox acknowledges that the Egyptian word-lists are often so 
arranged, but sees no reason to attribute this fact to a desire on the part of the authors to reflect categorial 
hierarchies in the phenomena of nature. Though in certain cases the forms of hieroglyphs are in fact related 
conceptually to the items they depict, a much more likely motivation, Fox argues, is that the onomastica were 
used to teach the writing of hieroglyphs.24 This would help explain the inclusion of orthographic variants in 
these texts, and separate entries for synonymous expressions. (As Fox points out, such considerations cannot 
apply to comparable texts in either Hebrew or Greek where orthographical considerations necessitate 
completely different kinds of pedagogical provision.) Interest in the realia depicted in such lists is a 
comparatively late phenomenon, typically found in Demotic rather than in hieroglyphic sources.25 Even here, 
though the lists are organized by individual sign rather than words in which they commonly appear, a 
primary focus on orthography is still likely since the texts do not share common organizational themes. 
 
Amongst lexicographical texts a number of forms are possible. It is the Glossary, for example, that provides 
explanations of abstruse, technical, dialectal, or foreign terms (in Egyptian samples often with bilingual 
equivalents in Greek or Latin). Kramer,26 furthermore, distinguishes two main types of ancient glossary: 
Gebrauchsglossare and Schulglossare. The former were intended as popular handbooks and for daily use. The 
latter belonged to the scholarly tradition of lexicography. Within the second group there subsequently 
developed a further distinction between more complex lexicographical forms such as the Idiomata and 
Hermeneumata. The first “always regarded Greek as the norm, [and] listed grammatical differences between 
the two languages,”  whereas the second “had a primarily lexical interest and contained lists of words (such as 
no. 5 in K.’s collection) and short texts with a literal translation.”27  
                               
22 Gardiner, Sir A. H., Egyptian Grammar (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1927): p.23 & note. 
23 See Fox, M. V., ‘Egyptian Onomastica and Biblical Wisdom’ in Vetus Testamentum, Vol.36, Fasc. 3. (Jul., 1986), pp.302-310. 
24 Specifically, logograms and ideographic determinatives; cf. Appendix 1. 
25 Cf. also the mediæval Græco-Coptic scalæ, or topical word-lists. 
26 Kramer, J., Glossaria bilinguia altera (C. Gloss. Biling. II). Archiv für Papyrusforschung und verwandte Gebiete, Beiheft 8. (München/Leipzig:  
Saur, 2001). 
27 Cribiore, R., Review of Glossaria bilinguia altera (C. Gloss. Biling. II). Archiv für Papyrusforschung und verwandte Gebiete, Beiheft 8 by Johannes 
Kramer in Bryn Mawr Classical Review 2002.05.08.  
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Developments towards the provision of explanatory information beyond simple lexical glosses, including 
semantic, grammatical, or etymological, as well as factual material, represent intermediate cases between the 
simple glossaries of lexicography proper and the broader philological and exegetical tradition. Sluiter28 
identifies lexicographical texts of this type as belonging to one of several groups of Greek texts constituting 
the class of secondary literature: 
 
“lexica, paraphrases, the so-called “περί-literature” (“on” specific topics in ancient authors), ἐπιμερισμοί (exhaustive, 
word-for-word discussions), scholia, ζητήματα / ἀπορήματα / προβλήματα-literature with or without léseiš (sic) (that is, the 
identification of critical problems in ancient texts, sometimes with “solutions”), ÃpitomaÉ (sic), and commentaries 
(conventionally distinguished by the explicit presence of lÔmmata (sic) sections of the source-text that are then being 
explained).”29  
 
Moreover, there is a problematic aspect to the assignment of genre to a study at least partly belonging to a 
discipline responsible for assigning genre (philology) compounded not only by the apparently dual generic 
affiliation of the text, but also by the fact that it is not at all clear that secondary literature as such enjoyed a 
recognized status as a separate genre or range of genres within ancient classifications of literary form. 
Isocrates distinguishes as many prose as poetic τρόποι or ἰδέαι, but does not identify a category relevant in this 
context. Six prose genres were recognized by Callimachus (c. IIIrd B.C.) in his Πίνακες,30 including history, 
oratory, philosophy, and law. A reference in the full title of this work to paideia quite generally may indicate 
the possibility that grammarians (philologists) might be subsumed under the πίναξ τῶν παντοδαπῶν. Though 
later works tend to show greater interest in the subject,31 on the question of the specific sub-genre to which 
we ought to assign the Hieroglyphica, the text is, however, both explicit and technically precise. 
 
The exegetical themes employed in the interpretation of the hieroglyphic signary by Horapollo are therefore 
not merely legitimated by virtue of their Egyptian provenance, but in the context of Alexandrian hieroglyphic 
semiotics, are methodologically justified too. Therefore, even if, as a result of limited evidence for 
contemporary eidography on secondary forms of literature, difficulties present themselves concerning the 
                               
28 Sluiter, I., ‘The Dialectics of Genre: Some Aspects of Secondary Literature and Genre in Antiquity’ in Depew, M., & Obbink, D., Matrices of 
Genre: Authors, Canons, and Society (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2000), pp.183-203. 
29 Sluiter, I., (2000), p.183. 
30 In which ‘registers’ or ‘tables’ of individuals and their works are arranged either by genre or professional affiliation. 
31 Sluiter, I., (2000), pp.198-9. 
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possibility of classifying the Hieroglyphica as belonging to a specific genre, then still it is possible clearly to 
identify features of the text more overtly relevant to determining how one should (or indeed how its original 
readers did) go about reading it. In other words, situating the Hieroglyphica in particular lines of historical or 
generic development entails the imposition of certain artificial limits on the range of historical materials to 
which the genre may be thought applicable, or generic uses to which the material may be put. This results in 
the failure to recognise the significance of the text’s apparently mixed provenance, which is not as 
incongruous as it seems, but in fact signals a distinguishable purpose and associated methodology: the 
interpretation of hieroglyphic signs by means of natural signs. It is not that originally lexicographical or 
paradoxographical material have become mutually contaminated (a conclusion which requires the further 
hypothesis that the text is the product of a certain of historical development). Rather, the extension 
(ὑπέταξα)32 which comprises Book Two of the Hieroglyphica of those resources that were utilized in Book One 
indicates the presence of an increasingly productive hermeneutic. The impact of this would not be felt, 
therefore, in the development of the methodologies proper to dictionaries and encyclopædias, i.e.  definition, 
translation, or classification, but in semiotically determined genres. Upon the issue of a series of printed 
editions of the text in the course of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, it was to the tradition of 
emblematics as exemplified in Valeriano’s Hieroglyphica and Alciato’s Emblemata that the interpretative 
methodology of the Hieroglyphica thereafter made its extensive contribution.  
 
For practical convenience one might begin a review of the relationship between the Greek hieroglyphic 
tradition and the Egyptian by considering the range of signs and (in this context) the range of objects they 
depict (whatever they may signify) according to Gardiner’s sign-list. Here they are arranged in twenty-six 
categories (A to Aa, excluding J) each designating a group of related concepts: e.g. ‘man and  his occupations’ 
(A), ‘buildings, parts of buildings’ (O), ‘strokes, signs derived from hieratic, geometrical figures’ (Z). In the 
Greek tradition our first major historical source on the use of hieroglyphs is the second book of Herodotus 
(484-430/425 B.C.), who establishes several of the major classes of sign found in subsequent accounts: flora 
and fauna, monumental architecture, cultic activity &c.33 Similar groupings of hieroglyphic signs can be found 
in later sources too. Ammianus Marcellinus, for example, notes the vulture, bee, and ‘volucrum ferarumque 
genera multa […] et animalium species innumeras multas’,34 but other groupings also exist.35 Ultimately, relevant 
                               
32 Horapollo Gramm., Hieroglyphica 2.t.5. 
33 Herodotus Hist., 2.125.  
34 Ammianus Marcellinus, Rerum gestarum libri, 17.4; 22.15.  
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material might include any natural objects or phenomena (divine names, sacred animals, theosophy, comets 
&c.) thought to be susceptible of being signified in some sense: natural signs, written signs of sounds, or 
hieroglyphic signs of natural objects.36  
 
It seems clear, however, that the hieroglyphic categories found in the Greek sources are not arranged solely 
according to the orthographic constraints that influenced the Egyptian onomastica. For example, every 
hieroglyph identified by Clement of Alexandria not only has native Egyptian credentials, but they are cited in 
two passages in the Stromata reflecting on the symbolic style in philosophy and theology.37 Nor are these the 
only references in the Stromata to the explanatory value of a semiology that brings hieroglyphic orthography 
into alignment with the pursuit of natural science or philosophy.38 The model of the semiological curriculum 
(cosmology, moral virtues) has an instructive purpose, which, despite Clement’s assurance that this is how 
the Egyptians learn their letters39 is not confined to instruction in exclusively Egyptian practice. More 
importantly, there is a sense in which the model is justified by the fact that the Egyptians pursue a philosophy 
of their own (μετίασι γὰρ οἰκείαν τινὰ φιλοσοφίαν Αἰγύπτιοι·).40 Clement catalogues the subjects covered by this 
philosophy in a catalogue of thirty-six out of forty-two books which he enumerates in accordance with the 
order of a certain ceremonial procession.41 This catalogue of forty-two books comprises: two books of music, 
four books of astrology, one pædeutic and one moscophatic book, ten books concerning Egyptian worship, six 
medical books, ten ‘hieratic’, and eight with which the sacred scribe must acquaint himself.42 All but the six 
medical books are described as ‘containing the whole philosophy of the Egyptians’ (τὴν πᾶσαν Αἰγυπτίων 
περιεχούσας φιλοσοφίαν).43 Of particular relevance among these books is one of the eight books assigned to the 
scribe in the procession, one of which concerns τὰ [τε] ἱερογλυφικὰ καλούμενα:  
 
[T102] Ἑξῆς δὲ ὁ ἱερογραμματεὺς προέρχεται, ἔχων πτερὰ ἐπὶ 
τῆς κεφαλῆς βιβλίον τε ἐν χερσὶ καὶ κανοῦν, ἐν ᾧ τότε 
γραφικὸν μέλαν καὶ σχοῖνος ᾗ γράφουσι. τοῦτον τὰ [τε]  
ἱερογλυφικὰ καλούμενα περί τε τῆς κοσμογραφίας καὶ 
γεωγραφίας [τῆς τάξεως τοῦ ἡλίου καὶ τῆς σελήνης καὶ περὶ 
Next in order the sacred scribe proceeds, with wings on his 
head, and a book and rule in his hands, in which were 
writing ink and a reed, with which they write. And he must 
know what are called hieroglyphics, and about 
                                                                                               
35 Cf. Marcus Annaeus Lucanus, Bellum Civile, 3.220ff.; Cornelius Tacitus, Annales, 11.14; Apuleius Madaurensis, Metamorphoses, 11.22: cited 
in Maréstaing (1913). 
36 See below: Dionysius Thrax Gramm., Fragmenta 52.1-20 = Clemens Alexandrinus Theol., Stromata 5.8.45.4 [T202].  
37 Clemens Alexandrinus Theol., Stromata, 5.4.20.1-21.4 & 5.7.41.1-43.3.  
38 Additional reflections by Clement on the relative capacities of the Greek and Egyptian languages for expressing philosophical truth are 
also found at Stromata 1.21.143.6 & 6.4.35-37. I. 
39 Ultimately, a similarly inexact model is still a basic pedagogical tool for learners of hieroglyphic Egyptian. 
40 Clemens Alexandrinus Theol., Stromata, 6.4.35.2. 
41 Clemens Alexandrinus Theol., Stromata, 6.4.35-37. The remaining six books are medical.  
42 Clemens Alexandrinus Theol., Stromata 6.4.35-37. 
43 Clemens Alexandrinus Theol., Stromata 6.4.37.3.2-3. 
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τῶν πέντε πλανωμένων,] χωρογραφίας τε τῆς Αἰγύπτου καὶ τῆς 
τοῦ Νείλου διαγραφῆς περί τε τῆς [καταγραφῆς] <κατα>σκευῆς 
τῶν ἱερῶν καὶ τῶν ἀφιερωμένων αὐτοῖς χωρίων περί τε 
μέτρων ἐν τοῖς ἱεροῖς χρησίμων | εἰδέναι χρή.44  
cosmography and geography [the position of the sun and 
the moon, and about the five planets,] also the description 
of the land of Egypt, and the chart of the Nile and about the 
description of the accoutrements of the priests and of the 
places consecrated to them, and about the measures and 
the things in use in the sacred rites.  
 
Clement is explicit then that hieroglyphics formed part of the philosophy of the Egyptians in a way that even 
the medical books do not (though the latter might have been expected to be included in a Greek context). In 
contrast to the earlier Clementian passage alluded to above,45 which is limited to a demonstration a detailed 
systematic knowledge of the script for Greek knowledge of hieroglyphic Egyptian, the significance of this 
later sequence extends as far as legitimising the etymological and allegorical exegeses of hieroglyphs as they 
appear in the tradition. The questions raised by this distinction between exegesis as textual archæology and 
exegesis as textual redeployment are dealt with later, but even if in particular instances hieroglyphs were not 
used in the symbolic-allegorical manner among the Egyptians themselves, still the exegetical themes 
reflected genuinely hieroglyphic tradition.  
 
Any general account of hieroglyphic Egyptian offering philological and historical evidence in support of the 
reading it offers quite properly engages in an inductive method of enquiry with a view to attaining a correct 
theoretical account of the full complexity of the rules of hieroglyphic orthography.46 This, briefly put, is the 
approach employed in the decipherment endeavour, for which the recovery of the language of ancient Egyptian 
hieroglyphs is the principal objective. The sense (if not always the exact meaning) of the vast majority of 
extant hieroglyphic texts has been put beyond reasonable doubt following precisely this method, the 
principles of which are, for that reason, no longer in question. What is thought by the classical hieroglyphic 
tradition, on the other hand, to have been preserved in the specific context of the hieroglyphic signary and 
texts, is original, primitive, true, or ultimately perfect Egyptian wisdom. The idea is well-attested in the textual 
tradition of Egyptian wisdom literature itself,47 though the range of its generality in the classical sources is 
significantly extended.  
                               
44 Clemens Alexandrinus Theol., Stromata, 6.4.36.1.1–8.   
45 Clemens Alexandrinus Theol., Stromata 5.4.20.3-21.3 
46 Some are genuinely straightforward: spelling, for example. Others are exceedingly complex, as, for example, the ‘sportive’ writing of 
certain Ptolemaic texts. 
47 In the present context, the important feature is the particular Egyptian provenance of the notion of hieroglyphs embodying wisdom. 
Wisdom literature as such is not conceived of as a collection of adages and homilies intended exclusively as instruction on the ways and 
means of life in accordance with mAat  (truth, justice), but ought to exemplify the principles it espouses. The idea at stake (in wisdom as 
textual tradition), is that ensures its transmission precisely because in preserved (i.e. written) form. Wisdom does not stand at a remove 
from the text of which it is the subject. Even as the theme of the literature surrounding it, wisdom is part of the structure of that 
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Where knowledge of the original circumstances of Egyptian hieroglyphic usage is in decline, and the reception 
of the wisdom of ancient Egypt is a dominant concern, the rules historically applied are of less importance than 
the range of the hieroglyphic signs themselves and the possibilities of their use as an exegetical resource.48 
Neither the approach via Egyptian linguistic practice, nor via later exegetical strategies, however, has 
satisfactorily clarified the philosophical context (concerning theories of the origins and function of language 
or of linguistic signification), for either conception. Nor have they provided such independent justification as 
might be thought necessary for either the deployment of these strategies in explanation of hieroglyphs, or 
the particular suitability of hieroglyphs for the purposes to which they are put.  
 
  
                                                                                               
literature, not merely a decorative addition. In Plotinus’ account, an individual hieroglyph stands in the same unmediated relation to the 
wisdom after which it is fashioned. The broader conception of hieroglyphic Egyptian as the textual tradition of recorded ‘perfect speech’ 
(mDt-nfrt), capable of a divine ‘power’ (^δύναμις^) missing in Greek, is dealt with in more detail below. 
48 It may be helpful in this context to think of hieroglyphs each as one of several thousand playing cards in a hieroglyphic deck: each card 
has a face value – how the face values of cards in this hieroglyphic deck are played, however, necessitates an explanation of the rules of 
any game played with them.  
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§4. Hieroglyphic Wisdom 
 
Following van Bekkum’s analysis49 Sluiter recognizes a precursor for the emergence of the commentary form 
in the exegesis of sacred literature. Even as such a precursor, however, it represents a culmination of an 
exegetical tradition which originated not in textual studies, but in such things as “divine signs, 
meteorological phenomena, and possibly even oracles” (p. 185). These mirabilia not only provide certain clear 
parallels with the paradoxographical exegeses, but also indicate a possible rationale for the interpretative 
methodology. Moreover, this was a possibility concerning which glossography itself was perhaps not 
unaware. Fragment 52 of the grammarian Dionysius Thrax,50 for example, appears to point to a ‘conception of 
semiology as a science that can embrace, not only linguistic, but also natural signs’.51  
 
[T103] Ἀλλὰ καὶ Διονύσιος ὁ Θρᾷξ ὁ γραμματικὸς ἐν τῷ Περὶ 
τῆς ἐμφάσεως περὶ τοῦ τῶν τροχίσκων συμβόλου φησὶ κατὰ 
λέξιν· “ἐσήμαινον γοῦν οὐ διὰ λέξεως μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ 
συμβόλων ἔνιοι τὰς πράξεις, διὰ λέξεως μὲν ὡς ἔχει τὰ 
λεγόμενα Δελφικὰ παραγγέλματα, τὸ ‘μηδὲν ἄγαν’ καὶ τὸ 
‘γνῶθι σαυτόν’ καὶ τὰ τούτοις ὅμοια, διὰ δὲ συμβόλων ὡς ὅ τε 
τροχὸς ὁ στρεφόμενος ἐν τοῖς τῶν θεῶν τεμένεσιν εἱλκυσμένος 
παρὰ Αἰγυπτίων καὶ τὸ τῶν θαλλῶν τῶν διδομένων τοῖς 
προσκυνοῦσι. φησὶ γὰρ Ὀρφεὺς ὁ Θρᾴκιος· †θαλλῶν δ' ὅσσα 
βροτοῖσιν ἐπὶ χθονὸς ἔργα μέμηλεν, οὐδὲν ἔχει μίαν αἶσαν ἐπὶ 
φρεσὶν, ἀλλὰ κυκλεῖται πάντα πέριξ, στῆναι δὲ καθ' ἓν μέρος οὐ 
θέμις ἐστίν, ἀλλ' ἔχει, ὡς ἤρξαντο, δρόμου μέρος ἶσον ἕκαστος. 
οἱ θαλλοὶ ἤτοι τῆς πρώτης τροφῆς σύμβολον ὑπάρχουσιν, ἢ 
ὅπως ἐπιστῶνται οἱ πολλοὶ τοὺς μὲν καρποὺς δι' ὅλου θάλλειν 
καὶ αὔξεσθαι διαμένοντας ἐπὶ τὸ πλεῖστον, σφᾶς δὲ αὐτοὺς 
ὀλίγον εἰληχέναι τὸν τῆς ζωῆς χρόνον, τούτου χάριν δίδοσθαι 
τοὺς θαλλοὺς βούλονται, ἴσως δὲ καὶ ἵνα ἐπιστῶνται, ὅτι, ὡς 
οὗτοι {αὖ} καίονται, οὕτως καὶ <αὐ>τοὺς δεῖ τοῦτον τὸν βίον 
ταχέως ἐκλιπεῖν καὶ πυρὸς ἔργον γενέσθαι.”52  
Also Dionysius Thrax, the grammarian, in his book, 
Respecting the Exposition of the Symbolical Signification in 
Circles, says expressly, “Some signified actions not by 
words only, but also by symbols: by words, as is the case of 
what are called the Delphic maxims, ‘Nothing in excess,’ 
‘Know thyself,’ and the like; and by symbols, as the wheel 
that is turned in the temples of the gods, derived from the 
Egyptians, and the branches that are given to the 
worshippers. For the Thracian Orpheus says: ‘Whatever 
works of branches are a care to men on earth, not one has 
one fate in the mind, but all things revolve around; and it is 
not lawful to stand at one point, but each one keeps an 
equal part of the race as they began.’ The branches either 
stand as the symbol of the first food, or they are that the 
multitude may know that fruits spring and grow 
universally, remaining a very long time; but that the 
duration of life allotted to themselves is brief. And it is on 
this account that they will have it that the branches are 
given; and perhaps also that they may know, that as these, 
on the other hand, are burned, so also they themselves 
speedily leave this life, and will become fuel for fire.”  
 
                               
49 Van Bekkum, W., Houben, J., Sluiter, I., & Versteegh, K., The Emergence of Semantics in Four Linguistic Traditions, Hebrew, Sanskrit, Greek, 
Arabic (Amsterdam & Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 1997). 
50 Linke, K., Die Fragmente des Grammatikers Dionysios Thrax (Berlin, New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1977): pp.30-1 & notes. 
51 Dyck, A. R., Review of Die Fragmente des Grammatikers Dionysios Thrax by Konstanze Linke, Die Fragmente der Grammatiker Tyrannion und 
Diokles by Walter Haas, & Apions Glossai Homerikai by Susanne Neitzel in Classical Philology, Vol.77, No. 3. (Jul., 1982): pp.270-277. Cf. the dual 
rôle as ἑρμηνεύματα and συνθήματα of certain of the Greek Magical Papyri, in this latter respect particularly, may point to an Egyptian 
precursor. See PGM II, ll.17-20; PGM III, l.701; PGM IV, l.945. 
52 Dionysius Thrax Gramm., Fragmenta 52.1-20 = Clemens Alexandrinus Theol., Stromata 5.8.45.4.  
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Moreover, not only does the source for the fragment provide a significant link not only to the broader subject 
of symbolism, but to that of hieroglyphic symbolism in particular, but such a conception of the peculiar 
suitability of hieroglyphic Egyptian for sacred texts is also fully in accord with Egyptian practice itself, since 
at this period demotic was in such wide use for administrative purposes that hieroglyphs had become the 
medium of preference for formulaic and ritualistic use.53 Egyptian wisdom literature ensures its transmission 
precisely because it exemplifies mAat (truth, justice) preserved in written form.54  
 
[T104] Ἑρμῆς μὲν γὰρ ὁ διδάσκαλός μου, πολλάκις μοι 
διαλεγόμενος καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ τοῦ Τὰτ ἐνίοτε παρόντος, ἔλεγεν ὅτι 
δόξει τοῖς ἐντυγχάνουσί μου τοῖς βιβλίοις ἁπλουστάτη εἶναι ἡ 
σύνταξις καὶ σαφής, ἐκ δὲ τῶν ἐναντίων ἀσαφὴς οὖσα καὶ 
κεκρυμμένον τὸν νοῦν τῶν λόγων ἔχουσα, καὶ ἔτι ἀσαφεστάτη, 
τῶν Ἑλλήνων ὕστερον βουληθέντων τὴν ἡμετέραν διάλεκτον 
εἰς τὴν ἰδίαν μεθερμηνεῦσαι, ὅπερ ἔσται τῶν γεγραμμένων 
μεγίστη διαστροφή τε καὶ ἀσάφεια. ὁ δὲ λόγος τῇ πατρῴᾳ 
διαλέκτῳ ἑρμηνευόμενος ἔχει σαφῆ τὸν τῶν λόγων νοῦν. καὶ 
γὰρ αὐτὸ τὸ τῆς φωνῆς ποιὸν καὶ ἡ τῶν Αἰγυπτίων ^δύναμις^ 
ὀνομάτων ἐν ἑαυτῇ ἔχει τὴν ἐνέργειαν τῶν λεγομένων. ὅσον 
οὖν δυνατόν ἐστί σοι, βασιλεῦ, πάντα δὲ δύνασαι, τὸν λόγον 
διατήρησον ἀνερμήνευτον, ἵνα μήτε εἰς Ἕλληνας ἔλθῃ τοιαῦτα 
μυστήρια, μήτε ἡ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ὑπερήφανος φράσις καὶ 
ἐκλελυμένη καὶ ὥσπερ κεκαλλωπισμένη ἐξίτηλον ποιήσῃ τὸ 
σεμνὸν καὶ στιβαρόν, καὶ τὴν ἐνεργητικὴν τῶν ὀνομάτων 
φράσιν. Ἕλληνες γάρ, ὦ βασιλεῦ, λόγους ἔχουσι κενοὺς 
ἀποδείξεων ἐνεργητικούς, καὶ αὕτη ἐστὶν Ἑλλήνων φιλοσοφία, 
λόγων ψόφος. ἡμεῖς δὲ οὐ λόγοις χρώμεθα. ἀλλὰ φωναῖς 
μεσταῖς τῶν ἔργων.55  
For my teacher Hermes often used to say in talk with me 
when we were alone, and sometimes when Tat was with us, 
that those who read my writings will think them to be 
quite simply and clearly written, but those who hold 
opposite principles to start with will say the style is 
obscure, and conceals the meaning. And it will be thought 
still more obscure in time to come, when the Greeks think 
fit to translate these writings from our tongue into theirs. 
Translation will greatly distort the sense of the writings, 
and cause much obscurity. Expressed in our native 
language, the teaching conveys its meaning clearly; for the 
very quality of the sounds and the ^power^ of the Egyptian 
words has in it the force of the things signified. Therefore, 
my King, as far as it is in your power, and you are all-
powerful, keep the teaching untranslated, in order that 
secrets so holy may not be revealed to Greeks, and that the 
Greek mode of speech, with its disdainfulness, and 
feebleness, and showy tricks of style, may not reduce to 
impotence the impressive strength of the language, and the 
cogent force of the words. For the speech of the Greeks, my 
King, is devoid of power to convince; and the Greek 
philosophy is nothing but a noise of talk. But our speech is 
not mere talk; it is an utterance replete with workings.56  
                               
53 See Diodorus Siculus Hist., Bibliotheca historica (lib. 1-20) 3.3.5.  
54 Apart from issues of translation arising from the use of loan-words, and issues of ritual power in the alternation between Egyptian and 
Greek in the PGM & PDM, cf. e.g. Clemens Alexandrinus Theol., Stromata 5.7.41.2.1-2: Ὅμοια γοῦν τοῖς Ἑβραϊκοῖς κατά γε τὴν ἐπίκρυψιν καὶ τὰ 
τῶν Αἰγυπτίων αἰνίγματα; the distinction conferred upon the king whereby he had access to the secret teachings of the priests is also the 
topic of Plutarchus Biogr., Phil., De Iside et Osiride, 9.354 B-C: τῆς φιλοσοφίας ἐπικεκρυμμένης τὰ πολλά; cf. also Corpus Hermeticum Phil., 
Theol., Fragmenta 23.7.1-9:  
Ἑρμῆς μὲν οὖν ἀπελογεῖτο τῷ περιέχοντι ὡς οὐδὲ τῷ παιδὶ παρέδωκεν 
ὁλοτελῆ θεωρίαν διὰ τὸ ἔτι τῆς ἡλικίας νεοειδές, ἔγνω δὲ τῆς ἀνατολῆς 
γενομένης τοῖς πάντα βλέπουσιν ὀφθαλμοῖς τὰ τῆς ἀνατολῆς θεωρήσας 
τι ἀειδές, καὶ ἐπισκοποῦντι βραδέως μὲν ἀλλ' οὖν ἦλθεν ἡ ἀκριβὴς 
διάγνωσις πλησίον τῶν Ὀσίριδος κρυφίων ἀποθέσθαι τὰ ἱερὰ τῶν 
κοσμικῶν στοιχείων σύμβολα, ἐπικατευξάμενον δὲ καὶ τοὺς λόγους 
τούσδε εἰπόντα εἰς οὐρανὸν ἀπελθεῖν.54 
But Hermes did not transmit the doctrine in its full completeness 
even to his own son, because he was still in his early youth. I have 
beheld with the all-seeing eyes of the rising that came to be and as 
I have examined the things the unseen things of the rising, there 
came to me by slow degrees, but came in very deed, accurate 
knowledge to set down hard by the secret things of Osiris these 
holy symbols of the cosmic elements, and after speaking over them 
a prayer, depart to heaven.  
 
55 Corpus Hermeticum, Ὅροι Ἀσκληπιοῦ πρὸς Ἄμμωνα βασιλέα 1.5-2.13.  
56 See Scott, W., (ed.) Hermetica, The Ancient Greek and Latin Writings which contain Religious or Philosophic Teachings ascribed to Hermes 
Trismegistus (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1925; reissued 1st vol.Shambhala: Boston, 1993): vol.1, p.263. 
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Though a possible objection to the idea is acknowledged in the observation that there are those who will say 
the style of the Hermetic texts is ‘obscure and conceals the meaning’, the text limits the source of the 
criticism to ‘those who hold opposite principles to start with’.57 Seeking the meaning of the words in the 
original Egyptian language, it is suggested, will remove the obscurity and render the structure of the books 
‘quite straightforward and clear’ (ἁπλουστάτη καὶ σαφής).58 Copenhaver further notes that Derchain recognises 
an Egyptian-conceived ‘definition of the function of language’ and that Fowden reads ‘evidence of Egyptian 
linguistic nativism’ in what he calls the ‘conceit’ regarding ineffectual translations from the Egyptian into the 
Greek language.59 Nonetheless, strong Platonizing undercurrents inform the contrast between ‘arrogant and 
showy Greek speech’ (^ὑπερήφανος^ φράσις … καὶ ὥσπερ κεκαλλωπισμένη), on the one hand, as exemplified in 
Greek philosophy, punningly referred to as ‘the noise of talk’ (φιλοσοφία, λόγων ψόφος), and, on the other 
hand, ‘the ^power^ of the Egyptian words’ (ἡ τῶν Αἰγυπτίων ^δύναμις^ ὀνομάτων), which ‘has the force of the 
things signified’ (ἔχει τὴν ἐνέργειαν τῶν λεγομένων).60 Clement too makes the point; nor is he the only patristic 
source to raise the matter.61  
 
The particular power inherent in Egyptian for theological purposes, which both Hermeticism and 
Neoplatonism endorse, and the doctrine of untranslatability it entails, is at least in part reversed in the corpus 
of Greek and Demotic magical papyri. These often bilingual texts not only frequently intersperse a 
predominantly Greek or Demotic sequence with both shorter and longer passages in the other of the two 
languages, they also impute a ritual power and significance peculiar to Greek itself.62 In these sequences 
correctly inflected Greek glosses on the Demotic text are introduced, along with Greek loan-words, suggesting 
a translation of a Greek original into Demotic preserving magically significant Greek features in order not to 
undermine the power inherent therein. The Neoplatonic injunction concerning the untranslatability of 
original languages here actually provides a model for a situation in which Greek is accorded magical priority 
over Egyptian.  
 
                               
57 See Scott, W., (ed.) Hermetica, The Ancient Greek and Latin Writings which contain Religious or Philosophic Teachings ascribed to Hermes 
Trismegistus (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1925; reissued 1st vol.Shambhala: Boston, 1993): vol.1, p.263; vol.2, p.436.  
58 Similar observations are made in Plutarchus Biogr., Phil., De Iside et Osiride, 10.354E27-F3: τῶν γὰρ καλουμένων ἱερογλυφικῶν γραμμάτων 
οὐθεν ἀπολείπει τὰ πολλὰ τῶν Πυθαγορικῶν παραγγελμάτων. 
59 Copenhaver, Hermetica: The Greek Corpus Hermeticum and the Latin Asclepius in a new English translation, with notes and introduction 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992): pp.201-2.  
60 The reading ^δύναμις^ is recommended by the testimonium of Nicephorus Gregoras Hist., Scr. Rerum Nat. despite Nock’s conjecture: 
^ἠχώ^.   
61 Cf. Origenes Theol., Contra Celsum 5.45.7ff.  
62 Magica Magica, Nat. Hist. PDM xiv (P.Lugd. Bat. J 383 = Anastasi 65; P Lond. demot. 10070 = Anastasi 1072): ll.93-114.  
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The corpus of Greek and Demotic magical papyri is of interest in this connection to the extent it exemplifies 
several of the features of the symbolic method in practice. Three terms from these texts are of particular 
relevance: σύμβολα μυστικὰ, ἑρμηνεύματα, and συνθήματα.63 Each reoccurs in the contexts of the endeavour to 
synthesize the Greek and Egyptian hieroglyphic traditions, the mystery-terminology of Clement’s analysis of 
hieroglyphs, and the methodology employed in their exegesis in, for example, Iamblichus. The third term, 
most distinctively, also suggests a connection between the thematic force of the glyphs chosen for exegesis in 
Clement (and sources) and the formulæ for magical syntheses or compounds, particularly since συνθήματα is 
also readable as ‘signs’ or ‘tokens’. Not only does the principle involved in both cases seem to involve the 
same hermeneutic principles, but the ingredients of the compounds (i.e. elements in the syntheses) for the 
latter correspond, sometimes in specific detail, 64  with hieroglyphs given allegorical symbolic exegesis 
elsewhere. In one instance65 actual examples of hieroglyphic script are specified in the context of securing 
secrecy about what is revealed in initiation into the mysteries by means of what are generally referred to in 
Demotic as examples of ghalagter (χαρακτήρ). Of the five glyphs used here, at least four are genuinely Egyptian. 
They are, in full: (i) a geometric arrow design; (ii) the xpr-scarab; (iii) the wDAt-eye; (iv) two sticks crossed; and 
(v) a sitting dog. The sequence as composed cannot be translated according to standard Egyptian grammar,66 
however, if the sequence is read as a σύμβολον according to the sort of principles applied by Clement, the 
elements in synthetic combination can be read as establishing (rather than being justified by) their mutual 
interrelations.  
 
Only two Greek titles specifically concerned with the Egyptian language are extant from the period (the 
Ίερογλυφικά of Chæremon and Horapollo respectively) and only one (the latter) survives intact. There is some 
precedent in the secondary literature for adducing several of the elements of the hieroglyphic traditions as 
detailed above in an effort to emphasize both the generic affiliations and, in fact, sources of Horapollo’s 
Hieroglyphica. What is absent from these attempts is an account of the tensions between the common features 
in which the text shares with the preceding pagan traditions and the contrasting Coptic and Christian 
response to hieroglyphic Egyptian and its rôle in 5th century Egyptian polemic. The following chapter 
addresses the possibility of reading the Hieroglyphica, as it were, from without, from the vantage-point of 
Coptic Christianity, engaged in that polemic as part of a pagan revivalist movement in late 5th century Egypt.   
                               
63 See PGM II, ll.17-20; PGM III, l.701; PGM IV, l.945.  
64 PGM XII, col.XII, ll.402-409.  
65 PDM xiv. ll.117-149.  
66 Johnson, in Betz, H. D., The Greek Magical Papyri in Translation including the Demotic Spells (University of Chicago Press: 1986): p.22, n.77.  
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Chapter Two: The Coptic-Pagan Controversy 
 
§1 Author and Text 
 
In a counter-petition filed against his estranged wife, a landowner in Phænebythis named Flavius Horapollo, 
the son of Asclepiades, identifies himself as ‘the clarissimus and eloquent philosopher’: 
 
[T201] [⳨ Αντιρρητικοι λιβελλοι παρ εμō Ωραπο]λλω[νος 
Ασκληπιαδου, το]υ λαμπρο-τατου κ[⳽ ελλογ]ιμ φιλοσο[φου], 
κεκτημ εν Φενεβυθει67 
Counter-petition laid by Horapollo, son of Asclepiades, the 
very renowned and very eloquent philosopher, land-owner 
in Phænebythis.  
 
Suda Ω 159 records two Horapollones, (usually identified as grandfather and grandson), both grammatici. The 
elder Horapollo (fl. 408 A.D. - 450 A.D.) of Phænebythis (a village in the Egyptian nome of Panopolis), taught in 
Alexandria, and afterwards, under Theodosius II, in Constantinople. He was author of an enquiry into sacred 
enclosures or temples (Τεμενικά), commentaries (ὑπομνήματα) on Sophocles and Alcaeus, and a volume 
entitled Εἰς Ὅμηρον, the choice of these three authors possibly reflecting an intention to provide a treatment 
of each of the three genres of tragedy, lyric, and epic.68 A third Horapollo is named in P. Bod. 1.73.3.10 (reign of 
Heraclius) – here an inhabitant of the Herakliopolite nome.69  
 
The single most important source of biographical information on the younger Horapollo comes from 
Damascius’ Vita Isidori. In it are charted the philosophical careers of the late 5th and early 6th century 
Neoplatonists in Athens, Alexandria, Aphrodisias, and Apamea – the diadochi of the aurea catena comprising 
municipal chair-holders in the Platonic schools and their circle. According to Damascius’ account, the elder 
Horapollo had two sons, Asclepiades and Heraiscus, under both of whom Isidore studied.70 Flavius Horapollo 
of Menouthis (fl. 474 A.D. - 491 A.D.) or ‘Psychapollo’,71 was the son of Asclepiades and both the nephew and 
son-in-law of Heraiscus, with whom he was arrested and tortured under Zeno’s persecution of the pagans.72 
Formerly the author of the Hieroglyphica was identified with Horapollo the elder, but subsequent work by 
                               
67 Horapollo Gramm., Exemplar antirrheticum 1.1–2 = P.Cair. Masp.3 67295 = Maspero, J., ‘Horapollon et la fin du paganisme égyptien’ in 
Bulletin de l’Institut Français d’Archéologie Orientale 11 (1914): pp.163-95.  
68 Cf. Dionysius Halicarnassensis Hist., Rhet., De compositione verborum 24.21-30.  
69 Litinas, N., Hierakapollon, the Title of Panos Polis and the Names in –apollon (University of Crete: Workshop of Papyrology and Epigraphy): 
p.103.  
70 Damascius himself studied rhetoric at Horapollo’s school. See Athanassiadi, P., (ed.) Damascius: The Philosophical History text with 
translation and notes (Athens: Apamea, 1999): p. 20.  
71 Zacharias Mytilenaeus Rhet., Vita Severi 32.  
72 See Damascius Phil., Vita Isidori (ap.Sudam, Hesychium, Photium et e cod. Vat. 1950) 314.1-9; 317.1-8.  
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Maspero73 and then Rémondon74 have identified Horapollo Νειλῷος with the younger man. Kaster thinks the 
matter ‘uncertain’ and counsels caution, though he goes on to argue that ‘the name “Horapollon” itself makes 
it virtually certain that H. [i.e. Fl. Horapollo] was a descendant of the gramm. Horapollon’.75 On the grounds 
that postulating a third Horapollo, also belonging to the same family, is perhaps less cautious than accepting 
an identification with one of the afore-mentioned bearers of the name I follow Maspero and Rémondon, 
whose analyses of the testimonia of Damascius’ Vita Isidori make the identification very likely indeed.  
 
The younger Horapollo continued to maintain the school in Alexandria with which his family had long been 
associated.76 Described as both γραμματικός and φιλόσοφος, it has been supposed77 that either some degree of 
social positioning by means of the deliberate appropriation of philosophical status to set his work apart from 
‘mere’ grammar is involved, or, alternatively, that a contrast between professional affiliation and private 
interest is indicated. On the other hand, I see no reason not to concede that he was in fact both and the 
purpose of the following is, accordingly, to argue that the claims for his philosophical accomplishment made 
in the counter-petition is not merely plausible (and not by virtue of the testimonia alone), but also substantive, 
formally, methodologically, and in terms of exegetical content.  
 
Insofar as the testimonia are concerned, it is known that Heraiscus (the son of the elder Horapollo, and the 
brother of the younger Horapollo) addressed one of his books to Proclus, who, according to Damascius, 
apparently had considerable respect for the former’s work.  
 
[T202] λέγεται δὲ καὶ ὁ Πρόκλος ἑαυτοῦ ἀμείνω τὸν Ἡραΐσκον 
ὁμολογεῖν· ἃ μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸς ᾔδει καὶ ἐκεῖνον εἰδέναι, ἃ δὲ 
Ἡραΐσκος οὐκέτι Πρόκλον.78  
They say that even Proclus is said to agree that Heraiscus 
was his superior; for [it is said that] what he himself knew 
the latter also knew, but [that] what Heraiscus Proclus still 
did not.  
 
In another passage concerning the death and burial of Heraiscus (Horapollo’s uncle) prepared by Asclepiades 
(Horapollo’s father), about whom Horapollo also writes in the document quoted in [T201] as one of the pious 
dead he too had attained sainthood.79  
                               
73 Maspero, J., ‘Horapollon et la fin du paganisme égyptien’ in Bulletin de l’Institut Français d’Archéologie Orientale 11 (1914): pp.163-95.  
74 Rémondon, R., ‘L’Égypte et la suprême résistance au christianisme (Ve-VIIe siècles)’ in BIFAO 51 (1952): pp.63-78.  
75 Kaster, R. A., Guardians of Language: The Grammarian and Society in Late Antiquity (Berkeley & Los Angeles: University of California Press, 
1988): pp.294-7.  
76 Maspero, J., ‘Horapollo et la fin du paganisme égyptien’ in Bulletin de l’Institut Français d’Archéologie Orientale 11 (1914): pp.165-6.  
77 Zacharias Mytilenaeus Rhet., Vita Severi 32; see also Maspéro (1914): pp.178, n.1.  
78 Damascius Phil., Vita Isidori (ap.Photium, Bibl. codd. 181, 242) 107.15–6.  
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[T203] οὕτω μὲν ζῶντι συνῆν ἀεί τι θεοειδές· ἀποθανόντι δέ, 
ἐπειδὴ τὰ νομιζόμενα τοῖς ἱερεῦσιν ὁ Ἀσκληπιάδης ἀποδιδόναι 
παρεσκευάζετο τά τε ἄλλα καὶ τὰς Ὀσίριδος ἐπὶ τῷ σώματι 
περιβολάς, αὐτίκα φωτὶ κατελάμπετο πανταχῇ τῶν σινδόνων 
ἀπόρρητα διαγράμματα, καὶ περὶ αὐτὰ καθεωρᾶτο φασμάτων 
εἴδη θεοπρεπῆ ἐπιδεικνύντων τὴν ψυχὴν ἐναργῶς, ποίοις ἄρα 
θεοῖς ἐγεγόνει συνέστιος.80  
Thus in life something godlike always attended him; and in 
death, when Asclepiades prepared to render him the 
honours prescribed for the priests and in particular the 
garments of Osiris on his body, ineffable figures on the 
burial cloths immediately shone everywhere, and around 
them there could be clearly seen the divine forms of visions 
which distinctly revealed his soul, and so with those gods it 
now shared its abode.  
 
Postponing for the moment the question of why they are described as ‘ineffable’, 81  it hardly seems 
conceivable but that the ‘figures’ (διαγράμματα) bathed in light be any other than hieroglyphs and the overall 
impression of the affiliations and professional commitments of the family and associated school is both 
philosophical and rhetorical/grammatical, and that in an overtly late Neoplatonic mould as it is characterized 
by Damascius.82  
 
The Hieroglyphics of Horus Apollo Nilous (Ὥρου Ἀπόλλωνος Νειλώου Ἱερογλυφικά, Horapollonis Niloi 
Hieroglyphica) has a print history five hundred years old. The work is a study of hieroglyphic writing 
comprising the explanations of two hundred and forty meanings of one hundred and eighty-six ‘Egyptian’ 
hieroglyphs in a series of one hundred and eighty-nine chapters in two books. Though most popular during 
the sixteenth century, the textual tradition survives through editions once every generation or two into the 
twentieth century, which saw at least five more, including a new editio optima. All editions have of course 
focussed principally on the Greek text itself, or on offering a translation of it, more often than not into Latin, 
though also into French, Italian, English, German, and Spanish.83  
 
The first manuscript84 containing the Hieroglyphica to be brought to European public attention in the Early 
Modern period was, according to a late subscriptio appearing on folio 75r, bought on the island of Andros in the 
Ægean in June 1419 by Cristoforo, presbyter of Bundelmonti. It contained three texts. They were: 
Philostratus’ Vita Apollonii Tyanensis, Horapollo’s Hieroglyphica, and Proclus’ Elementa Physica. The first is 
written in two different manuscript hands, the latter two texts in a third. In addition to the Vita Apollonii and 
                                                                                               
79 P. Cair. Masp. 3 67295 = BIFAO 11.165-166.  
80 Damascius Phil., Vita Isidori (ap.Sudam, Hesychium, Photium et e cod. Vat. 1950) 174.12–17.  
81 On the use of hieroglyphs independently of spoken language see Iamblichus Phil., De mysteriis 7.1.7-11 and Chapter Three, §§.2-3.  
82 Damascius Phil., In Phaedonem (versio 1) 172.1-3.  
83 See Bibliography (A) (ii).  
84 Bibliotheca Laurentiana Medicea, Florentiæ: Plutei 69: Codex 27. 
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the Elementa Physica, both of which appear together with the Hieroglyphica elsewhere,85 Aristotle’s Ethica ad 
Eudemum also appears as a companion piece in several other manuscripts.86 However, despite the presence of 
Harpocration’s Lexicon in Bibliotheca Vaticana græc. 871 (perhaps suggestive of an early opinion as to the 
text’s generic affiliations), in general, the texts associated with the Hieroglyphica in the manuscript sources are 
too varied a miscellany to indicate any judgement as to formal genre characteristics which might have 
informed the inclusion of the Hieroglyphica amongst them. With it were included Pletho’s Magica eloquia 
Magorum in both B. V. græc. 1011 and Bibliotheca Cardinalis Radulphi: Codex 49 and in October 1505 the first 
printed text of Horapollo was issued in an Aldine edition bound with Æsop’s Vita et Fabellæ, the writings of 
several other Greek fabulists, and a Collectio proverbiorum. Whether or not this may provide some indication of 
the kinds of associations the text had at that time, it is in general reasonable to suppose that these are 
precisely the kind of associations that either informed or were developed as part of later judgements as to 
possible interpretative strategies.87 Even into the modern period we find Gardiner, for example, claiming that 
the text comprises ‘mystical assertions’, ‘grotesque allegorical reasons’ and ‘fantastic explanations’.88  
 
In edited versions of the text Book One comprises seventy sections containing seventy hieroglyphs covering 
one hundred and thirteen meanings; Book Two, one hundred and nineteen sections of one hundred and 
sixteen glyphs with one hundred and twenty-seven meanings. That these divisions are the work of the editors 
poses few significant problems in this context since there is little room for doubt as to where each (typically 
short) explanation, or sequence of explanations, begins and ends.89 In other words, it is unproblematic to 
observe that the ratio of meanings per glyph is significantly lower in Book Two, where the meaning 
prefigures the glyph, than in Book One, where the movement is vice versa. The chapters of Book One are 
fewer, though those of Book Two are on the whole briefer. All of which lends weight to the claim of the incipit 
to Book Two, according to which it is largely90 the work of a subsequent editor (called Philip in the incipit to 
Book One) of Horapollo’s original book.  
 
                               
85 Monacense græc. 419 (the only other c. 14th manuscript) and Bibliotheca Veneta Divi Marci: Codex 391, respectively.  
86 E.g., Bibliotheca Laurentiana Medicea, Florentiæ: Plutei 81: Codex 15; ibid., Plutei 81: Codex 20; & al.  
87 See, e.g., Athanasius Kircher, Prodromus Coptus sive Aegyptiacus. Ad Eminentiss. Principem S.R.E. Cardinalem Franciscum Barberinum. in quo 
Cum linguae Coptae, sive Aegyptiacae, quondam Pharaonicae origo, aetas, vicissitudo, inclinatio; tum hieroglyphicae literaturae instauratio, uti per 
varia variarum eruditionum, interpretationumque difficillimarum specimina, ita nova quoque et insolita methodo exhibentur (Rome: Typis S. Cong. 
de propag: Fide, 1636).  
88 Gardiner, Sir A. H., Egyptian Grammar (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1927).  
89 On the structure, uniformity and variation of each section, see below: §2. The Representative Mode of Hieroglyphic Expression.  
90 Van De Walle & Vergote argue that perhaps the first thirty and last two entries of Book Two may also be original, i.e. predate Philip’s 
editorial work, on the grounds that they too include evidence of (knowledge of) genuinely Egyptian material; ‘Traduction des 
Hieroglyphica d’Horapollon’ in Chronique d’Égypte 18 (1943): 39-89, 199-239; addenda ibid., 22 (1947): pp. 251-59.  
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On the one hand, insofar as it exhibits features in common with surviving Egyptian onomastica and Greek or 
Roman bilingual glossaries, Horapollo’s Hieroglyphica may (as historically has in fact been common) be 
situated generically within the tradition of historical linguistics. In a related context (also historically 
conspicuous as an approach to the text) it also exhibits features in common with late Imperial or early 
mediæval encyclopædias and natural history miscellanies, which, though materially related to the glossaries, 
can, on the other hand, be situated generically within an exegetical tradition encompassing, for example, the 
c. 5th-6th encyclopædias of Martianus Capella and Cassiodor, or the Etymologiæ sive Origines of Isidore of Seville, 
which, on this view, it prefigures.91 The long-standing precedent of these approaches has, however, given rise 
to an apparent incongruity: is the purpose of the text as a matter of fact glossographical (and therefore 
subject to critique arising out of developments within the decipherment project), or encyclopædic and 
therefore to be assessed purely as a compendium of natural lore? The incongruity of a text half glossary, half 
encyclopædia is, however, so I shall argue, wholly illusory. It is an illusion that arises precisely because the 
Hieroglyphica has typically been read as a catalogue of linguistic and physiological claims, on which basis, both 
as linguistic and natural history, it has been found unsatisfactory.  
 
Since the propositional analysis has failed to clarify the nature of the relationship between the natural and 
the hieroglyphic material, what I wish to argue instead is that under these circumstances it seems reasonable 
to look for an interpretation of the text as one which offers an interpretation, rather than a series of claims. 
The assumption that the Hieroglyphics is as a work of historical linguistics and natural history therefore needs to 
be reassessed in light of the methodological motivation for its structure. My starting-point for this is that the 
text is both explicit in its hermeneutic objectives and structurally unambiguous in the application thereof.  
 
There is little rubric or preliminary framing to the text as presented, but there are brief statements at the 
beginning and end of each of the two books. The incipit to the second book reads:  
 
[T204] ΩΡΑΠΟΛΛΩΝΟΣ ΝΕΙΛΩΟΥ τῆς τῶν παρ’ Αἰγυπτίοις 
ἱερογλυφικῶν γραμμάτων ἑρμηνείας ΒΙΒΛΙΟΝ ΔΕΥΤΕΡΟΝ. Διὰ 
δὲ τῆς δευτέρας πραγματείας, περὶ τῶν λοιπῶν τὸν λὸγον ὑγιῆ 
σοι παραστήσομαι ἃ δὲ καὶ ἐξ ἄλλων ἀντιγράφων, οὐκ ἔχοντά 
τινα ἐξήγησιν, ἀναγκαίως ὑπέταξα.92  
The SECOND BOOK OF HORAPOLLO OF THE NILE on the 
interpretation of the hieroglyphic writings among the 
Egyptians. Now, in this second treatise I will set forth for 
you a sound account of the remaining ones which, having 
no explanation, I have necessarily added from other copies 
                               
91 Cf. Hüllen, W., (1999), English Dictionaries, 800-1100: The Topical Tradition (Oxford: Oxford University Press): pp.43 ff.  
92 Horapollo Gramm., Hieroglyphica, 2.t.1–5.  
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too.  
 
The terms ἑρμηνεία and ἐξήγησις crucially refer to genres of interpretative endeavour.93 An inventory of the 
hieroglyphic signs explained in the text (and comprising glyphic depictions of items of almost always 
identifiably Egyptian provenance), arranged according to thematic relationships, provides an index rerum in 
parallel with the index signorum. Thus the realia fall into the same categories as the hieroglyphic signs they are 
intended to explain: mammals, birds, fish, cosmological phenomena, as well as man and his occupations.94 The 
corresponding exegeses, therefore, draw precisely on resources which collate information on the realia the 
depictions of which the exegeses are intended to explain. However, an investigation designed to determine 
the extent of the influence of such resources on the exegetical content of the Hieroglyphica, except insofar as 
this might further support observations on the aggregation of source-materials, will provide only a 
reconstruction of the line of historical continuity of the content preserved by the text, and not a clarification 
of the conditions under which they are presented. Specifically in the Hieroglyphica, then, uncovering the 
underlying principle of exegetic judgement will have to be determined by the precise nature of the 
relationship between the hieroglyphic signs and natural signs established in the interpretative exegeses 
themselves, rather than through source-criticism.  
 
The text is certainly very unlikely to have been originally written in Egyptian (even in part), or to have 
appeared in Egyptian at any subsequent point,95 and the manuscript text itself is in fact in Greek. The 
attribution by an apparent redactor named Philip of the material treated (mostly in Book One) to Horos Apollon 
is nonetheless unlikely to be pseudepigraphical – an attempt to establish Egyptian provenance, and hence 
authorial authority. It is more likely to be a genuine acknowledgement of authorship. Annotations and 
additions by Philip, clearly indicated as such in the text at the beginning of Book Two, are structurally 
identifiable elements of the ‘interpretation of hieroglyphic writing among Egyptians’ (τῶν παρ’ Αἰγυπτίοις 
ἱερογλυφικῶν γραμμάτων ἑρμηνεία).  
 
                               
93 On the differences between the intrerpretative genres cf. Cribiore, R., Review of Glossaria bilinguia altera (C. Gloss. Biling. II). Archiv für 
Papyrusforschung und verwandte Gebiete, Beiheft 8 by Johannes Kramer in Bryn Mawr Classical Review 2002.05.08 (cited above).  
94 Cf. Perry, B. E., Review of Paradoxographorum Græcorum Reliquiæ. Recognovit, brevi adnotatione critica instruxit, latine reddidit by Alexander 
Giannini in The American Journal of Philology, Vol. 89, No. 1. (Jan., 1968): pp.119-121.  
95 The possibility that the text was originally published in ‘Egyptian’ (Coptic?) is provided for in the subtitle to Book One, though this may 
depend on the exact senses of the two aorist verbs used there: ἐξήνεγκε (‘produced, published’, ‘cited, adduced’) to describe the work of 
Horapollo himself & μετέφρασε (‘paraphrased, translated’) to describe the work of the editor, Philip; Horapollo Gramm., Hieroglyphica, 
1.t.1–5.  
 Hieroglyphic Semantics in Late Antiquity - 35 - 
 Mark Wildish - 35 - 
 
Even if the evidence for the original text having been composed in an earlier form Egyptian is ultimately 
unconvincing, there is, on the other hand, a two-fold prima facie case for exploring specifically Coptic (as 
opposed to Ancient Egyptian) corpora, both as a material resource and as a possible compositional 
environment. First, according to the incipit, the Hieroglyphica which Horapollo published (ἐξήνεγκε) in 
Egyptian (Αἰγυπτίᾳ φωνῇ). Philip rendered (μετέφρασε) into Greek (εἰς τὴν Ἑλλάδα διάλεκτον).96 As Gardiner 
remarks, if meant literally, at a time when neither hieroglyphic, nor even Demotic is in documentary use 
among the Egyptians, this indicates that the treatise was ‘written probably in Coptic but surviving only in a 
Greek translation’.97 If this were the case, then the text would represent de facto evidence of an Egyptian 
Hieroglyphica in precisely this form.  
 
[T205] ΩΡΟΥ ΑΠΟΛΛΩΝΟΣ ΝΕΙΛΩΟΥ ΙΕΡΟΓΛΥΦΙΚΑ ἃ ἐξήνεγκε 
μὲν αὐτὸς Αἰγυπτίᾳ φωνῇ, μετέφρασε δὲ Φίλιππος εἰς τὴν 
Ἑλλάδα διάλεκτον. <ΒΙΒΛΙΟΝ ΠΡΩΤΟΝ>.98  
THE HIEROGLYPHICA OF HORAPOLLO OF THE NILE which 
he published in the Egyptian tongue and which Philip 
translated into Greek. <FIRST BOOK>.  
 
On the basis of Greek works ascribed to Horapollo in the Suda, Lauth hypothesized that he composed the 
Hieroglyphica in Coptic before having learnt the Greek of his mature works.99 The conclusion is, however, 
perfunctory. While superficially accounting for the dual attribution of the incipit, it explains neither the 
obviously Greek resources freely and frequently drawn on, nor several instances of Greek etymological word-
play incomprehensible in Coptic.100 The second point is narrower, but more telling of Coptic origins. The 
Hieroglyphica contains thirteen words designated ‘Egyptian’, of which at least nine have clear Coptic 
credentials.101 There are besides three dozen additional Horapollonian explanations of hieroglyphs for which 
Sbordone has adduced Coptic language explanations.102 Because the thesis that the Hieroglyphica is a Greek 
translation of a Coptic original depends on a persuasive case to the effect that the author has been 
misidentified as Flavius Horapollo of Phænebythis, it faces apparently insuperable difficulties of historical 
context.103  It is not so much the availability of obvious predecessors in the genre from within the Greek 
tradition, but the fact that such Coptic material as exists on hieroglyphic Egyptian belongs either to polemical 
                               
96 Sbordone, F., Hori Apollonis Hieroglyphica (Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 2002): p.1. ΩΡΑΠΟΛΛΩΝΟΣ ΝΕΙΛΩΟΥ ΙΕΡΟΓΛΥΦΙΚΑ ἃ ἐξήνεγκε 
μὲν αὐτος Αἰγυπτίᾳ φωνῇ μετέφρασε δὲ Φίλιππος εἰς τὴν Ἑλλάδα διάλεκτον.  
97 Gardiner, Sir A. H., Egyptian Grammar (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1927): p.11.  
98 Horapollo Gramm., Hieroglyphica, 1.t.1–5.   
99 “Il Lauth immagina ch’ egli componesse il libro in Copto quando ancora non era padrone della lingua greca, alla quale avrebbe finito col 
dedicarsi completamente in età matura’; Sbordone remarks ‘Questa trama d’ ipotesi è tutta infondata.” Sbordone (2002): p.xxviii.  
100 E.g. 2.46. [Πῶς ἄνθρωπον ἰατρεύοντα ἑαυτὸν ἀπὸ χρησμοῦ]; 2.55. [Πῶς ἄνθρωπον μυστικόν].  
101 See Appendix 1.  
102  Sbordone, F., Hori Apollonis Hieroglyphica (Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 2002): 
1.1,3,4,5,6,7,10,11,16,17,19,20,21,22,26,27,29,31,37,38,39,42,43,44,45,47,48,52,54,55,57,59,63,67,68,70; 2.8,12,13,15,17,28.  
103 Note the edition of Martin Requier (Amsterdam-Paris: Musier 1779 [reissued 1782]), in which he rejects the authorship of Horapollo, 
attributing the text to Philip and the 15th century.  
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Christian texts of the period, condemning their use, or to clearly non-orthodox, but broadly Gnostic 
alternatives. The pre-Christian tradition of Coptic literature (a phenomenon of the 3rd century), though by no 
means homogenous, is nonetheless a considerably less fruitful resource for parallel compositions. Had our 
text then belonged to the overtly Coptic era, and originally been composed in Coptic, it would almost 
certainly have a Christian text, orthodox or otherwise. There is no trace of the Hieroglyphica showing any such 
provenance.  
 
Whether accurate knowledge of historical hieroglyphic practice or the (putative) desire on the part of a 
native Egyptian (Coptic) speaker to recover paganism from advancing Christian influence constitute 
sufficient grounds for supposing the text was originally written in Coptic is open to serious doubt even 
without the evidence of the Greek works securely identified as belonging to the œuvres of the elder and junior 
Horapollones.104 We have at least partial or occasional precedents in the Greek tradition both for the 
Egyptological material (in the fragments of an author such as Chæremon), and for the kind of physiological 
discussion which informs the Hieroglyphica (e.g. the de Historia Animalium of Aristotle, the de Animalibus of 
Philo,105 the de Natura Animalium of Ælian, the Naturalis Historia of Pliny, the Oneirocritica of Artemidorus, the 
Hexaemera of Saints Basil and Ambrose, the peripatetic Physiognomica, and the Physiologus).106 There is, in other 
words, more evidence of elements deriving from the Greek hieroglyphic and physiological traditions than 
from the Coptic material.  
 
Leemans’ commentary on the text107 and other systematic attempts to distinguish Egyptian hieroglyphic 
material from material originating in Græco-Roman sources have identified many of the educational, 
scientific, encyclopædic, or mythographical sources for the Hieroglyphica. Parallels with the Φυσιολογικά 
attributed to Manetho and the seven works108 attributed to the pseudo-Democritean Bolus in the Suda in 
particular have fostered further historicizing analyses with a particular interest in the question of genre-
attribution. Scott, for example, in reference to the literary genre of the Physiologus, notes that:  
 
                               
104 “Il Lauth immagina ch’ egli componesse il libro in Copto quando ancora non era padrone della lingua greca, alla quale avrebbe finito 
col dedicarsi completamente in età matura’, but remarks ‘Questa trama d’ ipotesi è tutta infondata.” Sbordone, F., Hori Apollonis 
Hieroglyphica (Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 2002): p.xxviii. See Lauth, Sitzungsberichte der philosophisch-philologischen u. historischen Classe 
der K. Bayer. Akad. zu München, 1876.  
105 Philonis Alexandrini De Animalibus, Abraham Terian, Studies in Hellenistic Judaism 1 (Chico, California: Scholars, 1981).  
106 “The many verbal agreements between Horapollo and the Physiologus must have led Sbordone to the erroneous conclusion that the 
former of these was indebted to the latter, had he not known that Horapollo got most of his stuff from Apion-Chaeremon.” Perry, B. E., 
Review of Physiologus by F. Sbordone in The American Journal of Philology, Vol. 58, No. 4. (1937), pp. 488-496.   
107 Leemans, C., (ed.) Horapollonis Niloi Hieroglyphica (Amsterdam: J. Müller et Socios, 1835): pp.117-404.  
108 See Sbordone, F., Hori Apollonis Hieroglyphica (Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 2002): p.xxi.  
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“Occasional paradoxographical references are part of the literary discourse of the age, so that e.g. an offhand reference to 
the phoenix can be made as early as Clement of Rome. There are numerous references in Philo, who devotes a treatise to 
beasts. But extensive treatment of paradoxographical material in the formative years of Christian theology is 
unknown.”109  
 
It is characteristic of this historicizing tendency, however, to question whether the ‘marvellous’ aspect of the 
material is original to the natural histories themselves or constitutes an intrusive accretion of 
paradoxography as an already distinct genre. 
 
“‘Aristotle has one after another of the Bestiary tales, – of the Eagle, the Hoopoe, the Night-raven, the Hyaena, the 
Ichneumon and so on. Some fifteen of these are in the Historia Animaliurn, and the curious thing is that they occur in just 
two places: I find eight in the Ninth Book, between pp. 612 and 630, and seven in the Sixth, between pp. 544 and 589. Are 
we looking for sources of the Physiologist in Aristotle, or is the Physiologist guiding us towards alien, fabulous, non-
Aristotelian parts of the Natural History?”110  
 
Even if it could be established that Coptic sources exercised some sort of direct linguistic or thematic 
influence on the text, the same reservations concerning their explanatory value would have to apply. The 
suggestive, but inconclusive linguistic and generic indications of ‘Copticity’ are, however, bolstered by 
reference to the works of Horapollo’s counterpart in the ongoing polemical exchange between Coptic 
Christians and Hellenized pagans in late 5th century Egypt. One of our Coptic sources, Shenoute, was also 
familiar with the 3rd century Egyptian zoological and allegorical text under the title Physiologus.111 Yet the 
parallels with the material in Horapollo which might have derived from knowledge of the Physiologus within 
the Coptic tradition also have multiple parallel attestations elsewhere. In particular, the sections dealing with 
the phœnix and the hyæna show close correlation, though the especial value of the Shenoutean corpus for the 
reconstruction of the Coptic text resides elsewhere, in the passage on the fruit of the sycamore (and possibly 
also on the honey-bee), both contained in ad Philosophum Gentilem.112  
 
Again the primary significance of the physiological material for which we have evidence of knowledge on 
Shenoute’s part is not as source-critical evidence. It is intended by him not merely as a record of empirical 
                               
109 Scott, A., ‘The Date of the Physiologus’ in Vigiliæ Christianæ, Vol. 52, No. 4. (Nov., 1998): pp.430-441.  
110 Thompson, D’Arcy W., Review of Physiologus by Francesco Sbordone in The Classical Review, Vol. 52, No. 5. (Nov., 1938), pp. 182-183.  
111 Sbordone, F., Physiologus (Rome: Dante Alighieri-Albrighi, Segati, 1936; repr. Hildesheim: Olms, 1976). See also,Lantschoot, A. van, ‘À 
propos du Physiologus’ in Coptic studies in honor of Walter Ewing Crum (Boston: Byzantine Institute of America, 1950): pp.339-363; Bourget, 
P.du ‘Diatribe de Chenouté contre le démon’ in Société d’archéologie copte, Bulletin 16 (1961-62): p.21.  
112 eÇihmooc anok hijnoutoou = As I Sat on a Mountain = ad Philosophum Gentilem (T21, from Discourses 1, 2, or 3?) = cod. A (HB 261:i.5-268), 
cod. B (XN 227-240), cod. C (XN 259-270), cod. D (HB 305-306) = No. 18 (pp.44-62), ad Philosophum Gentilem. Leipoldt, J., with the assistance 
of Crum, W. E., Sinuthii Archimandritae Vita et Opera Omnia. 3 volumes (numbered 1, 3, and 4). Corpus Scriptorum Christianorum 
Orientalium, volumes 41, 42, and 73 (Copt. 1 [= II.2.T], 2 [= II.4.T], 5 [= II.5.T]). Paris: Imprimerie nationale. 1906-1913. See below for more 
detail on the Shenoutean corpus. 
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data, but is deployed as part of a philosophical polemic against the misconception that the generated world 
can be used as a basis for speculation on the ungenerated world. However the question is resolved, an 
investigation designed to determine the extent of the influence of physiological sources on the exegetical 
content of the Hieroglyphica, though leading to a reconstruction of the historical line of generic development 
insofar as it supports observations on the aggregation of source-materials, cannot clarify the use to which 
that material is put.  This is a criticism of source-criticism in general, of course, but the fact that precisely this 
kind of engagement with Horapollo’s text has (along with philological criticism by Egyptologists) dominated 
the commentaries means it is a point worth repeating in order to sharpen our eye to the use Horapollo makes 
of his sources.  
 
With respect to the compositional circumstances of the text, as well as amplifications of, elaborations on, and 
corrections to its themes and conclusions, commentaries have tended to take one of two lines. One is to offer 
a philological study of ancient lexicography, the second to adduce parallels for Horapollo’s thought, an 
exercise that amounts in effect to the production of an eclectic compendium of diverse commonplaces and 
antiquarian lore. In the case of the first type, retrospective attempts at the rehabilitation of the Hieroglyphica 
as a philologically valid work of lexicography along Egyptological lines have also conceded at least partial 
philological authority to the work. As a result the text has latterly been recognized as composite, comprising 
a core of at least partially informed collated observations on genuinely Egyptian material, particularly in the 
first book, and a later expansion of that material originating in conception and execution with its named 
editor – Philip – in a doxographical manner, without specific knowledge of Egyptian hieroglyphs. This 
concession explicitly emphasizes, however, the comparative paucity of genuinely Egyptian hieroglyphic 
material. It also acknowledges that the standards of correctness to which the explanations might have claimed 
to have adhered may have been irredeemably lost, at least to Egyptologists, subsequent to the publication of 
Champollion’s system. Even allowing for the dilution of Horapollo’s accurate material by the expansion in 
Book Two by Philip, there remains a sense in which it is understood that the allegorizing explanations 
contained in Horapollo’s text had to be abandoned. Even where the meanings of hieroglyphs had been 
correctly interpreted (or nearly so) by Horapollo, the proper way to explain how they come to mean what 
they do was the province of the decipherment project, not allegoristic interpretation.  
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This brings us to the second type of commentary in which the explanations in the Hieroglyphica are 
represented as an extended fabrication based on the glyph-sequences and drawn from a backdrop of 
Hellenistic antiquarianism – the format of an interpretative treatise used as a blind to conceal its true origins 
as an imaginative elaboration of popular Egyptological themes. This judgement is founded on the assumption 
that the Hellenistic picture stands in need of correction in the direction of Egyptology, whereas in fact what is 
needed is some clarification of how the Hellenistic picture was supposed to be applied to the hieroglyphic 
material. To this end, and insofar as both the earlier and the later material are only imperfectly understood or 
represented by the text, there has also recently been an attempt to develop a consideration of the text as a 
semiotic resource, treating it as a Greek hermeneutic composition partly on Egyptian glyphs, partly on 
Hellenizing lore, offering hermeneutic strategies for the reception of an unknown written language.113 The 
difficulties of the attempt are rooted in the question of what connections there are between the glyphs and 
what they show or signify. The text itself establishes these connections primarily through the individual 
explanations, from which a general semiotic model may be derived, within which the specific hieroglyphic 
variables operate.  
 
Insofar as what is shown or meant by a glyph is interdependent with the form of the explanation one has to 
give of it, I suggest that the peculiar contribution of the Hieroglyphica lies primarily in the way in which it 
handles its material in establishing these explanations. It is important to understand that in Horapollo, the 
explanations themselves are not items of arcane significance, but the means whereby the hieroglyphs 
received their significance. In other words, the explanation does not serve to unlock an arcane meaning 
hidden in the glyph, but secures that meaning, establishing the glyph as significant. But if this is the case, 
then the explanations of Horapollo’s glyphs determine in what sense the glyphs are hieroglyphs at all. His 
work was meant neither to recover ancient Egyptian meanings, nor to address the methodology of such a 
procedure. Rather the Hieroglyphica exemplifies a possible determination of the meanings of hieroglyphs in a 
line of development from their formal and representational characteristics via a method for establishing their 
meaningful employment, not a reconstruction from an understanding of their meaningful use of an account of 
their formal and representational characteristics. My question is, therefore, what the motivations, objectives, 
and presuppositions of such a methodology in fact are, rather than the question posed by Horapollo’s critics 
as to whether there has been a failure of judgement in determining a methodology in the first place.  
                               
113 Eco, U., The Search for the Perfect Language (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995) and Serendipities Language and Lunacy (London: Weidenfeld & 
Nicolson, 1999).  
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The application of Egyptology, Greek natural history, and distinctively Renaissance archetypes of iconic 
language114 to the work has undoubtedly contributed to the success of the rehabilitation of the text as the 
subject of modern scholarly interest. There has, however, been little or no interest in the text’s philosophical 
presuppositions. The purpose of the following sections is to reconstruct the philosophical context in which it 
was composed. In addition to the biographical detail given above this will primarily involve determination of 
specifically internal features of the text’s methodological presuppositions. Once these have been established, 
it will be possible to examine the text’s explanatory structure of the constituent units of composition, the 
conception of meaning which that structure entails, and the methodological opportunities that affords.  
 
 
  
                               
114 The Hieroglyphica does not represent a movement towards the hieroglyphic system of Champollion, but towards the hieroglyphic 
technique of Colonna, Bellini, and Dürer.  
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§2. The Coptic Corpora 
 
As indicated above one of the relevant aspects of the historical context which might plausibly represent the 
most likely milieu for the composition of the texts with which I am specifically concerned here is 4th/5th 
century pagan revivalism under Christian persecution. That the Christian-pagan divide had fallen along 
linguistic lines is more or less clear in the Coptic designation of the pagans as nhellyn, i.e. the intellectual 
and aristocratic classes of Upper Egypt. Greek-language education separated them from the generally Coptic-
speaking population whose allegiances naturally lay with Pachomius, Shenoute, and their successors. For that 
reason this section focuses on the corpora Coptic-language texts representing some of the major sources for 
the Christian polemic against pagan and heterodox tendencies both within the Coptic tradition itself and 
within the Greek-language counter-movement.  
 
Coptic, also known as Neo-Egyptian, is the last phase of the Egyptian language. It was in spoken use 
throughout Egypt from perhaps the 1st century B.C. until the end of the 10th century A.D. with pockets of 
learned Coptic-use surviving into the 18th century. Varieties of Coptic can be distinguished historically, 
geographically, and linguistically.  
 
The language is attested in three geographically distinct dialect groups of varying historical longevity: (i) 
Upper, (ii) Middle, and (iii) Lower Egyptian, comprising (i) (a) Sahidic = Sa‘idic = Thebaic (3rd to 14th centuries), 
(b) Akhmimic, and the sub-dialect (c) Lycopolitan = Subakhmimic = Assiutic (4th to 5th centuries); (ii) (a) 
Fayyumic = Faiyumic = Bashmuric (3rd to 10th centuries) and (b) Oxyrhynchite = Mesokemic (4th to 5th 
centuries); and (iii) Bohairic = Memphitic (4th to 17th centuries).  
 
The Coptic lexicon is composed of both Egyptian Coptic and Græco-Coptic items. The standard reference 
dictionary records 3,308 Egyptian Coptic entries (not including innumerable derived forms – Coptic is a 
polysynthetic language).115 The extent of Greek borrowings into Coptic is undetermined; estimates range from 
20% of the vocabulary to as many as 4,000 loans. Cherix’ provisional edition of the Lexique grec-copte (2009) 
lists perhaps 1,000 Greek entries (including derived forms);116 Förster’s Wörterbuch der griechischen Wörter in 
                               
115 Crum, W. E., A Coptic Dictionary compiled with the help of many scholars (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1939).  
116 http://www.coptica.ch/30501.html.  
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koptischen dokumentarischen Texten (2002) lists 2,500.117 In the 10th and 11th centuries Coptic also acquires Arabic 
loans (perhaps 500 lemmata).118 Syntactically Greek has no influence on Coptic and semantic variation occurs 
even amongst borrowed lexical items.  
 
The oldest Coptic texts, written as early as the 1st century B.C. and as late as the 5th century A.D. (but primarily 
between the 1st and 3rd centuries) are the Old Coptic magical texts. Shortly thereafter (between the 2nd and 4th 
centuries) appear the first translations of the bible into Coptic, contemporary with Gnostic and Gnostic-
Christian works. At the end of the 3rd century Manichaean texts begin to be translated into Coptic, at which 
point appear the Patristic translations, apocrypha, and homilies.  
 
Coptic literature proper, i.e. non-magical, untranslated texts, originally composed in Coptic, begins in the 3rd 
and 4th centuries with Hierax, Pachomius, Antony, Shenoute, and Besa. There follows the polemical literature 
after Chalcedon and Damianus until the Arab conquest. The classical period of the patristic translations and 
hagiographic literature (8th to 12th centuries) is contemporary with the cyclical panegyrica and vitæ which are 
succeeded by the synaxarial systematization.119  
 
Shenoute (c. 346 A.D. – 466 A.D., scrib. 388 A.D. – 466 A.D.) was the archimandrite of the White Monastery in 
Atripe (opposite Panopolis – modern Akhmim – on the western Nile) responsible for mounting an attack on 
the otherwise unknown local deity Petbe.120 He also organized the destruction of the remaining pagan temple 
in Atripe,121 whose adherents had, in the preceding half century maintained a vigorous resistance to the 
advancing Christian influence.122 At one point the archimandrite and two brother monks travelled ‘in secrecy 
by night’ to the house of Gessius in Šmin (down river from the White Monastery), entered, and removed 
‘idols’ which they took to the riverside and destroyed.123 Gessius is the addressee of several of Shenoute’s 
works. He may be the same iatro-philosopher at whose house Heraiscus sheltered upon his release from 
similar persecution.124  
                               
117 Förster, H., Wörterbuch der griechischen Wörter in koptischen dokumentarischen Texten (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2002).  
118 http://www.rz.uni-leipzig.de/~egyptol/borrowing/main.html.  
119 See Orlandi, T., ‘Literature, Coptic’ in The Coptic Encyclopedia (New York: 1991), vol.5, pp.1450-60; Gee, J., ‘An Overview of Coptic 
Literature’ (Draft: 15th April 2002).  
120 Like Macarius against Kothos at the temple in Antaiopolis, and Apa Moïse at the temple of Apollo at Abydos.  
121 Maspero, J., ‘Horapollo et la fin du paganisme égyptien’ in Bulletin de l’Institut Français d’Archéologie Orientale 11 (1914): p.185.  
122 As had also been the case in Alexandria: see Rémondon, R., ‘L’Égypte et la suprême résistance au christianisme (Ve-VIIe siècles)’ in 
Bulletin de l’Institut Français d’Archéologie Orientale 51 (1952): pp. 63-78.  
123 Bell, D. N., (trans.), Besa: The Life of Shenoute (Kalamazoo, Michigan: Cistercian Publications, 1983): pp.77-8.  
124 Athanassiadi, P., ‘Persecution and Response in Late Paganism: The Evidence of Damascius’ in The Journal of Hellenic Studies, Vol.113. 
(1993): pp.1-29.  
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The other main Coptic-language resource for present purposes is the Nagʿ-Hammâdi corpus. The library of 
thirteen codices consists of fifty-three treatises of a broadly Gnostic character, discovered near ancient 
Chenoboskion on the west bank of the Nile in Upper Egypt. The treatises are neither uniform in scholastic 
character, nor attributable as a whole to any group unified along principled doctrinal lines, which is to say it 
is a syncretic collection.125 Various typologies emerge, both in terms of dialect and doctrinal affiliation. Most 
of the texts are in Sahidic, though often display a Subakhmimic colouring (the dialect used for the remaining 
texts). Many are Christian, mostly heterodox (but not exclusively); others are not; nor does the distinction 
map neatly onto sub-classifications. Apart from Platonist and Hermetic treatises, there appear a large number 
of Sethian (or Ophite) texts, a comparably large number of Valentinian texts, as well as Thomasine and 
Basilidian examples.  
 
This complex of scholastic divisions and the syncretistic overlappings poses several major methodological 
problems. Shenoute is unquestionably writing within orthodox Pachomian Coptic Christian doctrinal 
parameters. The affiliations of his polemical targets and those of the various texts of the Nagʿ-Hammâdi corpus 
are considerably less clear. The Melitians (non-Pachomian cœnobitics), Origenists (Evagrian Christologists), 
and Arians (heteroousians) are specifically singled out as antagonists in Shenoute. We also know that 
Shenoute was familiar with Thomasine presentations of gospel sayings and perhaps also Syrian Valentinian 
material found in The Gospel of Philip.126 Both his Pachomian affiliation and the correspondence of his floruit 
with the presumed date of the burial of the Nagʿ-Hammâdi texts make Shenoute a very significant secondary 
resource for these scholastic currents.  
 
The difficulty remains, however, that in many cases of heterodox doctrine primary sources are often only 
identifiable through secondary (usually patristic) sources. More problematic still is the fact that even in those 
cases where affiliation of a text is fairly well established, individual points of doctrine are perhaps less so. 
Insofar as the problem at hand is the nature of the Coptic Christian objection to the use of hieroglyphs, or, 
conversely, the Gnostic-Hermetic inclination to adopt them, particular references within texts broadly 
characterizable in these terms do not ensure that the objections or inclinations themselves are similarly 
identifiable. That these mutually antagonist attitudes not only exist, but are also theoretically informed, is, 
                               
125 The identity of the group responsible for their collation and the reasons for their burial will be considered below in an effort to bring 
their contents into the broader context of Coptic literature of the period.  
126 Young, D. W., ‘The Milieu of Nag Hammadi: Some Historical Considerations’ in Vigiliae Christianae, Vol.24, No. 2, (May, 1970), pp.127-137.  
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however, both demonstrable and pertinent to questions of motivation for the production of an exegetical 
manual of hieroglyphs.  
 
The Shenoutean corpus of Sahidic Coptic is itself the single most important source of literature in that 
language. As a result of recent work by Emmel the corpus is now recognized as falling into three components: 
the Canons (kanwn), Discourses, and Letters comprising individual works called ‘epistles’ (epictoly), ‘treatises’ 
or ‘discourses’ (logoc), and ‘sermons’ (exygycic or ka;ygycic).127 I shall be concerned with three texts in 
particular: in Loco Ædis Spiritus Immundi,128 contra Origenistas et Gnosticos,129 and ad Philosophum Gentilem.130  
 
A Monastic Invective against Egyptian Hieroglyphs is of obvious and direct specific, but also general interest here. 
The text appears to have been a sermon delivered on the conversion of a pagan temple into a Christian 
church ‘sometime after 431’.131  
 
[T206] 
g
 
ai negravy 
d
And if previously it is prescriptions for murdering man’s 
soul (ψυχή) that are therein, written with blood and not 
with ink alone – there is nothing else portrayed for them 
except the likeness of the snakes and scorpions, the dogs 
and cats, the crocodiles and frogs, the foxes, the other 
reptiles, the beasts (θηρίον) and birds, the cattle, etc.; 
furthermore, the likeness of the sun and the moon and all 
the rest, all their things being nonsense and humbug – and 
where these are, it is the soul (ψυχή) - saving scriptures 
(γραφή) of life that will henceforth come to be therein, 
fulfilling the word of God, with His name inscribed for 
them and His son Jesus Christ (Χριστός) and all His angels 
(ἄγγελος), righteous (δίκαιος) men and saints (portrayed), 
that everywhere what is therein may give instruction 
                               
127 Emmel, S., Shenoute’s Literary Corpus (2 voll.) (Corpus Scriptorum Christianorum Orientalium, voll.599-600, subsidia tom. 111-112) 
(Lovanii: in Ædibus Peeters, 2004).  
128 =epma =ntopoc =m=p=n=a =naka;a`rton = At the Site of a Shrine to an Unclean Spirit (in Loco Ædis Spiritus Immundi) = A Monastic Invective against 
Egyptian Hieroglyphs (Acephalous work A6) = DD 245:1-[ca. 251: ult.] (lection); TY [1]-[ca. 53]; ZW [1]-[ca. 54]. Young, D. W., (ed.) in ‘A 
Monastic Invective against Egyptian Hieroglyphs’ (=TY 3/4 and 13/14) in Young, D. W., (ed.), Studies Presented to Hans Jakob Polotsky 
(Beacon Hill, East Gloucester: Pirtle & Polson, 1981): pp.348-360.  
129 ]rmoeihe nnetseei = I Am Amazed = contra Origenistas et Gnosticos (W54, Discourses 7, Work 5) = DQ [1]-[ca. 148]; DS [ca. 60]-222:ii.11; DT 
[between 82 and 87]-[between 88 and 163] (lection); HB [1]-[ca. 150]; XE [ca. 127]-[ca. 263]; XN [wanting, except for the incipit in the table 
of contents, 270:i.19]; YU [1]-[ca. 128]; ZN frg. 1; Vienna inc. 54. Orlandi, T., (ed. & trans.), Shenute contra Origenistas: testo con introduzione e 
traduzione (Roma: C.I.M., 1985).  
130 eÇihmooc anok hijnoutoou = As I Sat on a Mountain = ad Philosophum Gentilem (T21, from Discourses 1, 2, or 3?) = cod. A (HB 261:i.5-268), 
cod. B (XN 227-240), cod. C (XN 259-270), cod. D (HB 305-306) = No. 18 (pp.44-62), ad Philosophum Gentilem. Leipoldt, J., with the assistance 
of Crum, W. E., Sinuthii Archimandritae Vita et Opera Omnia. 3 volumes (numbered 1, 3, and 4). Corpus Scriptorum Christianorum 
Orientalium, volumes 41, 42, and 73 (Copt. 1 [= II.2.T], 2 [= II.4.T], 5 [= II.5.T]). Paris: Imprimerie nationale. 1906-1913.  
131 Emmel, S., Shenoute’s Literary Corpus (2 voll.) (Corpus Scriptorum Christianorum Orientalium, voll.599-600, subsidia tom. 111-112) 
(Lovanii: in Ædibus Peeters, 2004): vol.2; pp.688-9.  
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132  
concerning every good thing (ἀγαθόν), especially (μᾶλλον 
δὲ) purity. And how will he not become pure?133  
 
The first point made in the passage is that though hieroglyphs are demonized as ‘prescriptions for murdering 
man’s soul’ (hennomoc =mm=ntrefhet=b 'u,y =nrwme), ‘written with blood and not with ink alone’ 
(netnhytf eucyh h=noucnof auw h=noumela an mauaaf·), the invective of the passage is not merely 
rhetorical. The situation can be rectified, according to the passage, not merely by the destruction of the 
offending tableaux, but by replacing them with scriptural alternatives. For Shenoute, it is not primarily that 
hieroglyphs are an offence to Christian sensibilities qua script (even a script ‘written in blood’ rather than 
ink), nor even that the meaning of the inscriptions is contrary to Christian doctrine (though that is 
undoubtedly true too), but that hieroglyphic inscriptions as such ‘murder the soul’ (refhet=b 'u,y), whereas 
‘the scriptures of life’ (negravy =nwnh) ‘give the soul life’ (reftanhe 'u,y).  
 
Nonetheless, the passage does lend support to the impression that the very use of hieroglyphic script is in 
itself anathema. Though ‘there is nothing else portrayed for them except the likeness’ ( =mm=nkelaau cyh 
eroou ncapine) of a range of creatures and celestial bodies, neither does the piece contribute only the usual 
details that can be found in the more schematic Græco-Roman accounts. In fact, it is precisely the fact that 
hieroglyphs are likenesses of creatures and celestial bodies that explains Shenoute’s characterization of them 
as ‘murdering the soul’.  
 
In order to develop the implication that the connection between hieroglyphic script and the created world is 
of itself profane, we have to look elsewhere in the Shenoutean corpus. Doctrinally by far the most important 
text for this purpose is contra Origenistas et Gnosticos, in which Shenoute attacks the heretics with particular 
reference to their books, the ‘apocrypha’ (napokruvon). Of specific concern are their doctrines concerning: 
                               
132 Sinuthius Theol., epma =ntopoc =m=p=n=a =naka;a`rton = At the site of a shrine to an unclean spirit (Apud ædem spiritus immundi) = A monastic 
invective against Egyptian hieroglyphs (Invectio monachica contra hieroglyphica Ægyptia) (Acephalous work A6), TY 3.1.25–4.1.14.  
133 Young, D. W., (ed.) in ‘A Monastic Invective against Egyptian Hieroglyphs’ (=TY 3/4 and 13/14) in Young, D. W., (ed.), Studies Presented to 
Hans Jakob Polotsky (Beacon Hill, East Gloucester: Pirtle & Polson, 1981): pp.348-360.  
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the plurality of worlds; the work of the Son, the value of suffering, against magic; the Pascha; the Father and 
the Son; souls; Christ’s conception; the Eucharist; the resurrection of the body; God and the stars; and the four 
elements.134  
 
[T207] jwwme gar nim mpb(o)l nnegravy. eite na 
nh(e)llyn. eite na he;noc nim natnoute eite na 
nhairetikoc. henpneuma ncwrm netsoop nhytou. auw 
sahrai enke apokr]von esje cetaouo mpran mpnoute 
nhytou. y cejw nhensaje eucmont. sare ne;oou 
tyrou etcyh eroou tako mpke oua etnanouf. 
neusaje ntof # 
ute 
pefouehcahne. auw on ere pooh mouh hm pefoueh-- 
xane nnsyn # 
euau
mmoc je euo navormy nsmse mpcwnt. 
negravy ] oube teumnta;yt. pr
ensoop # gar nhytf auw en kim. 135  
For (γάρ) every book outside the Scriptures (γραφή), both 
(εἴτε) those | of the pagans (Ἕλλην) and (εἴτε) those of any 
atheist people (ἔθνος), and (εἴτε) those | of the heretics 
(αἱρετικός) – some impure spirits (πνεῦμα) are in them. And 
| also the apocrypha (ἀπόκρυφος), even if the name of God is 
named | in them or they say some right things, do the 
errors, | all which are written in them, ruin also the good 
things. || Aren’t their words like those we have | referred to 
before which are now written in the apocrypha 
(ἀπόκρυφος)? They say | of God the Almighty (παντοκράτωρ) 
that he is the one who runs in the orbit (δρόμος) of the sun, 
| and that the full moon augments (αὐξάνειν) the trees and 
the animals. || O what impiety (ἀσεβής)! Indeed, is it not an 
impiety (ἀσεβής) to say that the God of the | all runs in the 
sun and grows in the moon? | Is it not he who causes it to 
run in its own service (λειτουργία) in | its own order, and 
moreover the moon becomes full in its own | order? || Isn’t 
the moon the one which makes the plants and the animals 
grow. Don’t | they all grow (αὐξάνειν) out of the work of 
God. Isn’t he the one who makes | shine all the stars (ἀστήρ) 
according to their place (κατὰ μέρος), like they say, | which 
are the reasons (ἀφορμή) to serve the creature. || But (ἀλλά) 
the Scriptures (γραφή) oppose their foolishness. For (γάρ) 
the sun and | the moon and the stars and the days and the 
nights and the winds and | the clouds and the whole 
creation do not move by themselves, but (ἀλλά) | receive 
energy (ἐνεργεῖν) from his order, without him moving; | he 
in whom we move too, as is written: | “for (γάρ) in him we 
are and we move”. ||  
 
The nature of the connection is spelled out as the ‘impiety’ (mntacebyc) of the ‘spirit’ (pneuma), whereby 
‘the errors, all which are written in them, ruin also the good things’ (sare ne;oou tyrou etcyh eroou tako 
mpke oua etnanouf). Furthermore, the association of ‘God the Almighty’ (epnoute ppantokratwr) with 
                               
134 Orlandi, T., ‘A Catechesis against Apocryphal Texts by Shenute and the Gnostic Texts of Nag Hammadi’ in The Harvard Theological 
Review, Vol.75, No. 1. (Jan., 1982), pp.85-95.  
135 Sinuthius Theol., ]rmoeihe nnetseei = I am amazed = Contra Origenistas et Gnosticos (W54, Discourses 7, Work 5), HB 39.2–41.1; 0384-8.  
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‘the orbit of the sun, and that the full moon augments the trees and the animals’ (pedromoc mpry auw je 
pmouh mpooh efauxane nnsyn mn ntbnooue) are, according to Shenoute, ‘reasons to serve the creature’ 
(navormy nsmse mpcwnt) of he who is responsible for  their creation. The movement of the sun and moon 
cannot for Shenoute be accounted for within the generated world, but requires motive force from the 
Creator. They further deny the resurrection, claiming that the body is formed out of and will dissolve back 
into the four elements.136 Here, Shenoute argues, they commit two errors. First, the claim that the body is 
created out of all four elements and not out of earth alone. Second, the failure to acknowledge that the living 
soul is breathed into the body by the omnipotent Lord.  
 
The issue reaches decisive momentum in Shenoute’s polemical development against the doctrine of the 
generation of the Son. The history of the controversy is complex, but the doctrine Shenoute here attacks 
constitutes one major thread. According to the doctrine of the twofold stage theory of the generation, the 
Logos existed from eternity in God, and was subsequently, prior to the creation of the world, generated as a 
distinct personal being. This is the view as taught by Tertullian, Lactantius and others (with parallels in 
Philo). The alternative account is the single stage theory according to which the generation of the Logos was 
from eternity. This is the view taught by Irenæus and, Shenoute’s treatise notwithstanding, Origen.137 The 
fundamental Origenist misconception (as ascribed) is that for them ‘there was a moment in which the Logos 
itself of God did not exist … before being generated’ (ntof hwwf plogoc mpnoute aououoeis swpe 
enfsoop an ... mpatoujpof).138 Or, put another way, ‘He is one of those who are generated and who are 
created’ (oua pe hn netoujpo mmoou mn netoucwnt mmoou). These false doctrines are founded on what is 
for Shenoute the crucial error of the pagans: the appeal to the ontology of the generated to understand that 
of the ungenerated world. Paganism undoes the Christian doctrine of the distinction of God into persons, 
whether ‘from eternity’ (Irenæus, Origen, & al.) or generated prior to the creation of the world as a distinct 
personal being (Philo, Justin Martyr, Tatian, & al.). As noted above, the former single stage account appears as 
a major polemical target in Shenoute’s contra Origenistas (as well as the Origenist pagans opposed there).139  
 
                               
136 Ibid., §§.0401-0403.  
137 See Wolfson, H. A., ‘Clement of Alexandria on the Generation of the Logos’ in Church History, Vol.20, No. 2, (Jun., 1951): pp.72-81.  
138 Orlandi, T., (ed. & trans.), Shenute contra Origenistas: testo con introduzione e traduzione (Roma: C.I.M., 1985): §.0326.  
139 Wolfson, H. A., ‘Clement of Alexandria on the Generation of the Logos’ in Church History, Vol.20, No. 2, (Jun., 1951): pp.72-81.  
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Several themes and techniques here overlap. The difficulty of disentangling them is in part due to Shenoute’s 
habit (alluded to above) of employing techniques familiar from the hermeneutical endeavours that he 
criticizes when practiced by pagans In, for example, in ad Philosophum Gentilem, he concludes that pagans 
impute obscurantism to the Holy Spirit with the claim that certain scriptural truths are only available 
through allegorical interpretation (euallygorei).140 He does not scruple, however, to compare the presence 
of pagans within the church to a creature that walks the earth prevailing over one that flies.141  
 
[T208] eihmooc anok hijnoutoou> pejepetjw nnai> 
ainau euzwon efhapayr efmise *mnkezwon 
efhijmpkah. airouno[ nrase jeapethyl [m[om 
ejmpetmoose hijmpkah. mnncaouapryte de apzwon 
ethijmpkah ktof ejmpethyl afamahte mmof 
afrjoeic erof.142   
As I sat on a mountain, the one who says these things said, I 
saw an animal (ζωόν) in the air (ἀήρ) attacking another 
animal (ζωόν) on the ground. I rejoiced greatly that the one 
which flew had strength over the one which walks on the 
earth. But after a while the animal (ζωόν) which is on the 
ground turns on the one which flies and overcame it and 
was master over it.   
 
He develops criticisms of pagan prayer by developing analogies between it and purely physiologically 
conditioned responses of creatures: 143  
 
[T209] esjesarephairetikoc [e m=nphellyn pwr=s 
ebol =nneu[ij y =ncefitou ehrai h=n;upokricic jeeuslyl 
eic =nhalate hwou eire =mpai =nhah ncop eupwr=s 
ebol =nneut=nh144  
If then the heretic (αἱρετικός) and the pagan (Ἕλλην) spread 
their hands or hold them up in the pretence (ὑπόκρισις) 
that they are praying, look, the fowl themselves do this 
many times spreading their wings.  
 
He also brings out pagan weakness by alluding to Pharaoh’s susceptibility to the least of creatures in the 
course of the biblical plagues with which he is beset.145 The beneficence of the Christian, on the other hand, 
can be compared with the solicitude of the honey-bee.146 The honey-bee is sought out by men as Christians 
                               
140 Orlandi, T., (ed. & trans.), Shenute contra Origenistas: testo con introduzione e traduzione (Roma: C.I.M., 1985): §§.0331; 0359-0360.  
141 Ibid., p.45.  
142 Sinuthius Theol., eÇihmooc anok hijnoutoou = As I sat on a mountain = Ad philosophum gentilem (T21, from Discourses 1, 2, or 3?), HB 
261/2; 18.44.18–23.  
143 Leipoldt, J., with the assistance of Crum, W. E., Sinuthii Archimandritae Vita et Opera Omnia. 3 volumes (numbered 1, 3, and 4). Corpus 
Scriptorum Christianorum Orientalium, volumes 41, 42, and 73 (Copt. 1 [= II.2.T], 2 [= II.4.T], 5 [= II.5.T]). Paris: Imprimerie nationale. 1906-
1913. 18.262.45.3-6.  
144 Sinuthius Theol., eÇihmooc anok hijnoutoou = As I sat on a mountain = Ad philosophum gentilem (T21, from Discourses 1, 2, or 3?), HB 262; 
18.45.3–6.  
145 Sinuthius Theol., eÇihmooc anok hijnoutoou = As I sat on a mountain = Ad philosophum gentilem (T21, from Discourses 1, 2, or 3?), HB 262; 
18.232.50.  
146 Sinuthius Theol., eÇihmooc anok hijnoutoou = As I sat on a mountain = Ad philosophum gentilem (T21, from Discourses 1, 2, or 3?), HB 262; 
18.264.45.27-266.47.2.  
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are sought out by the angels; the bee resembles its parents which descend from the sky as the Christian 
resembles his Creator whose spirit descends from the heavens.  
 
[T210] esjeounoua de ouws ejneouhellyn y 
ouhairetikoc euhwb> marefjnepeizwon enela,icton 
etmmau> etetefvucicpe kim ntefape epecyt auw 
ncatpe> etesarensyre sym jnouf eucwbe y euji 
nhrau eujw mmoc jeenepmoou nyu& henteimine onne 
netna emma nsine mnneteine mmoou. petouws de on 
eepeteima nau etbeteumnthah nsaje> jecejw 
nnetencesoop an hmpeucooun nnouj> marefjooc nau 
nteihe jenim petjnou nnekrour etbepmoou jenefnyu& 
n;e etesaujepai n[inetji nhrau> ebol jecews ebol 
hinekrwou nm*ma nhaate nmmoou. ereteihe rou& 
etrenhyperytyc mplogoc nrmmao epeteima nytn 
ncejooc jeeienetnau ebol netnajnenblleeu 
enehiooue& y pouoein petnajnepkake epouoein& y 
nrwme netnajnehentbnooue etbehenmuctyrion 
mnhenpe;yp ntepnoute& etbepai ateicmy mme 
tntntyutn entbnooue nateime. atetnswpe etetneine 
mmoou. n;e etoujw mmoc jeprwme efhnoutaio 
mpefeime erof aunojf mnntbnooue nateime afeine 
mmoou. y oumoihe nnahrytnpe jenetvorei mpcooun 
mme hnneucpotou n;e etcyh cwbe ncwtn& n;e on 
etoumokh nhyt ejwtn jendaimwn cwbe ncwtn 
ntetncooun an> ebol jeatetnra;yt.147  
If then (δέ) anyone wants to consult a pagan (Ἕλλην) or (ἤ) 
a heretic (αἱρετικός) about something, let him ask this 
animal (ζωόν) being the least (ἐλάχιστόν) which there is, 
whose nature (φύσις) is to move its head down and up, and 
which little children ask laughing and crying out saying: is 
the water coming? Some are even of this kind, who go to 
the places of asking (oracula) and those who are like them. 
But (δέ) still the one who wants to censure them on 
account of their multitude of words, that they say things 
which are false in their knowledge of lies, let him say to 
them thus: that he who asks the frogs whether the water is 
coming as those who joke are accustomed to say, that they 
croak on the banks of the places of flowing water. What 
does this achieve? Let servants of the word (λόγος) for 
riches reproach you. They say that those who see are those 
who will ask the blind about the ways; or (ἤ) the light the 
one that will ask darkness (κακόν) about the light; or men 
the ones who will ask beasts on account of mysteries 
(μυστήριον) and that which is hidden of god; on account of 
this this voice knows you for the beasts of ignorance. You 
have become like them. Thus they say that man in 
honouring his knowledge did not know and are like the 
unknowing beasts and are made like them. Or (ἤ) a marvel 
in the presence of heaven that the ones who bring (φορεῖν) 
knowledge make knowledge on their shores, as it is 
written, mock you; thus again they who grieve for you that 
the demons mock you, since you do not know that you are 
stupid.  
 
It is clear that he accusations of sophistical (petoucovize) and allegorical (euallygorei) obscurities (eaur 
kake hn neumeeue)148 are meant to imply that there is no possibility of consulting ‘the usual range of 
creatures and celestial bodies’ in search of knowledge of ‘mysteries and that which is hidden of god’ 
(etbehenmuctyrion mnhenpe;yp ntepnoute). What the Greek conception obscures (according to 
                               
147 Sinuthius Theol., eÇihmooc anok hijnoutoou = As I sat on a mountain = Ad philosophum gentilem (T21, from Discourses 1, 2, or 3?), XN 
230/1; 18.49.8–31.  
148 See Orlandi, T., (ed. & trans.), Shenute contra Origenistas: testo con introduzione e traduzione (Roma: C.I.M., 1985) = Sinuthius Theol., 
]rmoeihe nnetseei = I am amazed = Contra Origenistas et Gnosticos (W54, Discourses 7, Work 5), HB 39.2–41.1: §.0331; §.0403.  
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Shenoute) is the difference between ‘faith and doctrine which saves and knowledge which is perfect’ (tpictic 
auw tecbw etouoj mn pcooun etjyk ebol) and ‘knowledge of lies and doctrine which perverts’ (nc(o)oun 
nnouj auw cbw ef[oome).149 What separates the Christian and the pagan, in other words, is the difference 
not between truth and falsehood as determined by the reasonings of Greek sophistry and allegory, but 
dialectically between Shenoute’s Christian encounter with scriptural ‘revelation’ ([wlp) and the pagan 
rationalist enquiry into ‘what is hidden’ (apokruvon).  
 
As mentioned above, the main source of a counter-current to the orthodox Coptic Christian response to the 
hieroglyphic tradition can be found in several Coptic sources of a Gnostic character which lend support for a 
heterodox conception of both Christology and hieroglyphic possibilities within an Egyptian monastic 
environment. That environment may also have been mediated through Evagrian influences. Though Evagrian 
material was originally Greek, the tradition would, in light of Shenoute’s polemic, appear to have survived in 
Coptic. Both Young (1970) and Orlandi (1982) have proposed that the historical environment and literary 
career of Shenoute may in fact further mediate that counter-current.150 If the proposal can be taken at face 
value, two important texts for this purpose belong amongst the Nagʿ-Hammâdi Codices.151 They are ‘the 
Gospel of Truth’ (peuaggelion =ntmye) and ‘the Discourse on the Eighth and Ninth’ (psaje =ntmahsmoune 
m=n tmah'ite).  
 
The former exists in two versions in the Nagʿ-Hammâdi corpus, the first, almost complete in the Upper 
Egyptian Coptic dialect of Subakhmimic (= Lycopolitan = Assiutic) as the third of five titles contained in codex 
I (the Jung Foundation Codex), the second in fragments, in Sahidic (= Sa‘idic = Thebaic) as the second of three 
titles contained in codex XII. Its relation to the Valentinian text of the same name, mentioned by Irenæus152 is 
                               
149 Sinuthius Theol., ]rmoeihe nnetseei = I am amazed = Contra Origenistas et Gnosticos (W54, Discourses 7, Work 5), HB 39.2–41.1: §.0415.  
150 Young, D. W., ‘The Milieu of Nag Hammadi: Some Historical Considerations’ in Vigiliae Christianae, Vol.24, No. 2 (May, 1970), pp.127-137; 
Orlandi, T., ‘A Catechesis against Apocryphal Texts by Shenute and the Gnostic Texts of Nag Hammadi’ in The Harvard Theological Review, 
Vol.75, No. 1. (Jan., 1982), pp.85-95.  
151 Orlandi, T., ‘A Catechesis against Apocryphal Texts by Shenute and the Gnostic Texts of Nag Hammadi’ in The Harvard Theological 
Review, Vol.75, No. 1. (Jan., 1982): pp.93-5.  
152 Irenaeus Theol., Adversus Haereses, 3.11.9.  
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uncertain, though ‘the general Valentinian affinities of codex I’ make it seem likely it is the same text in a 
Coptic translation of a Greek original composed between 140 and 180 A.D.153  
 
The relatively short text (running from p.16 to p.43 of codex I) is in general concerned with ‘the oblivion of 
error’ (]=bse =nte ]plany) and its remedy ‘through the mercies of the Father, the hidden mystery, Jesus, the 
Christ’ (hÇit=n nim=ntsanhtyf =nte piwt· pimuctyrion e;yp iy(cou)c pe,r(icto)c).154 The relevant passage 
in the present context reads as follows:155  
 
[T211] - 
- - 
efouan=h ab~a~l· ~eis¬e-- 
asou =nf- - 
- 
wme· efjyk abal· eh=nche- 
piwt·156  
This is the knowledge of the living book, which he revealed 
to the æons (αἰών) at the end as his letters, revealing how 
they are not places (τόπος) of voices nor (οὐδέ) are they 
letters lacking sound, so that one might read them and 
think of something empty, but (ἀλλά) they are letters of the 
truth, which they alone speak who know them. Each letter 
is a complete <thought>, each letter is like a complete book, 
since they are letters written by the Unity, the Father 
having written them for the æons (αἰών), in order that by 
means of his letters they should know the Father.  
 
Several features distinguish an interest in written characters entirely distinct from, if not immune to, the 
criticisms levelled at their use in Shenoute. That these written characters are ostensibly the revelation of the 
                                                                                               
Hi vero, qui sunt a Valentino, iterum exsistentes extra omnem timorem, 
suas conscriptiones proferentes, plura habere gloriantur, quam sint ipsa 
Evangelia. Si quidem in tantum processerunt audaciae, uti quod ab his 
non olim conscriptum est, Veritatis Evangelium titulent, in nihilo 
conveniens Apostolorum Evangeliis, ut nec Evangelium quidem sit apud 
eos sine blasphemia. Si enim, quod ab eis profertur, veritatis est 
Evangelium, dissimile est autem hoc illis, quae ab Apostolis nobis tradita 
sunt; qui volunt, possunt discere, quemadmodum ex ipsis Scripturis 
ostenditur, jam non esse id, quod ab Apostolis traditum est, veritatis 
Evangelium. 
But those who are from Valentinus, being, on the other hand, 
beyond all fear, while offering their own compositions, boast that 
they possess more Gospels than exist. Indeed, they have reached so 
far in their audacity, that they entitle their comparatively recent 
composition ‘the Gospel of Truth’, which does not agree in any 
respect with the Gospels of the Apostles, so that they in fact have 
no Gospel which does not contain blasphemy. For if what is offered 
by them is the Gospel of truth, and yet is unlike those which have 
been handed down to us by the apostles, any who want to can 
learn, as is shown from the Scriptures themselves, that that which 
has been handed down from the apostles is no longer the Gospel of 
truth. 
 
153 Attridge, H. W., & MacRae, G., Nag Hammadi Codex I (The Jung Codex) (Nag Hammadi Studies 22, 23; Leiden: Brill, 1985. Volume editor and 
contributor (Gospel of Truth, with George MacRae, and the Tripartitie Tractate, with Elaine Pagles): p.38.  
154 Nag Hammadi Codices I, 3, The Gospel of Truth, 17.36 & 18.14-16.  
155 Nag Hammadi Codices I, 3, The Gospel of Truth, 22.38 – 23.18 and Motte, L., ‘L’hiéroglyphe, d’Esna à l’Évangile de Vérité’ in Deuxième 
Journée d’Études Coptes, Cahiers de la Bibliothèque Copte 3 (Louvain, Paris: Peeters, 1984).  
156 Valentinus Theol., peuaggelion =ntmye = The Gospel of Truth = Evangelium veritatis, 22.38–23.18.   
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Logos for the return of mankind to knowledge of the Father need not detract from the point.157 The signal 
contribution is the development of a conception of how the characters legitimize an understanding of the 
truth as denied in the Shenoutean critique, namely, by virtue of each letter being a complete thought 
(‘eoume«eue» efjyk pe pcheei’), written by the Unity (‘aucahou abal hÇitootc· / =n]m=ntoueei·’).158  
 
Shenoute’s objection to allegorical and sophistical reasonings on higher matters through items belonging to 
the lower world is not then obviated, but bolstered by appeal to an explanatory principle justifying the 
procedure. In The Discourse on the Eighth and Ninth the procedure itself is clearly highlighted, but lacks the 
principled justification.159  
 
[T212] - 
ly =nkalaeinoc· w pasy- 
pnouc gar ouaaf =ntaf- 
' 
apwne =ng'kaaf =nhou~n ¬=m-- - 
' 
«hi» ounam eue =mprocw- 
- - 
tragwnon =ng'chaÇi pran et'- 'peirinon· 
eÇisoop' h=n tpa - 
am=nty =mmoira =rpa- '  sa- 
nim et=kjw =mmoou ]na- '·160  
“My <son>, write the language of the book on steles (στήλη) 
of turquoise (καλάινος). My son, it is proper to write this 
book on steles (στήλη) of turquoise (καλάινος), in 
hieroglyphic characters. For (γάρ) Mind (νοῦς) himself has 
become overseer (ἐπίσκοπος) of these. Therefore, I 
command (κελεύειν) that this teaching be carved on stone, 
and that you place it in my sanctuary. Eight guardians 
(φύλαξ) guard it with [...] of the sun (ἥλιος). The males on 
the one hand (μέν) on the right are frog-faced (πρόσωπόν), 
and (δέ) the females on the left are cat-faced (πρόσωπόν). 
And put a square milk- (γάλα) stone at the base (πλάξ) of 
the turquoise (καλάινος) tablets (τετράγωνον), and write 
the name on the azure (καλάινος) on the base (πλάξ) of the 
stone tablet in hieroglyphic characters. My son, you will do 
this when I am in Virgo (παρθένος), and the sun is in the 
first half of the day, and fifteen degrees have passed by 
me.” “My father, everything that you say I will do eagerly.”  
 
The character of this discourse, between Hermes Trismegistus and an initiate, exhibits features notably 
familiar from other Greek-language hermetic and Platonic texts, for example, Poimandres, particularly in its 
astronomical emphasis. Perhaps for that reason, as well as the premiss that the initiate has already advanced 
                               
157 That Plotinus (Enneades, 3.8, 5.8, 5.5, & 2.9) mounted a concerted attack on the Gnostics and yet makes explicit use of this conception of 
written characters in explanation of hieroglyphic Egyptian at Enneades 5.8 precludes the notion that the latter is itself of Valentinian 
provenance despite the use to which it is put in context. See chapter four.  
158 Cf. Nag Hammadi Codices I, 3, The Gospel of Truth, 19.34 – 20.1: afouwn=h abal h=m pouhyt =n[i pijwwme etan=h =nte netan=h peei 
etcyh hryei· h=m pimeeue· ouah=m pinouc ¬=nte p-~iw~t· ‘in their hearts appeared the living book of the living, which is written in the 
Father’s thought and intellect’.  
159 Nag Hammadi Codices VI, 6, The Discourse on the Eighth and Ninth, 61, 18 – 63, 32.  
160 Anonymus Herm., psaje =ntmahsmoune m=n tmah'ite = The discourse on the eighth and ninth (Oratio de octavo nonoque), 61.18–63.32.  
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through the lower levels of spiritual ascent, no immediate justification is felt to be requisite. Nonetheless, a 
reason is given for writing the book specifically in hieroglyphic characters: ‘for Mind himself has become 
overseer of these’ (‘pnouc gar ouaaf =ntaf- / swpe =nnepickopoc / =nnaÇi’).   
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§3. The Pagan Response 
 
As argued above, the crucial Coptic Christian objection brought against pagan textual exegesis was directed 
against the latter’s reliance on reason either as the sole source, or as the sole criterion of truth. What grounds 
the Christian accusation of sophism (petoucovize), allegory (euallygorei), and rationalized obscurantism 
(eaur kake hn neumeeue) was an imputed relativism in the decisive emphasis cultivated Hellenism had 
placed on the process of reflection and ratiocination (λόγος). Specifically, the speculative application of 
allusion (αἰνίττεσθαι) and allegory (ἀλληγορεῖν) to empirical phenomena in pursuit of ungenerated first causes 
was particularly unacceptable.161 This is prima facie a difficult objection to understand given the extensive use 
of the same exegetical techniques on the part of the Christians themselves. However, the Christian objection 
to pagan employment of those techniques was established on two related and in this context decisively 
Christian observations. First, the undue limitation placed by pagan rationalism on assumptions that could be 
made about divine agency within the natural order, since the rejection of revelation was at the same time a 
rejection of the idea that god might do anything which could be understood only through revelation. Second, 
the related problem that inference from observations in the sensible world to ideas about the intelligible 
might lead to speculations which were at positively at odds with the truth about god.  
 
Porphyry is especially forceful in addressing specific aspects of the Christian critique of pagan rationalism as 
a means to understanding, both by means of a sustained counterattack in Contra Christianos and through the 
defence of pagan superiority over Christian appropriation of pagan allegoristic in De philosophia ex oraculis. It 
is not only that the accusation reflected back onto the Christians themselves, who clearly made extensive use 
of allegoristic exegeses of biblical passages, especially, in the Alexandrian context, in Clement and Origen. 
Rather, in so doing, the allegorical method had been misapplied in reference to unsuitable texts, fruitlessly or 
unclearly applied in its reliance on revelation where reason alone had failed to reveal the allegorical meaning 
of the passage, or applied with rationally unacceptable results.162 In neither the Christian nor the pagan cases, 
however, did the objections rest on the use of allegory or allusion as such. On both sides the focus is on the 
material to which the interpretative procedure is applied. Each thought the other’s texts were incapable of 
                               
161 Sinuthius Theol., ]rmoeihe nnetseei = I am amazed = Contra Origenistas et Gnosticos (W54, Discourses 7, Work 5), HB 39.2–41.1: §.0331; 
§.0403.  
162 Porphyrius Phil., Contra Christianos (fragmenta). 39.1-46 = Eusebius Theol., Scr. Eccl., Historia ecclesiastica 6.19.2 ff.; 54.1-10 = Macarius 
Scr. Eccl., Apocriticus seu Μονογενής 4.8.  
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supporting the metaphysical load placed on them, but the results were both superfluous to and at odds with, 
respectively, scripturally revealed or rationally defensible truths.  
 
The hieroglyphic tradition was routinely seen as premissed on a form of allegorical or allusive interpretation, 
and was to that extent susceptible to the same objections. Several representatives of the various schools of 
late Platonism address, both directly and indirectly, themes emerging from the hieroglyphic tradition that 
preceded it. The nature of those schools’ interest in that tradition and its part in a broader engagement in 
theosophical speculation was a matter remarked upon even within late Platonism itself. The engagement with 
theosophical topics was seen as a development alongside the strictly philosophical subjects, but prioritized in 
the activities of the Syrian school under the momentum provided by Iamblichus. It was this reversal of 
emphasis that particularly distinguished the latter from the Roman school that had preceded it and was to 
influence the Alexandrian and Athenian schools which followed.  
 
[T213] οἱ μὲν τὴν φιλοσοφίαν προτιμῶσιν, ὡς Πορφύριος καὶ 
Πλωτῖνος καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ φιλόσοφοι· οἱ δὲ τὴν ἱερατικήν, ὡς 
Ἰάμβλιχος καὶ Συριανὸς καὶ Πρόκλος καὶ οἱ ἱερατικοὶ πάντες.163  
Some prefer philosophy, as Porphyry and Plotinus, and 
many other philosophers; but others [prefer] the hieratic 
art, such as Iamblichus and Syrianus and Proclus and all 
those who are sacerdotal.  
 
 
Whether this is an accurate picture of one kind of difference between schools or not, one especial advantage 
of late Platonism for the understanding of the hieroglyphic tradition is nevertheless its position at the end of 
the broader development of Platonism quite generally. The consequent prospect of both an overview and 
synthesis of preceding developments is possible, in fact, in large part due to a curricular feature across which 
those themes are distributed. The themes in question are classifiable into the three parts: physiology, logic, 
and theology. Inquiring into natural causes and phenomena, the physiological part looks to material 
originating in hieroglyphic Egyptian from the perspective of Græco-Egyptian cultural and natural history. For 
the inquiry into the processes of discursive reasoning, the logical part looks to hieroglyphic Egyptian from 
the perspective of the rational relations between language, mind, and world. The theological part looks to the 
unity, origin, and efficacy of hieroglyphic wisdom on the subject of the gods and cosmology.  
 
                               
163 Damascius Phil., In Phaedonem (versio 1) 172.1-3.  
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The question, therefore, with which the following sections are concerned is how these three parts of the 
curriculum are related to each in such a way as to account for both the rôle played by theosophical 
speculation in general, and hieroglyphic exegesis in particular. The aim is to establish the Egyptizing 
philosophical subjects both as proper topics for philosophical investigation and as consciously addressing the 
Christian accusations of sophistical and allegorical obscurity. Part Two examines aspects of semantic theory 
which may be thought to account for how and what hieroglyphic signs signify as well as the relationship 
between what is signified and both the natural phenomena they depict and the causes of them. Part Three 
aligns this semantic account with an independently characterizable metaphysical substrate. This provides 
both a justificatory framework for the semantic account and a methodological principle legitimizing 
hieroglyphic exegetical procedure. Thereby hieroglyphic signs are established as depictions of realia of 
Egyptian provenance reflecting, in the phenomena of nature, categorial hierarchies which might be thought 
to legitimize inference to primary (or secondary) causes of those phenomena. Part Four addresses the 
question of the sense in which the interpretation of hieroglyphs either preserves or fails to preserve the 
intellectual content of the hieroglyph it explains by virtue of aligning the two elements (glyph and exegesis) 
with the categorial hierarchies described in Part Three.  
 
Porphyry had maintained a threefold distinction of Egyptian script:  
 
[T214] Καὶ ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ μὲν τοῖς ἱερεῦσι συνῆν καὶ τὴν σοφίαν 
ἐξέμαθε, καὶ τὴν Αἰγυπτίων φωνήν, γραμμάτων δὲ τρισσὰς 
διαφοράς, ἐπιστολογραφικῶν τε καὶ ἱερογλυφικῶν καὶ 
συμβολικῶν, τῶν μὲν κυριολογουμένων κατὰ μίμησιν, τῶν δὲ 
ἀλληγορουμένων κατά τινας αἰνιγμούς· καὶ περὶ θεῶν πλέον τι 
ἔμαθεν.164  
In Egypt he conversed with the priests and learned their 
wisdom, and the speech of the Egyptians, and the three 
different types of letters, epistolographic, hieroglyphic, 
and symbolic, some used with primary significance 
mimetically, others used with allegorical significance  
allusively; and he learnt something more about the gods.  
 
The epistolographic may be supposed to be a reference either to the demotic (δημοτικά) or to the hieratic 
script (ἱερατικά). If the latter, then Porphyry does not recognise hieratic as cursive hieroglyphic. Uniquely in 
the Greek exegeses, however, Plotinus does note a script-variation in the form of ‘a representation in 
something else, already unfolded and speaking it discursively’ (εἴδωλον ἐν ἄλλῳ ἐξειλιγμένον ἤδη, καὶ λέγον 
αὐτὸ ἐν διεξόδῳ).165 If hieratic and elements of demotic script can be described as (dis)cursive hieroglyphic, 
then the distinctive feature of hieroglyphic in the narrow sense must be conceived of as bound to the media 
                               
164 Porphyrius Phil., Vita Pythagoræ 11.9–12.4.   
165 Plotinus Phil., Enneades 5.8.6.10-11. The suggestion originates in a note to a translation of the passage made by Малеванский (see 
Плотин. Сочинения. Плотин в русских переводах (СПб: 1995).  
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or means of their production. Insofar as the crucial feature of the hieroglyphic characters is their transparency 
as depictions of sensible phenomena, a feature lost in the cursive development of hieroglyphs in the demotic 
and hieratic scripts, Plotinus specifically ties the hieroglyphic usage to the availability of the meaning of the 
glyph in its depictive immediacy.  
 
Porphyry’s threefold distinction (τρισσὰς διαφοράς) is arranged, using τε … καὶ to separate the epistolographic 
from both the hieroglyphic and symbolic uses, such that the two-part explanatory comment that follows can 
only refer to the latter two types. Although the primary distinction is between epistolographic and non-
epistolographic types of script, there is no reason to suppose that the secondary distinction between script 
‘used with primary significance representatively’ (τῶν μὲν κοινολογουμένων κατὰ μίμησιν) and ‘used with 
allegorical significance allusively’ (τῶν δὲ ἀλληγορουμένων κατά τινας αἰνιγμούς) correspond to the 
hieroglyphic and symbolic uses respectively. What is crucial in Porphyry’s classification is that hieroglyphic 
signs may be used in two ways: (i) in virtue of their mimetic aspect and (ii) in virtue of their allusive aspect. 
The term ‘hieroglyphic’ is, in this sense, applied in a manner consistent with Plotinus’ usage as described 
below. The Porphyrian division of primary (or mimetic) and symbolic (or allegorical) modes of expression 
involves not only a clearly distinct use of the notion of symbolism to refer not to phonetic orthography, but 
to a new relation, independent of the depictive functions of hieroglyphs, which is referred to as allusive.  
 
Egyptian writing, then, is capable of three modes of expression. The first it shares with Greek, namely, the 
capacity to render the spoken language. The second is depictive, capable of signifying its meaning 
transparently, that is, without recourse to the medium of the spoken language. The third is allusive, 
susceptible of allegorical interpretation. On the face of it this is a straightforward claim about how the 
Egyptians used their scripts. I shall, however, argue that these distinctions are in fact theoretically motivated 
by a specific conception of semantics, which is in turn justified by Platonic metaphysical distinctions. Both 
the semantic and metaphysical basis for the Porphyrian model of hieroglyphics had wide currency in 
Neoplatonic thought and were significantly developed by Iamblichus and given scholastic expression in 
Proclus. In the following chapter, therefore, I develop an account of: first, Neoplatonic semantic theory quite 
generally; second, the rôle of semantic theory within the broader metaphysical framework to which it 
belonged; and, third, the interpretative methodology applied on the basis of that framework to the specific 
understanding of Egyptian hieroglyphs current amongst the Neoplatonic exegetes.   
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Chapter Three: Neoplatonic Hieroglyphics 
 
§1. Semantics 
 
The primary occasion for the Neoplatonic commentators’ interest in semantics is the controversy over the 
σκοπός of the Categoriæ. The controversy can be summarized as follows. There are three major readings of the 
aim or purpose of the Categoriæ according to whether the subject being addressed is construed as realities 
(πράγματα), linguistic expressions (φωναί), or concepts (νοήματα). As presented by, for example, Iamblichus,166 
these readings need not, however, be understood to be mutually exclusive and in fact a unified account is 
precisely what is required. A version of the view that a unified conception of the σκοπός of the Categoriæ had 
become canonical by for later Neoplatonists in the form: ‘the subject of the Categoriæ concerns expressions in 
so far as they signify objects, through the medium of concepts’ (ἔστιν ὁ σκοπὸς τῶν Κατηγοριῶν περὶ φωνῶν 
σημαινουσῶν πράγματα διὰ μέσων νοημάτων).167 The reason the semantic question is materially implicated in 
the σκοπός question is that this canonical expression of the solution to the latter is formulated in terms of the 
solution to the former. The relationship between the three possible answers to the question of the subject-
matter of the Categoriæ is a semantic relationship. Linguistic expressions signify objects and that semantic 
relation is mediated through concepts. This solution to the σκοπός question was neither universally accepted, 
nor univocally understood. The primary point of controversy is the mediation of concepts (νοήματα) between 
linguistic expressions (φωναί) and realities (πράγματα). Further controversies arise concerning what exactly 
‘concepts’ and ‘realities’ are. Moreover, the attribution of the various proposals attested is a similarly vexed 
issue. Nor is the identification of scholastic divisions on the matter, even where possible, clearly desirable.168  
 
It is at any rate clear that the idea that two kinds of thing are signified by linguistic expressions (φωναί), one 
direct, the other indirect – i.e. concepts (νοήματα) and objects (πράγματα) respectively – is the Aristotelian 
view as presented at the opening of De interpretatione.169 The main alternative solution excluded the mediating 
                               
166 Iamblichus apud Olympiodorus Phil., Prolegomena 19.36-20.12.  
167 Cf. Joannes Philoponus Phil., In Aristotelis categorias commentarium 13.1.9.12-5; cf. Olympiodorus Phil. Prolegomena 21.3-39; Elias Phil. Eliae 
(olim Davidis) In Aristotelis categorias commentarium 129.19-131.33.  
168 See esp. Griffin, M. J., ‘The Reception of Aristotle’s Categories, c. 80 BC to AD 220’ (Thesis submitted for the D.Phil.: Oriel College, 
Oxford, 2009). See also Strange, S. K., ‘Plotinus, Porphyry, and the Neoplatonic Interpretation of the ‘Categories’’ in Aufstieg und Niedergang 
der Römischen Welt (ANRW), Band II. 36.2 (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1987): pp. 955-974.  
169 Aristoteles Phil. De interpretatione 16a1ff.  
Ἔστι μὲν οὖν τὰ ἐν τῇ φωνῇ τῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ παθημάτων σύμβολα, καὶ 
τὰ γραφόμενα τῶν ἐν τῇ φωνῇ. καὶ ὥσπερ οὐδὲ γράμματα πᾶσι τὰ αὐτά, 
οὐδὲ φωναὶ αἱ αὐταί· ὧν μέντοι ταῦτα σημεῖα πρώτων, ταὐτὰ πᾶσι 
παθήματα τῆς ψυχῆς, καὶ ὧν ταῦτα ὁμοιώματα πράγματα ἤδη ταὐτά.  
Now spoken sounds are symbols of affections in the soul, and 
written marks symbols of spoken sounds. And just as written 
marks are not the same for all men, neither are spoken sounds. But 
what these are in the first place signs of – affections of the soul – 
are the same for all; and what these affections are likenesses of – 
actual things – are also the same. 
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role of concepts.170 Thirdly, in the course of his synthesis of the preceding traditions Simplicius further 
specifies a crucial link establishing the precise relationship between the direct and indirect significata of 
linguistic expressions, which he attributes to ‘members of the Academy’ (οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς Ἀκαδημίας).171  
 
The first question facing those who believe in the mediating role of concepts is the motivation for introducing 
them between words and things. According to the standard account,172 for Porphyry the primary significance 
of words derives from a ‘first imposition of expressions’ (τῆς πρώτης θέσεως τῶν λέξεων) signifying things 
directly. This is followed by a ‘second imposition’ (τῆς δευτέρας θέσεως) concerning the use of terms for parts 
of language, e.g. noun (ὄνομα) and verb/adjective (ῥῆμα). Here is his account of the origins of significant 
language.173  
 
[T301] Φημὶ τοίνυν ὅτι τῶν πραγμάτων ἐκκειμένων δηλωτικὸς 
γενόμενος καὶ σημαντικὸς αὐτὸς ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἦλθεν ἐπὶ τὸ καὶ 
διὰ τῆς φωνῆς κατονομάζειν καὶ δηλοῦν ἕκαστον. καὶ γέγονεν 
αὐτῷ ἡ πρώτη χρῆσις τῶν λέξεων εἰς τὸ παραστῆσαι ἕκαστον 
τῶν πραγμάτων διὰ φωνῶν τινων καὶ λέξεων, καθ' ἣν δὴ 
σχέσιν τῶν φωνῶν τὴν πρὸς τὰ πράγματα τόδε μέν τι πρᾶγμα 
βάθρον κέκληκεν, τόδε δὲ ἄνθρωπον, τόδε δὲ κύνα, ἥλιον δὲ 
τόδε, καὶ πάλιν τόδε μὲν τὸ χρῶμα λευκόν, τόδε δὲ μέλαν, καὶ 
τόδε μὲν ἀριθμόν, τόδε δὲ μέγεθος, καὶ τόδε μὲν δίπηχυ, τόδε δὲ 
τρίπηχυ, καὶ οὕτως ἑκάστῳ πράγματι λέξεις καὶ ὀνόματα 
τέθεικεν σημαντικὰ αὐτῶν καὶ μηνυτικὰ διὰ τῶν τοιούτων τῆς 
φωνῆς ψόφων.174  
So I claim that once man himself came to be denotative and 
significative of things that are present he came to name 
and denote each thing by means of the voice. And for him 
the first use of expressions came to stand for each of the 
things through certain utterances and expressions, and in 
accordance with the relation of utterances to things he 
called a certain thing a seat, this a man, this a dog, this the 
sun, and again this colour white, this black, and this 
number, this size, and this two cubits, this three cubits, and 
so he assigned to each thing expressions and names 
significant and indicative of them through such sounds of 
the voice.  
 
The crucial feature of this account is that first-imposition expressions signify things directly without the aid 
of mediating concepts. One possible explanation for the absence of concepts from the account might be that it 
derives from Stoic rather than Aristotelian sources.175 Another possible explanation is that first- and second-
imposition expressions may be thought to provide a systematic distinction between the τόποι of the Categoriæ 
and De interpretatione: simple expressions (ἁπλαῖ φωναί) and the first synthesis of simple expressions (τῆς 
πρώτης συνθέσεως τῶν ἁπλῶν φωνῶν) as constituents of assertion (ἀπόφανσις) respectively – followed by a 
                                                                                               
 
170 Attributed to Herminus apud Porphyrius Phil. In Aristotelis categorias expositio per interrogationem et responsionem 4.1.59.20-25 and 
Porphyry himself apud Simplicius Phil. In Aristotelis categorias commentarium 8.17.3ff.  
171 Simplicius Phil. In Aristotelis categorias commentarium 8.209.10-14.  
172 Cf. Griffin, M. J., ‘The Reception of Aristotle’s Categories, c. 80 BC to AD 220’ (Thesis submitted for the D.Phil.: Oriel College, Oxford, 
2009) and Lloyd, A. C., The Anatomy of Neoplatonism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990): chapter 2, ‘Porphyrian Semantics’.  
173 Porphyrius Phil. In Aristotelis categorias expositio per interrogationem et responsionem 4.1.57.20-29.  
174 Porphyrius Phil., In Aristotelis categorias expositio per interrogationem et responsionem, 4.1.57.20–29.  
175 Ammonius Phil. In Aristotelis librum de interpretatione commentarius 17.20-28. The terminology of imposition itself was known in the Stoa; 
cf. Eusebius Scr. Eccl. et Theol. Præparatio evangelica 6.8.8.2-3.  
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second synthesis in συλλογισμός as the topic of Analytica priora.176 Though Porphyry does seem to have 
eschewed any consideration of intermediaries in the nature of concepts between expressions and objects, at 
least insofar as he took the former to stand for (παραστῆσαι) the latter in the first imposition,177 he 
nonetheless makes it clear that the theory of both first and second imposition of names is independent of the 
question of predication. To predicate is to ‘call something in accordance with something signified’.178 A 
predicate expression does not then signify a thing directly, for predication would then be to call a thing in 
accordance with itself. In the case of Porphyry too, then, it becomes clear that two kinds of thing are signified 
by linguistic expressions, one in accordance with first imposition, another through predication.179  
 
Regarding predication, the Categoriæ had drawn a distinction as follows: ‘of things’ (τῶν ὄντων) ‘some are said 
of a subject, but are not in any subject’ (τὰ μὲν καθ' ὑποκειμένου τινὸς λέγεται, ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ δὲ οὐδενί ἐστιν) and 
‘others are in a subject but are not said of any subject’ (τὰ δὲ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ μέν ἐστι, καθ' ὑποκειμένου δὲ οὐδενὸς 
λέγεται).180 As an example of the latter, Aristotle gives ‘the individual white’ (τὸ τὶ λευκὸν), which ‘is in a 
subject, the body’ (ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ μέν ἐστι τῷ σώματι) ‘for all colour is in a body’ (ἅπαν γὰρ χρῶμα ἐν σώματι), 
‘but is not said of any subject’ (καθ' ὑποκειμένου δὲ οὐδενὸς λέγεται·).181 White (τὸ λευκόν), we further learn, 
because it is ‘what is in something, not as a part, and cannot exist separately from what it is in’ (ὃ ἔν τινι μὴ ὡς 
μέρος ὑπάρχον ἀδύνατον χωρὶς εἶναι τοῦ ἐν ᾧ ἐστίν), is a ‘qualification’ (ποιόν).182  
 
In specifying the subject of the Categoriæ Porphyry’s account had been explicit in distinguishing such 
individuals as ‘white’ and their corresponding verbal expressions – which are ‘practically infinite in number’ 
(ἄπειρα μὲν σχεδὸν καὶ τὰ πράγματα καὶ αἱ λέξεις κατὰ ἀριθμόν). Nevertheless, ‘the list of ten genera under which 
the infinity of beings and expressions that signify them are found to be included’ (ἡ ἀπειρία τῶν ὄντων καὶ τῶν 
σημαινουσῶν αὐτὰ λέξεων εἰς δέκα γένη εὕρηται περιλαμβανομένη εἰς τὸ γράφεσθαι) comprehends both subjects 
and their qualifications and what is said of them.183  
 
[T302] εἰς δέκα τοίνυν γενικὰς διαφορὰς περιληφθέντων τῶν Since beings are comprehended by ten generic differentiæ, 
                               
176 Ammonius Phil. In Aristotelis librum de interpretatione commentarius 4.5-10.  
177 ἡ πρόθεσις τοῦ βιβλίου περὶ τῆς πρώτης θέσεως τῶν λέξεων τῆς παραστατικῆς τῶν πραγμάτων· ἔστιν γὰρ περὶ φωνῶν σημαντικῶν ἁπλῶν, καθὸ 
σημαντικαί εἰσι τῶν πραγμάτων (4.1.58.4-6). See also Lloyd, A. C., The Anatomy of Neoplatonism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990): chapter 2, 
‘Porphyrian Semantics’.  
178 τὸ δὲ ἀγορεύειν τὰ πράγματα κατά τι σημαινόμενον κατηγορεῖν ἔλεγον (4.1.58.16-17).  
179 Porphyrius Phil. In Aristotelis categorias expositio per interrogationem et responsionem 4.1.56.8-13.  
180 Aristoteles Phil. Categoriæ 1a20-24.  
181 καὶ τὸ τὶ λευκὸν ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ μέν ἐστι τῷ σώματι,  – ἅπαν γὰρ χρῶμα ἐν σώματι, –  καθ' ὑποκειμένου δὲ οὐδενὸς λέγεται· (1a27-29).  
182 οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο σημαίνει τὸ λευκὸν ἀλλ' ἢ ποιόν (3b19).  
183 Porphyrius Phil. In Aristotelis categorias expositio per interrogationem et responsionem 4.1.58.9-20.  
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ὄντων δέκα καὶ αἱ δηλοῦσαι ταῦτα φωναὶ γεγόνασι κατὰ γένη 
καὶ αὐταὶ περιληφθεῖσαι. δέκα οὖν λέγονται κατηγορίαι τῷ 
γένει δηλονότι, ὥσπερ καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ ὄντα δέκα τῷ γένει.184   
the words that denote them have also come to be ten in 
genus, and are themselves also so comprehended. 
Therefore predications are said to be manifestly ten in 
genus, just as beings themselves are ten in genus.   
 
By virtue of the correspondence of the ten genera of being and the ten genera of predication, for Porphyry, 
Aristotle is justified in naming the work Categoriæ insofar as he is concerned with simple expressions directly 
significant of things ‘according to each genus’ (κατὰ γένος ἕκαστον).  
 
[T303] ὥστε πᾶσα ἁπλῆ λέξις σημαντικὴ ὅταν κατὰ τοῦ 
σημαινομένου πράγματος ἀγορευθῆ τε καὶ λεχθῇ, λέγεται 
κατηγορία. οἷον ὄντος πράγματος τοῦδε τοῦ δεικνυμένου λίθου, 
οὗ ἁπτόμεθα ἢ ὃ βλέπομεν, ὅταν εἴπωμεν ἐπ' αὐτοῦ ὅτι τόδε 
λίθος ἐστίν, ἡ λίθος λέξις κατηγόρημά ἐστι· σημαίνει γὰρ τὸ 
τοιόνδε πρᾶγμα καὶ ἀγορεύεται κατὰ τοῦ δεικνυμένου 
πράγματος λίθου.185  
Every simple significant expression when it is spoken and 
said of the thing signified is said to be a predicate. For 
example if there is a thing which is this stone which is 
being shown, and which we are touching or looking at, 
when we say of it, ‘This is a stone’, the expression ‘stone’ is 
a predicate, for it signifies a thing of such a kind and is 
spoken of the thing being shown.  
 
That is, a predicate expression is described as applying to the object indicated and signifying the kind of thing it 
is.186 Having identified the former (i.e. the indicated object) as an ‘individual’ (τόδε τι), which is ‘particular’ 
(καθ' ἕκαστον) in continuity with the Aristotelian account, the latter (i.e. the kind of thing signified) as ‘the 
thing in common for thought’ (τὸ κοινῇ τῇ διανοίᾳ), i.e. a universal. The point is not only to distinguish 
universals from particulars, but also to qualify the relation involved as explicitly a relation in thought.187 In the 
case of predication, then, in addition to the terminology of individuals and particulars, the explicit relation in 
thought indicates the presence of a conceptual component to semantics.  
 
[T304] παρὰ γὰρ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστον οὔτε βοῦν οὔτε ἄνθρωπον 
οὔτε ἵππον οὔτε ὅλως ἔστι νοῆσαι ζῷον. εἰ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς τῶν καθ' 
ἕκαστον αἰσθήσεως ἐπὶ τὸ κοινῇ τῇ διανοίᾳ ἀφικνούμεθα, ὅπερ 
οὐκέτι τόδε τι νοοῦμεν ἀλλὰ τοιόνδε, εἰ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστον 
ἀναιρεθῇ ζῷα, οὐκέτι οὐδὲ τὸ κοινῇ κατηγορούμενον κατ' 
αὐτῶν ἔσται.188 
It is impossible to conceive of an ox or a man or a horse or 
any animal at all apart from particulars. But if (we start) 
from the perception of particulars, we arrive at that which 
is in common for thought, which we no longer conceive as 
an individual, but as a thing of such a kind, if particular 
animals were taken up, it will no longer be that which is 
predicated in common of them.  
 
                               
184 Porphyrius Phil., In Aristotelis categorias expositio per interrogationem et responsionem 4.1.58.9–20.  
185 Porphyrius Phil., In Aristotelis categorias expositio per interrogationem et responsionem 4.1.56.8–13.  
186 σημαίνει γὰρ τὸ τοιόνδε πρᾶγμα καὶ ἀγορεύεται κατὰ τοῦ δεικνυμένου πράγματος λίθου (56.12-13).  
187 Porphyrius Phil. In Aristotelis categorias expositio per interrogationem et responsionem 4.1.91.1-5.  
188 Porphyrius Phil., In Aristotelis categorias expositio per interrogationem et responsionem 4.1.91.1–5.  
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Now we are in position to reconcile the apparent discontinuity of an account of direct signification of things 
through simple expressions and the account of predication. The first imposition relation between expressions 
and things qualified as a second-imposition relation in thought is, as such, the relation between significant 
expressions and the ten genera of things of such a kind. First imposition signifiers signify particulars by directly 
naming them; predicative signifiers directly signify universals, i.e. what is common in thought.  
 
This is not to say, however, that Porphyry envisaged two ways to signify particulars: one directly through the 
first imposition and the other indirectly through predication. On the contrary, insofar as a predicative 
statement is composed of a syntactic subject (ὄνομα) and a syntactic predicate (ῥῆμα), it is predicative 
statements that make use of two types of signification. In the case of the subject we have direct signification of 
the particular of which the predication is made by naming it and in the case of the predicate we have directly 
signified universals predicable of those particulars. In other words, the notion of semantics as exclusively 
constrained by the theory of the first imposition of names not only presupposes that the semantic rôle that is 
attributable to concepts is confined to mediating the naming relation, but also that meaning as such is 
univalent. Neither constraint appears to be supported by the text. What we have instead is an account of 
signification sensitive to the variety of rôles played by linguistic expressions and to the variety of their 
respective relations to the objects or states of affairs of which they speak.  
 
For that reason, though I describe the controversy over the σκοπός of the Categoriæ as the primary occasion 
for the Neoplatonic commentators’ interest in semantics, it ought to be emphasized that Neoplatonic interest 
in (and theorization of) semantics is by no means confined to just those semantic relations that may be 
thought to be directly relevant to the σκοπός question alone. Nonetheless, the question of how precisely the 
bipartite account as presented by Porphyry and the tripartite account as presented by, for example, 
Iamblichus can be reconciled in a unified account remains unanswered. Moreover, the further question of 
how precisely particulars directly signified in the first imposition of names are related to the universals under 
which they fall and which are directly signified in predication is taken up by Iamblichus apud Simplicius.189  
 
[T305] ὁ μέντοι Ἰάμβλιχος – οὐ τὰ γένη, φησίν, τῶν 
ὑποκειμένων κατηγορεῖται, ἀλλ' ἕτερα διὰ ταῦτα· ὅταν γὰρ 
λέγωμεν Σωκράτην ἄνθρωπον εἶναι, οὐ τὸν γενικόν φαμεν 
Iamblichus however says it is not genus that is predicated 
of what subsists, for when we say of Socrates that he is a 
man we say not that the man is the generic, but that he 
                               
189 Simplicius Phil. In Aristotelis categorias commentarium 8.53.9-18.  
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αὐτὸν ἄνθρωπον εἶναι, ἀλλὰ μετέχειν τοῦ γενικοῦ, ὥσπερ τὸ 
λευκὴν εἶναι τὴν ἄμπελον ταὐτόν ἐστιν τῷ λευκοὺς βότρυας 
φέρειν, κατὰ ἀναφορὰν τὴν ἐπὶ τὸν καρπὸν οὕτως αὐτῆς 
καλουμένης. περὶ δὲ τούτων ἐν τοῖς Μετὰ τὰ φυσικὰ ἀκριβῶς 
διώρισεν Ἀριστοτέλης. νῦν δὲ κοινότερον κέχρηται ταῖς 
σημασίαις, ὡς καὶ ἡμεῖς ὅταν λέγωμεν τοὺς ὁρισμοὺς ἐκ γένους 
εἶναι καὶ διαφορῶν, οὐ κυρίως τὸ γένος ἐνταῦθα λαμβάνοντες, 
ἀλλ' ἀντὶ τῆς πτώσεως, ἧς ἐξηγητικόν ἐστιν τὸ μετέχειν τοῦ 
γενικοῦ.190  
participates in the generic. Similarly, by anaphora, the 
white grape is so identified by virtue of the white that the 
grapes bear, as Aristotle in the Metaphysics precisely 
distinguished. For we use the same signifiers in common as 
when we say that definitions are by genus and differentiæ, 
understanding thereby not genus primarily but case 
instead, which is to be explained as participation in the 
generic.  
 
Here we not only have the familiar Aristotelian distinction between ‘the [whiteness] on the fruit’ (τὴν 
[λευκὴν] ἐπὶ τὸν καρπὸν) and ‘being white’ (τὸ λευκὴν εἶναι), but also a specification of the relation between the 
two. The former is a particular, the latter is the particular’s participation in a universal. Furthermore, the 
relation of participation in the generic (μετέχειν τοῦ γενικοῦ) is, in a primary sense, the relation of ‘case’ 
(πτώσεως), not genus, because definition by genus and differentiæ would otherwise define the very thing in 
accordance with which it defines. That is, the same problems that arise in an account of predication as 
signifying a thing directly applies to definition by genus and differentiæ, namely circularity in the case of true 
definition and the consequent impossibility of false definition.  
 
Attributing further reflection on ‘cases’ (πτώσεις) to unspecified ‘members of the Academy’ (οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς 
Ἀκαδημίας) – evidently Platonists, given the contrast with ‘members of the Stoa’ (οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς)191 – 
Simplicius clarifies their relation to both particulars and universals.192  
 
[T306] ἐκάλουν δὲ τὴν ποιότητα καὶ ἕξιν οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς, οἱ δὲ 
ἀπὸ τῆς Ἀκαδημίας ἀπὸ τοῦ ἔχεσθαι τὰς ἕξεις ἑκτὰ ἐκάλουν, 
ὥσπερ τὰ ἐννοήματα μεθεκτὰ ἀπὸ τοῦ μετέχεσθαι καὶ τὰς 
πτώσεις τευκτὰς ἀπὸ τοῦ τυγχάνεσθαι καὶ κατηγορήματα καὶ 
συμβάματα ἀπὸ τοῦ συμβεβηκέναι.193  
Those from the Stoa also called the property a disposition, 
but those from the Academy called dispositions ‘things to 
possess’ from being possessed, and concepts ‘things to 
participate in’ from being participated in, and the cases 
‘things to have’ from being had, and predicates ‘accidents’ 
too from following upon them.  
 
So predicates are neither particular properties nor dispositions, which are ‘things to possess’ (ἑκτά), nor 
universal concepts, which are ‘things to participate in’ (μεθεκτά). But nor are predicates the cases themselves, 
which are ‘things to have’ (τευκτά), i.e. what particulars have as a result of participating in universals. Rather 
                               
190 Simplicius Phil., In Aristotelis categorias commentarium 8.53.9–18.  
191 Cf. Frede, M., ‘The Stoic notion of a lekton’ in Everson, S., (ed.) Companions to Ancient Thought: 3 Language (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1994): pp.109-28.  
192 Simplicius Phil. In Aristotelis categorias commentarium 8.209.10-14.  
193 Simplicius Phil., In Aristotelis categorias commentarium 8.209.10–14.  
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they are ‘accidents’ (συμβάματα) by virtue of ‘following upon’ (συμβεβηκέναι) the former through their 
participation in the latter and thereby falling under predicable concepts.  
 
Porphyry’s theory of the first imposition of names, according to which the phenomena of nature are 
representatively signified by the direct application of names, defines the intelligibility of linguistic terms 
prerequisite for predication. In reception of Aristotle’s Categoriæ a second type of signification is described by 
Porphyry, conceptually mediated in predication. A linguistic expression (φωνῆ or λέξις) is composed of a 
noun (ὄνομα) and a verb or an adjective (ῥῆμα). In representative signification the object is to identify features 
of the phenomenal world in order to establish the terms used in predication as meaningful at all. Such an 
expression directly signifies a factual condition (πρᾶγμα) composed of a particular individual (τόδε τι) and 
property (ποιόν), which is an attribute (ἕκτον). The expression is further classified by genus in the form of a 
predicative statement (κατηγόρημα) indicating the universal (τὸ καθόλου), which is an incident (μεθεκτόν). 
Insofar as a predicate is thereby predicable of a particular it is an accident (σύμβαμα), and what we indicate by 
means of a predicate is that by falling under a universal the particular has a case (πτῶσις), which is a resultant 
(τευκτόν). In predicative signification the object is to make a statement about features of the phenomenal 
world by virtue of terms established as meaningfully identifiable as the objects they are through the first 
imposition of names.  
 
The first type of signification signifies particulars and their composition in factual conditions. It is a bipartite 
theory according to which words directly signify things without the mediation of concepts. In this the 
representative semantic relation contrasts with the conceptual semantic relation of the second type of 
signification. The latter is a tripartite theory, whereby words directly signify concepts and thereby, indirectly 
things. In the version of the theory as developed by Iamblichus apud Simplicius, the relationship between 
linguistic expressions and what they signify is given greater precision. According to this version, words 
(φωναί) signify neither common concepts (νοήματα), nor particular things (πράγματα), but particular things 
insofar as they fall under common concepts. Insofar as particular things fall under common concepts they are 
specified as cases (πτώσεις) and resultants (τευκτά). Far from being mutually exclusive, the tripartite theory is 
dependent on the bipartite theory for the meaningfulness of the terms predicated. The meaningfulness of 
terms used in predication is indefeasible, whereas predications are verifiable or falsifiable by reference to the 
sensible world, but indefeasible by reference to the thoughts which they express. Type one directly signifies 
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things; type two directly signifies thoughts. It is in this sense that type one provides a physiological account 
of meaning and type two, a logical account of meaning. But there is a third type of signification, for which a 
metaphysical explanation is given, upon which both types one and two are causally dependent and to which 
it is possible to reason from them. This is the subject of the next section.  
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§2. Metaphysics 
 
Plotinus thinks the Categoriæ a work of metaphysics concerning realities (πράγματα), on which reading he 
offers substantial criticism of Aristotle in ‘On the genera of being’ (Περὶ τῶν γενῶν τοῦ ὄντος).194 Each reality, 
however, is not the particular (καθ' ἕκαστον) individual (τόδε τι) of Porphyry’s account,195 but the substance of 
the thing itself (τοῦ πράγματος καὶ τῆς οὐσίας).196 In a well-known passage in ‘On intelligible beauty’ (Περὶ τοῦ 
νοητοῦ κάλλους)197 Plotinus states that there is an individual hieroglyphic image for each thing (ἓν ἓκαστον 
ἑκάστου πράγματος ἄγαλμα) by which ‘to present the way there in truth’ (τὴν ἐκεῖ οὐ διέξοδον ἐμφῆναι).198  
 
[T307] Δοκοῦσι δέ μοι καὶ οἱ Αἰγυπτίων σοφοί, εἴτε ἀκριβεῖ 
ἐπιστήμῃ λαβόντες εἴτε καὶ συμφύτῳ, περὶ ὧν ἐβούλοντο διὰ 
σοφίας δεικνύναι, μὴ τύποις γραμμάτων διεξοδεύουσι λόγους 
καὶ προτάσεις μηδὲ μιμουμένοις φωνὰς καὶ προφορὰς 
ἀξιωμάτων κεχρῆσθαι, ἀγάλματα δὲ γράψαντες καὶ ἓν ἕκαστον 
ἑκάστου πράγματος ἄγαλμα ἐντυπώσαντες ἐν τοῖς ἱεροῖς τὴν 
ἐκεί<ν>ου διέξοδον ἐμφῆναι, ὡς ἄρα τις καὶ ἐπιστήμη καὶ σοφία 
ἕκαστόν ἐστιν ἄγαλμα καὶ ὑποκείμενον καὶ ἀθρόον καὶ οὐ 
διανόησις οὐδὲ βούλευσις. 199  
Also the wise of Egypt seem to me, whether understanding 
by precise knowledge or by nature, concerning those 
things which they wanted to show through wisdom, to use 
not arguments and premisses with regular types of letters 
nor those imitating utterances and articulations of 
propositions, but by writing images and engraving on the 
temples one each for each object thus to present the 
exposition of that thing, for each image is a particular 
knowledge and wisdom and a unified entity and not 
discursive reason or will.  
 
Each hieroglyphic image is a unified and particular entity in itself (ὑποκείμενον καὶ ἀθρόον) and a particular 
instance of knowledge and wisdom (τις καὶ ἐπιστήμη καὶ σοφία ἓκαστόν ἐστιν ἄγαλμα). This use of hieroglyphs is 
furthermore without recourse to the use of discursive reason (διανόησις) and its typical expression in 
‘arguments and premisses’ (λόγους καὶ προτάσεις) and writing which imitates ‘utterances and articulations of 
propositions’ (φωνὰς καὶ προφορὰς ἀξιωμάτων), but preserves the ontology of its object, which allows one to 
grasp the substrate (ὑποκείμενον) in its totality (ἀθρόον).  
 
                               
194 Plotinus Phil., Enneades 6.1-3 = Tractates 39.1-3/42-4: Περὶ τῶν γενῶν τοῦ ὄντος πρῶτον· οὗ ἡ ἀρχή· περὶ τῶν ὄντων πόσα, καὶ τίνα; Περὶ τῶν 
γενῶν τοῦ ὄντος δεύτερον· οὗ ἡ ἀρχή· ἐπειδὴ περὶ τῶν λεγομένων δέκα γενῶν ἐπέσκεπται; Περὶ τῶν γενῶν τοῦ ὄντος τρίτον· οὗ ἡ ἀρχή· περὶ μὲν 
τῆς οὐσίας ὅπηι δοκεῖ. See Strange, S. K., ‘Plotinus, Porphyry, and the Neoplatonic Interpretation of the ‘Categories’’ in Aufstieg und 
Niedergang der Römischen Welt (ANRW), Band II. 36.2 (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1987): pp. 955-974.  
195 Porphyrius Phil., In Aristotelis categorias expositio per interrogationem et responsionem 4.1.91.1-5.  
196 Plotinus Phil., Enneades 6.5.3.30-31 = Tractate 22.2/23: Περὶ τοῦ τὸ ὂν ἓν καὶ ταὐτὸ ὂν ἅμα πανταχοῦ εἶναι ὅλον δεύτερον· οὗ ἡ ἀρχή· τὸ ἓν καὶ 
ταὐτὸν ἀριθμῶι πανταχοῦ ἅμα ὅλον εἶναι.  
197 Plotinus Phil., Enneades 5.8 = Tractate 28/31: Περὶ τοῦ νοητοῦ κάλλους· οὗ ἡ ἀρχή· ἐπειδή φαμεν τὸν ἐν θέαι τοῦ νοητοῦ - a commentary on 
Plato Phil. Phædrus 246d-247e.   
198 Cf. Valentinus Phil., Theol., Evangelium veritatis = Nag Hammadi Codices I, 3, The Gospel of Truth, 22.38–23.18 and Motte, L., 
‘L’hiéroglyphe, d’Esna à l’Évangile de Vérité’ in Deuxième Journée d’Études Coptes, Cahiers de la Bibliothèque Copte 3 (Louvain, Paris: Peeters, 
1984).  
199 Plotinus Phil., Enneades 5.8.6.1–19.  
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The hieroglyphic example provided there is a specific instance of the general principle that ‘a certain wisdom 
fashions all the things that are made, whether works of art or natural’ (πάντα δὴ τὰ γινόμενα, εἴτε τεχνητὰ εἴτε 
φυσικὰ εἴη, σοφία τις ποιεῖ). The wisdom of the artist guides the production of the work. The artist himself is 
also generated (γεγένηται) in accordance with the wisdom of nature. This principle in nature (λόγον ἐν τῇ 
φύσει) is either ‘of itself’ (ἐξ αὑτοῦ) or is generated by the further principle of intellect (ὁ νοῦς ἐγέννησε τὴν 
σοφίαν).200  
 
This distinction between ‘discursive’ (διανόησις) and ‘intellective’ (νοῦς) thought is intended to overcome the 
objection to the Platonic doctrine of Forms levelled by means of the Third Man Argument, but also responds 
to the sceptical objections to which the Stoic position appeared to lend itself.201 The Stoic position is liable to 
sceptical objections because it relies on to the idea that the distinctive faculty of the soul is discursive reason. 
That is, insofar as the conceptual apparatus for discursive reason is the product of repeated exposure to the 
causal influence of objects on the soul resulting in the formation of concepts organized as experience, some 
further condition or criterion is required by which to judge whether or not the evidential relation itself might 
reasonably be inferred. To that extent the objects of (Stoic) discursive reason are external to itself and 
therefore liable to the standard sceptical objections concerning the possibility of establishing any non-
recursive connection between what is observed in perception as evidence on the basis of which inferences 
about objects might be made. In order to preserve the possibility of knowledge, Platonists argue that 
knowledge is by (non-material) intellect and of intelligibles with which it can be identical.202 Plotinus’ account 
explicitly focuses on the significative possibilities of hieroglyphic language for such intelligibles – as distinct 
from language concerning the sensible world. His aim appears to be to secure a form of non-discursive 
language which will advertise the fact (against potential sceptical objections) that knowledge is not based on 
sense-perception.203 The third strand of my argument, then, concerns the relationship between ‘intellective’ 
(νοερά) and ‘discursive’ (διανοητική) thought as treated in the Aristotelian reflections of Porphyrian 
semantics.  
 
                               
200 Plotinus Phil., Enneades 5.8.5.  
201 Wallis, R. T., ‘Nous as Experience’ in Harris, R. B., (ed.), The Significance of Neoplatonism (Albany: New York, 1976).  
202 νοῦς must know the essence (τὸ τί) of its objects rather than merely its quality (τὸ ποῖόν τι). This is possible because ‘real truth consists 
in agreement not with another but with itself, and it says nothing else beside itself, and is what it says and says what it is’ (ἡ ὄντως 
ἀλήθεια οὐ συμφωνοῦσα ἄλλῳ ἀλλ' ἑαυτῇ, καὶ οὐδὲν παρ' αὑτήν, ἄλλο λέγει, <ἀλλ' ὃ λέγει>, καὶ ἔστι, καὶ ὅ ἐστι, τοῦτο καὶ λέγει). See Plotinus 
Phil., Enneades 5.5.2.18-20. Cf. Wallis, R. T., ‘Nous as Experience’ in Harris, R. B., (ed.), The Significance of Neoplatonism (Albany: New York, 
1976). See also Rappe, S., Reading Neoplatonism: Nondiscursive Thinking in the Texts of Plotinus, Porphyry, and Damascius (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000).  
203 Wallis, R. T., ‘Scepticism and Neoplatonism’ in Aufstieg und Niedergang der Römischen Welt (ANRW), Band II. 36.2 (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1987): 
pp. 911-954.  
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An obvious objection is that the possibility of non-discursive thought expressed through hieroglyphs is 
excluded precisely by virtue of the sensible nature of the hieroglyphs themselves. If hieroglyphs are not to be 
subject to sceptical objections based on causal relations between world and language inhering in discursive 
thought, then there is an apparent need for some possibility of synthesizing hieroglyphs with the objects of 
‘intellective’ (νοερά) thought which accommodates their materiality within a broader framework.204  
 
One possible answer to this might be not to allow Plotinus’ reflections on discursive and intellective language 
to form part of the analysis of the Categoriæ at all, by reading Aristotle as offering an exclusively semantic as 
opposed to metaphysical account. Porphyry may then have deliberately omitted any introduction of the 
Forms into his semantics in order to leave room for the possibility of the synthesis of the Aristotelian account 
with the Platonic. One way to achieve this is by characterizing the Platonic endeavour as proceeding from the 
intelligible to the sensible and the Aristotelian endeavour as proceeding from the sensible to the 
intelligible,205 the causal-semantic sequence φωνή – νόημα - πρᾶγμα can be brought into correspondence with 
the Neoplatonic hypostases τὸ ψυχικόν - τὸ νοερόν - τὸ θεῖον.206 In so doing, the possibility of situating 
hieroglyphics in an intermediate (rather than terminal) position and thus attributing to them a mediating 
rôle in the process is provided for along lines I describe below.  
 
Within the context of an exclusively logical topic, for example, Iamblichus’ discussion of the Aristotelian 
categories allows for the mediation of concepts (νοήματα) between expressions (φωναὶ) and realities 
(πράγματα). These three elements, however, constitute in Iamblichus a tripartite account of universals (τὰ 
καθόλου), not the controversial subject-matter of Aristotle’s text. Each element is the proper subject of three 
distinct disciplines, namely: logic, physiology, and theology respectively; and each part of the account is 
mapped onto the canonical tripartite account of the subject-matter of the Categoriæ.  
 
[T308] εἰ τοίνυν περὶ γενῶν, ὡς εἴρηται, ἐστὶν αὐτῷ ὁ σκοπός, 
οἶδε δὲ πάλιν ἡ λογικὴ οὐ τὰ πρὸ τῶν πολλῶν (θεολογίας γὰρ 
ἔργον τοῦτο), οὐδὲ τὰ ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς (φυσιολογίας γὰρ τοῦτο), 
ἀλλὰ τὰ ἐννοηματικὰ τὰ ἐπὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς καὶ ὑστερογενῆ, πῶς 
οὐκ ἔσται αὐτῷ ὁ σκοπὸς περὶ νοημάτων ἐνταῦθα, εἴ γε λογική 
If then for him the topic is about genera, as it is said, once 
again logic examines not things before the many (for that 
is the subject of theology), nor things in the many (for this 
is the subject of physiology), but concepts which are over 
                               
204 Rappe, S., Reading Neoplatonism: Nondiscursive Thinking in the Texts of Plotinus, Porphyry, and Damascius (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2000).  
205 Gerson, L. P., ‘What is Platonism?’ in Aristotle and Other Platonists (Ithaca, London: Cornell, 2005); Lloyd, A.C., The Anatomy of Neoplatonism 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990).  
206 See Ammonius Phil., In Aristotelis librum de interpretatione commentarius 24.24-9.  
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ἐστιν ἡ μετὰ χεῖρας πραγματεία;207 the many and posterior, how for him will the topic not be 
about concepts here, if at any rate logic is the business at 
hand?  
 
Accordingly, (i) expressions are ‘in the many’ (ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς) and are the subject of physiology, (ii) concepts are 
‘over the many’ (ἐπὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς) and the subject of logic, and (iii) realities are ‘before the many’ (πρὸ τῶν 
πολλῶν) and the subject of theology. It is against this background that the peculiar significative possibilities 
of hieroglyphic language (as attested by Iamblichus, Plotinus, and Porphyry) is considered.208  
 
The correspondences are not, however, entirely transparent. One might have expected, for instance, that the 
‘realities’ of the tripartite account, which were the objects signified by utterances through the medium of 
concepts, would be classified as items ‘in the many’, i.e. the particulars of the Porphyrian account. On the 
other hand, on the standard tripartite account expressions too are particulars, a complication Iamblichus’ 
proposal resolves by juxtaposition of the Platonic ‘top-down’ account – i.e., by identifying realities with 
intelligible rather than sensible objects, proceeding from the intelligible to the sensible.  
 
[T309] οὐ μία τοίνυν γέγονε δόξα περὶ τοῦ σκοποῦ τῶν 
Κατηγοριῶν, ἀλλὰ τοσαῦται γεγόνασι δόξαι, ὅσα τὰ ὄντα 
καθέστηκε· τριττὰ δὲ ταῦτα, ἢ πράγματα ἢ νοήματα ἢ φωναί, 
καὶ τὰ μὲν πράγματα θεόθεν παράγεται, τὰ δὲ νοήματα ὑπὸ τοῦ 
νοῦ, αἱ δὲ φωναὶ ὑπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς.209  
Not one opinion then has arisen concerning the subject-
matter of the Categoriæ, as many as actual objects have 
established; these are three, whether realities, concepts, or 
expressions, and realities are produced from god, concepts 
by the mind, and expressions by the soul. 
 
Thereby a characteristically Neoplatonic hierarchical ontology is developed such that it is expressions that are 
‘by the soul’ (ὑπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς), concepts are ‘by the mind’ (ὑπὸ τοῦ νοῦ), and realities are ‘from god’ (θεόθεν). 
Porphyry’s Aristotelian account, by virtue of being purely ‘logical’, only deals with the first two levels of the 
ontological hierarchy: both expressions (φωναὶ) and objects (πράγματα) in that account are ‘in the many’ and 
concepts (νοήματα) are ‘over the many’. It is the Platonic account that supplies realities (πράγματα), which are 
‘before the many’.  
 
The position attributed by Simplicius and Olympiodorus to Iamblichus and outlined above appears at first 
sight to present a radical departure from the Porphyrian semantic account, not merely (if one is committed to 
                               
207 Olympiodorus Phil., Prolegomena 19.31-34. Cf. Ammonius Phil., In Aristotelis categorias commentarius 8.20-9.16 and Simplicius Phil., In 
Aristotelis categorias commentarium 9.8-10.20.  
208 Iamblichus Phil., De mysteriis 7.1.1-2.5; Plotinus Phil. Enneades 5.8.5; Porphyrius Phil. Vita Pythagoræ 11.9-12.4.  
209 Olympiodorus Phil., Prolegomena 18.23-27.  
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attributing to him a bipartite semantics) by conceding a mediating role to concepts (which, as I shall argue, is 
neither necessary, nor justified), but also by contributing a further layer of ‘intellective interpretation’ (νοερὰ 
θεωρία) in order to establish the possibility of an exegesis of the metaphysical substrate of the lower 
ontological orders. The sources, however, emphasize both continuity and complementarity.  
 
[T310] μετὰ τοῦτον δὲ ὁ θεῖος Ἰάμβλιχος πολύστιχον καὶ αὐτὸς 
πραγματείαν εἰς τοῦτο τὸ βιβλίον κατεβάλετο, τὰ μὲν πολλὰ 
τοῖς Πορφυρίου καὶ ἐπ' αὐτῆς τῆς λέξεως κατακολουθῶν, τινὰ 
δὲ ἐπικρίνων ἐκείνων καὶ διαρθρῶν ἀκριβέστερον μετὰ τοῦ 
συστέλλειν τὴν ὡς ἐν σχολαῖς πρὸς τὰς ἐνστάσεις μακρολογίαν, 
πανταχοῦ δὲ τὴν νοερὰν θεωρίαν ἑκάστῳ σχεδὸν τῶν 
κεφαλαίων ἐπιτιθεὶς καί τι καὶ ἄλλο πρὸς τούτοις χρήσιμον τῷ 
συγγράμματι προστιθείς·210  
After this the divine Iamblichus himself set down a prolix 
treatise in this book, in many respects following what 
Porphyry had said even using the same expression, 
selecting some of these sections more strictly by restricting 
verbosity against objections as in lectures, and everywhere 
imposing intellective theory almost to every chapter and 
adding something else useful to the treatise.   
 
He reasoned that the logical (λογικός) account (attributed to Porphyry) stands in need of correction for its 
emphasis on ‘the utterances by the soul’ (αἱ δὲ φωναὶ ὑπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς), which are ‘in the many’ (ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς) 
and ‘the work of natural science’ (φυσιολογίας γὰρ τοῦτο). The conceptual (ἐννοηματικός) account (attributed to 
Alexander), similarly needs correction, for its emphasis on ‘the concepts by the mind’ (τὰ δὲ νοήματα ὑπὸ τοῦ 
νοῦ), which are ‘over the many’ (ἐπὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς) and ‘posterior’ (ὑστερογενῆ).  The third, divine (θεῖος) account 
(attributed to Herminus) needs correction for emphasizing ‘realities’ (πράγματα), which are ‘from god’ 
(θεόθεν) and ‘before the many’ (πρὸ τῶν πολλῶν), which is ‘the work of theology’ (θεολογίας γὰρ ἔργον τοῦτο).211 
The crucial manœuvre here is not merely to treat the tripartite structure as indicative of a tripartite 
ontology, but to treat the correspondence as a methodological principle for the exegesis of its metaphysical 
implications.  
 
The more problematic aspect of Iamblichus’ procedure lies in how to explain how universals as post rem 
predicables can have an intermediary rôle to play between realities and utterances, since they are explicitly 
posterior to the latter. The answer seems to lie in the apparent two-fold sense attributed to universals which 
appears to have given rise to the problem of the subject-matter of the Categoriæ originally. Predicable post rem 
concepts are indeed posterior to the common properties of individuals, but what explains the fact they are 
predicable is itself prior to the predicable. The presupposition that Aristotelian universals were conceived of 
as counterparts to Platonic Forms, performing the same explanatory work as the Forms (namely explaining 
                               
210 Simplicius Phil., In Aristotelis categorias commentarium 8.2.9–15.  
211 Olympiodorus Phil., Prolegomena 18.25-19.36.  
 Hieroglyphic Semantics in Late Antiquity - 71 - 
 Mark Wildish - 71 - 
 
the predicability of common properties), is one reason that the ‘problem of universals’ was taken to be a 
problem of differing accounts of universals as such at all.212 However, a distinction between Forms as 
explanatory of the participation of numerically distinct individuals in common properties and predicable 
universals as ‘that which is predicated in common’ (τὸ κοινῇ κατηγορούμενον)213 would seem to be not only a 
genuinely viable option in the development of the Neoplatonic harmonization of the two, but is in fact 
explicitly argued. Nor is it simply a matter of making attempt not to attribute to the latter the explanatory 
function of the former, but instead a rôle complementary to it. In order to preclude the objection that the 
explanatory rôle performed by the former is complicated by the relation of participation, ‘that which 
participates’ (τὸ μετέχον), (2) ‘that which is participated in’ (τὸ μετεχόμενον), and (3) ‘that which is 
unparticipated’ (τὸ ἀμέθεκτον) are further distinguished.214  
 
If, then, universals are distinct from both Forms and particulars, how might Iamblichus align the three such 
that concepts might mediate realities and utterances?  
 
[T311] Πᾶσα ὁλότης ἢ πρὸ τῶν μερῶν ἐστιν ἢ ἐκ τῶν μερῶν ἢ 
ἐν τῷ μέρει. ἢ γὰρ ἐν τῇ αἰτίᾳ τὸ ἑκάστου θεωροῦμεν εἶδος, καὶ 
ὅλον ἐκεῖνο πρὸ τῶν μερῶν λέγομεν τὸ ἐν τῷ αἰτίῳ 
προϋποστάν· ἢ ἐν τοῖς μετέχουσιν αὐτῆς μέρεσι. καὶ τοῦτο 
διχῶς· ἢ γὰρ ἐν ἅπασιν ὁμοῦ τοῖς μέρεσι, καὶ ἔστι τοῦτο ἐκ τῶν 
μερῶν ὅλον, οὗ καὶ ὁτιοῦν μέρος ἀπὸν ἐλαττοῖ τὸ ὅλον· ἢ ἐν 
ἑκάστῳ τῶν μερῶν, ὡς καὶ τοῦ μέρους κατὰ μέθεξιν τοῦ ὅλου 
<ὅλου> γεγονότος, ὃ καὶ ποιεῖ τὸ μέρος εἶναι ὅλον μερικῶς. καθ' 
ὕπαρξιν μὲν οὖν ὅλον τὸ ἐκ τῶν μερῶν· κατ' αἰτίαν δὲ τὸ πρὸ 
τῶν μερῶν· κατὰ μέθεξιν δὲ τὸ ἐν τῷ μέρει. καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο κατ' 
ἐσχάτην ὕφεσιν ὅλον, ᾗ μιμεῖται τὸ ἐκ τῶν μερῶν ὅλον, ὅταν μὴ 
τὸ τυχὸν ᾖ μέρος, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὅλῳ δυνάμενον ἀφομοιοῦσθαι οὗ καὶ 
τὰ μέρη ὅλα ἐστίν.215  
Every whole is either a whole-before-the-parts, a whole-of-
the-parts, or a whole-in-the-part. For either the form of 
each thing is surveyed in its cause, and we call that which 
subsists in its cause a whole prior to parts, because it 
presubsists in the cause, or it is seen in the parts which 
participate of it. And this in a twofold respect: for it is 
either seen in all the parts together, and this is a whole 
consisting of parts, any part of which being absent 
diminishes the whole, — or, it is seen in each of the parts, 
so that the part likewise becomes by participation a whole; 
which makes the part to be a whole partially. The whole, 
therefore, which is according to reality consists of parts; 
but the whole which is prior to parts is according to cause. 
And the whole which is in a part is according to 
participation: for this, likewise, according to an ultimate 
diminution or remission is a whole so far as it imitates the 
whole which consists of parts, since it is not any casual 
part, but that which is capable of being assimilated to a 
                               
212  See Gerson, L. P., ‘Platonism and the Invention of the Problem of Universals’ 
http://individual.utoronto.ca/lpgerson/Platonism_And_The_Invention_Of_The_Problem_Of_Universals.pdf, contra Landesman (1971), 
Quine (1961), & Wolterstorff (1970).  
213 Aristoteles Phil., Metaphysica 1003a11.  
214 Proclus Phil., Institutio theologica 23-4.  
215 Proclus Phil., Institutio theologica 67.1-14. Cf. Simplicius Phil., In Aristotelis categorias commentarium 8.82.35-83.10; Asclepius Phil., In 
Aristotelis metaphysicorum libros A-Z commentaria 433.9-436.6; Porphyrius Phil., In Aristotelis categorias expositio per interrogationem et 
responsionem 90.30-91.18; Ammonius Phil., In Porphyrii isagogen sive quinque voces 41.1-42.26; 68.25-69.2.  
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whole of which the parts likewise are wholes.216  
 
An Aristotelian universal, in this context, is ‘a whole consisting of parts’ (τοῦτο ἐκ τῶν μερῶν ὅλον) in contrast 
both to the Platonic Form, which is ‘a whole prior to parts’ (ὅλον ἐκεῖνο πρὸ τῶν μερῶν), and the particular, a 
‘part <that> becomes by participation a whole’ (τοῦ μέρους κατὰ μέθεξιν τοῦ ὅλου <ὅλου> γεγονότος). In this case 
a particular, i.e. a part which becomes by participation a whole, participates in a universal, i.e. a whole 
consisting of parts, and the Form, i.e. a whole prior to parts, is unparticipated (ἀμέθεκτον). The difficulty 
addressed here is the apparent irreconcilability of immanence and transcendence of the Forms alluded to 
above.217 It depends, however, on a conception of participated universals as both a posteriori abstractions from 
particulars and a priori Forms causally determinative of those particulars.  
 
The Neoplatonic solution to this apparent incommensurability between the dual conception of participated 
universals lies in the rôle of the former in ‘procession’ (πρόοδος) and of the latter in ‘reversion’ (ἐπιστροφή).218 
The standard conception of dialectic among late Platonists was that it had four branches: definition (ὁριστικὴ), 
division (διαιρετικὴ), demonstration (ἀποδεικτικὴ), and analysis (ἀναλυτική).219 Division is to ‘make the one into 
many’ (τὸ ἓν πολλὰ ποιεῖν); definition is to ‘collect many into one’ (τὰ πολλὰ συνάγειν εἰς ἕν).220 These two are 
then converse procedures. Demonstration ‘begins from causes and primary things’ (ἀπὸ αἰτίων καὶ πρώτων 
ἀρχομένης); analysis ‘begins from effects and secondary things’ (ἀπὸ τῶν αἰτιατῶν καὶ δευτέρων ἄρχεται), ‘for 
analysis is nothing if not the converse of demonstration’ (οὐδὲν γάρ ἐστιν ἀνάλυσις, εἰ μὴ ἀπόδειξις 
ἀντεστραμμένη).221 Analysis, that is, ‘concerns what is consequent to first principles’ (περὶ δὲ τὰ μετὰ τὰς ἀρχὰς) 
and ‘traces the desired result back to an acknowledged principle’ (ἐπ' ἀρχὴν ὁμολογουμένην ἀνάγουσα τὸ 
ζητούμενον).222  
 
[T312] Ὑπὸ δὲ ταύτην μίαν καὶ ὅλην μέθοδον αἱ τέτταρες 
τελοῦσι δυνάμεις, ὁριστικὴ, καὶ διαιρετικὴ, καὶ ἀποδεικτικὴ, καὶ 
ἀναλυτική· καὶ γὰρ ὅπου μὲν διελεῖν ἀναγκαῖον ἢ ὡς ἀπὸ ἑνὸς 
Under this single and complete method the four functions 
operate, division, and definition, and demonstration, and 
analysis; for also here on the one hand it is necessary to 
                               
216 Dodds, E. R., Proclus. The elements of theology, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963) (2nd edn.; repr. 1977).  
217 Aristoteles Phil., Metaphysica 990b27-34.  
218 Contrast Plotinus apud Porphyrius Phil., Vita Plotini 10.35-36: ἐκείνους δεῖ πρὸς ἐμὲ ἔρχεσθαι, οὐκ ἐμὲ πρὸς ἐκείνους and Iamblichus Phil., De 
mysteriis 1.12.35-39: ἀλλὰ κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ ἀληθὲς ὡς βούλεται ἀναδιδάσκειν, τὴν γνώμην τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐπιτηδείαν ἀπεργαζόμεναι πρὸς τὸ μετέχειν 
τῶν θεῶν, καὶ ἀνάγουσαι αὐτὴν πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς καὶ διὰ πειθοῦς ἐμμελοῦς συναρμόζουσαι.  
219 See Proclus Phil., In Platonis Parmenidem 982.19-30; 1003.6-29; Syrianus Phil., In Aristotelis metaphysica commentaria 3.30-33; Elias Phil., In 
Porphyrii isagogen 37.9-11; Damascius Phil., In Philebum 54.1; Simplicius Phil., In Aristotelis libros de anima commentaria [Sp.?] (fort. auctore 
Prisciano Lydo) 11.9.33-37; Ammonius Phil., In Porphyrii isagogen sive quinque voces 34-24-25; David Phil., In Porphyrii isagogen commentarium 
88.8-9; Joannes Philoponus Phil., In Aristotelis analytica priora commentaria 13.2.307.5-8.  
220 Proclus Phil., In Platonis Parmenidem 649.25-26.  
221 Elias Phil., In Porphyrii isagogen 37.17.23.  
222 Proclus Phil., In primum Euclidis elementorum librum commentarii 57.23; 211.20-21.  
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γένους εἰς εἴδη, ἢ ὡς ἀπὸ ὅλου εἰς μέρη διάφορα, ἢ ἄλλως 
ὁπωσοῦν· ὅπου δὲ ὁρίσασθαι δεῖ, τάς τε ὁριστικῶν εἰδέναι 
διαφορὰς καὶ τὰς τῶν ὁρισμῶν καθ' ἑκάστην τάξιν τῶν ὄντων· 
ὁρίζεσθαι γὰρ δυνατὸν καὶ ἀπὸ εἴδους καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ὕλης καὶ δι' 
ἀμφοτέρων· ὅπου δὲ ἀποδεῖξαι, καὶ ἐνταῦθα τάς τε τῶν αἰτιῶν 
ἀνάγκη διαγιγνώσκειν διαφοράς· ἄλλως γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐνύλων τὰ 
αἴτια καὶ ἄλλως ἐπὶ τῶν ἀΰλων ληπτέον, ἄλλως ἐπὶ τῶν 
κινουμένων, καὶ ἄλλως ἐπὶ τῶν ἀκινήτων· ὅπου δὲ ἀναλῦσαι 
μέχρι τῶν πρώτων· καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἀπὸ τοῦ ζητουμένου μετάβασις ἐπὶ 
τὰ ἄλλα τοτὲ μὲν ὡς ἐπὶ τὰ αἴτια γίγνεται ἀναλυτικῶς, τοτὲ δὲ 
ὡς ἐπὶ συναίτια, τοτὲ δὲ ὡς ἐπ' ἀμφότερα· ταῦτα δὲ ἀναγκαῖόν 
ἐστι μὴ παρέργως ἐπισκοπεῖν τὸν τῇ μεθόδῳ χρώμενον, διότι δὴ 
καὶ τὸ προκείμενον ἢ ὡς τὸ ἀκρότατόν ἐστιν, ἢ ὡς τὸ ἔσχατον ἐν 
τοῖς οὖσιν, ἢ ὡς μέσην τάξιν ἔχον.223  
distinguish either as from one genus to species, or as from 
the whole to different parts, or otherwise in any way 
whatever; and on the other hand there one must divide, 
both to know the differences of the things divided and 
those of the dividers according to each order of being; for 
to be divided is possible both from species and from matter 
and through both; but elsewhere to demonstrate, and here 
the necessity is to distinguish differences of causes; for 
otherwise the causes of things implicated in matter and 
otherwise one must assume things not material, otherwise 
things moved, and otherwise things unmoved; and 
elsewhere it is necessary to analyse as far as the first 
things; for also the descent from what is sought to other 
things sometimes analytically comes to the causes, other 
times to the accessory causes, sometimes to both; with 
respect to these it is necessary to examine not incidentally 
the use of the method, because it is the proposal or the 
farthest point, or the last among the things that are, or 
having a middle order.  
 
In analysis, then, starting with assertions about what is consequent to first principles – i.e. observable 
particulars – one proceeds upwards to acknowledged principles or accessory causes. This species of analysis 
proceeding from effects to causes is therefore distinct from Aristotelian conceptions of syllogistic analysis, 
being the characteristically Platonic process of ascent from the sensible to the intelligible. Strictly speaking in 
hieroglyphic exegesis ascent through analysis is from the sensible particular to the intellective content of the 
glyphs, which content is presumably to be thought of as an accessory cause, the first principles being the 
unified intelligible thoughts. In line with Iamblichean precedent, then, exegetical procedure is (i) to abstract 
from sensible phenomena to universal concepts, (ii) by analogy or allusion, (iii) by virtue of pre-eminent 
examples of Forms for the possibility of unified thought. The objects of Platonist interest are precisely those 
objects which legitimize the application of the procedure itself (Forms), rather than the items to which the 
procedure is applied (particulars), or the results of applying the procedure (predicables).  
 
There might be thought to be some difficulty concerning how reversion can be fully realized if the productive 
principle is ‘more perfect’ (τελειότερα) than its effect.224 In other words, how can analysis be possible if the 
starting-point of the ascent is a state of ontological subordination or inferiority, specifically as deficient in 
                               
223 Proclus Phil., In Platonis Parmenidem 1003.6-29.  
224 Proclus Phil., Institutio theologica 36.2.  
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ἐνέργεια? The question is specifically addressed in a doctrine, which Olympiodorus attributes to Iamblichus, 
apparently undoing the earlier Neoplatonic doctrine of decreasing ἐνέργεια as emanation from the One 
approaches matter.  
 
[T313] ὁ δὲ θεῖος Ἰάμβλιχος οὐ διακρίνει τὰ ὑψηλότερα ἀπὸ τῶν 
κοιλοτέρων τῇ πλείονι μεταδόσει (πάντα γὰρ ἄχρι τῆς ὕλης 
κάτεισι· δόγμα γάρ ἐστιν, ἀφ' οὗ ἄν τι ἄρξηται ἐνεργεῖν μὴ 
παύεσθαι ἄχρι τῶν ἐσχάτων· εἰ γὰρ καὶ ἰσχυρότερόν ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ 
δύναται διὰ τῆς πόρρω διαστάσεως ἀντανίσωσις γίνεσθαι πρὸς 
τὸ ἀσθενέστερον), ἀλλὰ διακρίνει τῷ δριμυτέραν τὴν μετάδοσιν 
τῶν ὑψηλοτέρων εἶναι. μᾶλλον γὰρ ἐφιέμεθα εἶναι ἤπερ ζωῆς, 
καὶ μᾶλλον τοῦ ζῆν ἤπερ τοῦ νοεῖν.225  
The divine Iamblichus does not distinguish the higher 
things from the lower things by the greater exchange (for 
all things come down even as far as matter; for it is a 
doctrine, from which anything that begins to operate not 
cease even as far as the last things; for if it is also stronger, 
but balance is able through the onwards distension to come 
into being with respect to the weaker thing), but 
distinguishes [them] by the keener exchange of the higher 
things. For we rather give up that than even life, and rather 
living than thinking.  
 
Procession explicitly entails no diminishment of the productive principle.226 Olympiodorus’ Iamblichean 
doctrine of ‘balance’ (ἀντανίσωσις) makes this possible without decreasing activity (ἐνέργεια) through 
‘distension’ (διαστάσις) of ‘the stronger’ (ἰσχυρότερόν) to ‘the weaker’ (ἀσθενέστερον), also referred to as 
‘exchange’ (μετάδοσις) of ‘the higher things’ (τὰ ὑψηλότερα) and ‘the lower things’ (τὰ κοιλότερα). Everything, 
he argues, descends as far as matter (πάντα γὰρ ἄχρι τῆς ὕλης κάτεισι·). If emanation from the Neoplatonic One 
does not entail decreasing activity with proximity to the sensible realm, but extends whole as far as matter, 
then matter preserves ἐνέργεια undiminished and therefore the bridge between the divine, conceptual, and 
material is traversable in both directions without loss. The tripartite Iamblichean ontology thereby describes 
a situation in which analysis undertaken on the basis of the work of natural science can result in a fully 
‘energetic’ account of conceptual movements in the soul, on which further basis it can also result in an 
equally fully ‘energetic’ account of divine realities. It is possible to apply intellective interpretation to the 
work of natural science unattenuated precisely because the latter is continuous with and complementary to 
the former, specifically in terms of balance of activity. On this account semantic theory is a matter of interest 
to Iamblichus not merely because it lends itself to being subsumed under the broader metaphysical 
framework within which he is operating, but precisely because properly conceived it presents a means of 
rational ascent to the first principles upon which meaning depends.  
  
                               
225 Olympiodorus Phil., In Platonis Alcibiadem commentarii 110.13–111.2.  
226 Proclus Phil., Institutio theologica 26.1-2: Πᾶν τὸ παρακτικὸν αἴτιον ἄλλων μένον αὐτὸ ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ παράγει τὰ μετ' αὐτὸ καὶ τὰ ἐφεξῆς.  
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§3. Interpretation 
 
There are then two main traditions of interpretation of the semantics of the Neoplatonic Aristotelian 
commentators. They are: (i) a bipartite theory according to which words directly signify things without the 
mediation of concepts; and (ii) a tripartite theory whereby words directly signify concepts and thereby, 
indirectly, things. Simplicius explicitly seeks to unify the two traditions, a possibility which Porphyry had 
already provided for, and cites otherwise unidentified Academicians (οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς Ἀκαδημίας)227 to the effect 
that words signify neither concepts, nor things, but things insofar as they fall under concepts, which are cases 
and resultants. I have also outlined a distinctively Iamblichean strategy of mapping a tripartite Neoplatonic 
ontology of universals onto the tripartite semantic theory. This is a development of a thought one element of 
which we already find in Plotinus, who conceived of hieroglyphic ἀγάλματα as non-discursively presenting 
(ἐμφῆναι) particular (intelligible) truths as a unified whole. Finally, Iamblichus’ introduction of intellective 
interpretation (νοερὰ θεωρία), directed towards a theology to complement the physiological and logical 
accounts he finds in his predecessors, was investigated to establish the kind of metaphysical knowledge such 
hieroglyphic language might be thought to afford.  
 
Inferential argumentation from the phenomena of the generated world via analysis is a key concern of 
Neoplatonic hieroglyphic exegesis insofar as empirical observations explain why linguistic items bear the 
meanings they do, rather than license inferences about what they might mean. The relation between sign and 
object depicted (and therefore referred to in explanation of the meaning of the sign) is not conceptually 
mediated (but parastatically, or representatively), therefore the empirical veridicality of a predicable 
attribute in its application to the object depicted, explains not the meaning of the glyph, but why it is the 
glyph bears the meaning it does. There is, then, no requirement for a Neoplatonic commitment to an 
evidence-based inferential semantics in which it is the meanings of glyphs (or linguistic expressions more 
generally), rather than the reasons explaining why they do so, which are inferred.  
 
As I argued above, natural history cannot be used to explain why it is that certain hieroglyphic signs mean 
what they do (in the sense of providing a causal account of meaning), it can, however, be adduced to explain 
that the meanings of hieroglyphic signs are in fact what they are. If natural history has explanatory value in 
                               
227 I.e. Platonists. Simplicius Phil. In Aristotelis categorias commentarium 8.209.11.  
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this second sense, can not one also infer from natural history the significance of glyphs otherwise not 
understood? That is, can the understanding of the fact that certain linguistic items have known meanings 
(provided by a natural-historical resource such as Aristotle or Ælian) license an increasingly productive 
hermeneutic for establishing the meaning of signs with previously unknown meanings (without, that is, 
thereby being committed to a causal account of meaning)? The answer to this question depends on the extent 
to which this further commits the exegete to the correspondence of the observations provided in explanation 
of hieroglyphs with factual conditions. If, that is, those observations are, at least in principle, falsifiable, the 
validity of the explanation of the meaning of signs may be thought susceptible to a critical objection. If the 
observational evidence is susceptible of being falsified, any inference drawn from it lacks an intrinsic mark of 
veridicality. No doubt if the predicability of a given attribute were falsified, the semantic relation too would 
likely, but not necessarily, lapse. On the other hand, if the explanation of the meaning of a hieroglyphic sign 
is dependent upon the formal properties of the glyph itself, namely that it depicts such-and-such an item, it is 
the glyph and not the object it depicts that licenses the inference that its meaning can be explained in terms 
of that which it depicts.  
 
The logico-metaphysical picture resulting from the above may briefly be spelled out as follows. Written 
language differs from spoken language by virtue of medium alone.228 Spoken language differs from thought as 
the actualization of a potentiality for articulation or utterance. Predicative thought is causally effected by the 
phenomena of the sensible world (and therefore posterior to it), but by virtue of the prior relation of 
participation of the sensible in the intelligible.  
 
Even given a sufficiently well-developed account of the various types of relations described above (between 
the sign in question, what it depicts, what it signifies, and how it informs the associated exegetical 
procedure), one outstanding question remains: the nature and content of the allusive or enigmatic function of 
hieroglyphs. The tradition of hieroglyphic exegesis is not an innovation on Neoplatonism’s part. Van der 
Horst (1987) and Le Boulluec (1981) have correspondingly noted extensive exegetical parallels for the 
exegeses of Porphyry and Iamblichus in Clement and Plutarch before that, suggestive of a common source in 
Chæremon, who, it is supposed, was most likely first to have identified the exegetical possibilities peculiar to 
                               
228 See Barnes, J., ‘Meaning, Saying, Thinking’ in Döring, K. & Ebert, Th. (edd.) Dialektiker und Stoiker: zur Logik der Stoa und ihrer Vorläufer 
(Stuttgart: Steiner, 1993).  
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the Egyptian material.229 Chæremon is typically identified by three epithets: ἱερογραμματεύς, φιλόσοφος, and 
Στωϊκός. That the latter is an appropriate designation is apparent from the typically Stoic exegetical strategy 
of employing a ‘natural theory of the gods’ (φυσικòς λόγος περὶ θεῶν),230 and conceiving ‘in general everything 
as referring to physical things’ (ὅλως πάντα εἰς τὰ φυσικά).231 This might naturally be expected to encounter 
some doctrinal resistance amongst Platonists and just such doctrinal differences are perhaps most explicit in 
Porphyry’s reconsideration of Chæremon. The latter had, for example, advanced a physical-astral conception 
of divinity232 rejected by Porphyry233 on Platonizing grounds (perhaps signifying a change in Porphyry’s 
attitude to Chæremon)234 but paralleled by two passages from the Stromata on the subject of hieroglyphs and 
at least one passage from the Hieroglyphica, collected by Van der Horst among the fragmenta dubia of 
Chæremon.235  
 
[T314] Χαιρήμων μὲν γὰρ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι οὐδ' ἄλλο τι πρὸ τῶν 
ὁρωμένων κόσμων ἡγοῦνται, ἐν ἀρχῆς λόγῳ τιθέμενοι τοὺς 
Αἰγυπτίων, οὐδ' ἄλλους θεοὺς πλὴν τῶν πλανητῶν λεγομένων 
καὶ τῶν συμπληρούντων τὸν ζῳδιακὸν καὶ ὅσοι τούτοις 
παρανατέλλουσιν, τάς τε εἰς τοὺς δεκανοὺς τομὰς καὶ τοὺς 
ὡροσκόπους καὶ τοὺς λεγομένους κραταιοὺς ἡγεμόνας236  
For Chæremon and the others do not believe in anything 
prior to the visible worlds, stating that the basic principles 
are the gods of the Egyptians and that there are no other 
gods than the so-called planets, and those stars which fill 
up the zodiac, and all those that rise near them, and the 
sections relating to the decans, and the horoscopes, and 
the so-called mighty rulers.237  
 
On the one hand, Porphyry himself elaborates extensively on thematic depictions of Egyptian-provenanced 
realia in the treatise Περὶ ἀγαλμάτων: girdle, sceptre, royal wing, egg; feet joined together, robe of many 
colours, golden sphere; and man embarked on a ship set on a crocodile. Divine names, sacred animals, comets, 
&c. are all covered, as is any natural object or phenomenon thought to be susceptible of being signified or 
signifying in some sense: natural signs, written signs of sounds, or hieroglyphic signs of natural objects.  
 
                               
229 Van der Horst, P., Chæremon: Egyptian Priest and Stoic Philosopher (Leiden: Brill, 1984); Le Boulluec, A., (ed.) Les Stromates (bk V, 2 voll.) 
(Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1981).  
230 Chæremon Hist. et Phil., Fragmenta 12.  
231 Chæremon Hist. et Phil., Fragmenta 5.  
232 Fragm. 21D = Porphyrius Phil., De abstinentia 4.9 = Eusebius Theol., Scr. Eccl., Præparatio Evangelica 3.4.8-14. 
233 Fragm. 5 = Porphyrius Phil., Epistula ad Anebonem 2.12-13 = Eusebius Theol., Scr. Eccl., Præparatio Evangelica 3.4.1-2.  
234 With parallels in fragm. 6 (= Eusebius Theol., Scr. Eccl., Præparatio Evangelica 3.9.15), fragm. 7 (= Eusebius Theol., Scr. Eccl., Præparatio 
Evangelica 3.13.8), fragm. 8 (= Porphyrius Phil., Epistula ad Anebonem 2.15), and fragm. 9 = Iamblichus Phil., De mysteriis 8.4) where 
Iamblichus claims that the Salmeschiniaca are Hermetic writings, though claiming Chæremon is opposed to astrology. For the use of the 
decans of the zodiac as explanations of gods, cf. Egyptian astrological calendars, possibly of Babylonian origin.  
235 Fragment 17D (= Porphyrius Phil., Περὶ ἀγαλμάτων = Eusebius Præparatio Evangelica 3.11.45-13.2) shows additional parallels with fragm. 
5 (= Porphyrius Phil., Epistula ad Anebonem 2.12-13 = Eusebius Theol., Scr. Eccl., Præparatio Evangelica 3.4.1–2), fragm. 21D (= Porphyrius 
Phil., De abstinentia 4.9 = Eusebius Theol., Scr. Eccl., Præparatio Evangelica 3.4.8-14), 25D (= Horapollo Gramm., Hieroglyphica), and 26D (= 
Joannes Tzetzes Gramm., Poeta, Chiliades 12.723-736), as well as test. 9 (= Porphyrius Phil., Contra Christianos fragm. 39). Fragment 12 (=  
Tzetzes Exegesis in Iliadem 1.97) also shows parallels with fragm. 21D and 25D in addition to 19D (= Clemens Alexandrinus Theol., Stromata 
5.7.41-43) and 20D (= Clemens Alexandrinus Theol., Stromata 5.4.20-21).  
236 Porphyrius Phil., Epistula ad Anebonem 2.12b.1-5.  
237 Van der Horst, P., (ed.) Chæremon: Egyptian Priest and Stoic Philosopher, 2nd edn (Leiden: Brill, 1987).  
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[T315] Ἥλιον δὲ σημαίνουσιν ποτὲ μὲν δι’ ἀνθρώπου 
ἐπιβεβηκότος πλοῖον, τοῦ πλοίου ἐπὶ κροκοδείλου κειμένου. 
δηλοῖ δὲ τὸ μὲν πλοῖον τὴν ἐν ὑγρῷ κίνησιν, ὁ δὲ κροκόδειλος 
πότιμον ὕδωρ, ἐν ᾧ φέρεται ὁ ἥλιος. ἐσημαίνετο τοίνυν ὁ ἥλιος 
δι’ ἀέρος ὑγροῦ καὶ γλύκεος τὴν περιπόλησιν ποιεῖσθαι.238  
They symbolize the sun by a man embarked on a ship 
which is set upon a crocodile. The ship indicates the sun’s 
movement in a liquid element, the crocodile the potable 
water in which the sun moves. Thus they symbolize that 
the sun accomplishes his revolution through air that is 
liquid and sweet.  
 
However, a crucial Platonic distinction, on the basis of which Porphyry rejects what he sees as the reductive 
physicalism of his Stoic predecessor, is preserved in the explicit denial that the physiological material as such 
is the direct object of Egyptian theosophical speculation.  
 
[T316] ὅτι δὲ οὐδὲ τὰ ζῷα θεοὺς ἡγοῦνται, εἰκόνας δὲ ἐποιοῦντο 
καὶ σύμβολα ταῦτα θεῶν, δηλοῖ τὸ πολλαχοῦ βοῦς ἀναχθέντας 
θεοῖς ἐν ταῖς ἱερομηνίαις καὶ ταῖς πρὸς θεοὺς θρησκείαις 
βουθυτεῖν. ἡλίῳ μὲν γὰρ καὶ σελήνῃ βοῦς ἀνιέρωσαν.239  
But that they do not believe the animals to be gods but 
made them the images and symbols of the gods is apparent 
from the fact that in many places they bring up bulls for 
the gods at their festivals in the sacred months and in their 
religious services and sacrifice them. For they consecrate 
bulls to the sun and the moon.  
 
For Porphyry, then, it is not the ‘images and symbols’ in themselves that are the objects of theological 
interest, but what they are images and symbols of.  On the contrary, in the presumably generalizable cases of 
bulls what these images and symbols represent and symbolize are immune to the variability one finds in the 
images themselves. This distinction consequently enables Porphyry to argue that the names of the gods in 
various languages are simply variant expressions of the same divine reality, a doctrine which Iamblichus 
would later strenuously oppose.  
 
[T317] Τὸ δὲ αὐτὸ δύναται Δημήτηρ παρ' Ἕλλησι καὶ Ἶσις παρ' 
Αἰγυπτίοις· καὶ πάλιν Κόρη παρ' Ἕλλησι καὶ  Διόνυσος, καὶ Ἶσις 
καὶ Ὄσιρις παρ' Αἰγυπτίοις.240  
Demeter has the same power among the Greeks as Isis 
among the Egyptians, and also Kore and Dionysus among 
the Greeks the same power as Isis among the Egyptians.  
 
Though motivated, then, by the unacceptability of the Stoic analysis in accordance with which the gods are 
interpreted in the strictly physical terms of their representation, it is not, however, allegorical interpretation 
as such that Porphyry rejects. Instead it is the application of those exegetical techniques without the 
guidance of the appropriate metaphysical τέλος of the philosophical endeavour, namely an interpretation 
                               
238 Porphyrius Phil., Περὶ ἀγαλμάτων 10.18–23.  
239 Porphyrius Phil., Περὶ ἀγαλμάτων 10.81–5.  
240 Porphyrius Phil., Περὶ ἀγαλμάτων, 10.28–30.   
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observing properly Platonic criteria for an exegesis of the structure and genesis of the cosmos. It was 
necessary to conceive of allegorical interpretation in such a way as to preserve the individual ontological 
identities of the object to be interpreted and the object of which it is interpreted as being an allegory. This is 
because it was the respective ontological statuses of these objects upon which the allegorical reinterpretation 
of the culturally Egyptian material is dependent for its relevance.241  
 
Iamblichus opposed any form of syncretism in the exegetical endeavour.  
 
[T318] Ἀλλ' ὁ ἀκούων, φής, πρὸς τὰ σημαινόμενα ἀφορᾷ, ὥστε 
αὐτάρκης ἡ αὐτὴ μένουσα ἔννοια, κἂν ὁποιονοῦν ὑπάρχῃ 
τοὔνομα. Τὸ δ' οὐ τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν οἷον σὺ προσεδόκησας· εἰ μὲν 
γὰρ ἦν κατὰ συνθήκην κείμενα τὰ ὀνόματα, οὐδὲν διέφερε τὰ 
ἕτερα ἀντὶ τῶν ἑτέρων μεταλαμβάνειν· εἰ δὲ τῇ φύσει 
συνήρτηται τῶν ὄντων, τὰ μᾶλλον αὐτῇ προσεοικότα καὶ τοῖς 
θεοῖς ἐστι δήπου προσφιλέστερα· ἐκ δὴ τοῦδε καταφαίνεται ὡς 
εὐλόγως καὶ ἡ τῶν ἱερῶν ἐθνῶν προκέκριται φωνὴ πρὸ τῶν 
ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων· οὐδὲ γὰρ πάντως τὴν αὐτὴν διασώζει 
διάνοιαν μεθερμηνευόμενα τὰ ὀνόματα, ἀλλ' ἔστι τινὰ καθ' 
ἕκαστον ἔθνος ἰδιώματα, ἀδύνατα εἰς ἄλλο ἔθνος διὰ φωνῆς 
σημαίνεσθαι· ἔπειτα κἂν εἰ οἷόν τε αὐτὰ μεθερμηνεύειν, ἀλλὰ 
τήν γε δύναμιν οὐκέτι φυλάττει τὴν αὐτήν· ἔχει δὲ καὶ τὰ 
βάρβαρα ὀνόματα πολλὴν μὲν ἔμφασιν πολλὴν δὲ συντομίαν, 
ἀμφιβολίας τε ἐλάττονος μετέσχηκε καὶ ποικιλίας καὶ τοῦ 
πλήθους τῶν λέξεων· διὰ πάντα δὴ οὖν ταῦτα συναρμόζει τοῖς 
κρείττοσιν.242  
“But,” so you say, “a listener looks to the meaning, so 
surely all that matters is that the conception remains the 
same, whatever the kind of words used.” But the situation 
is not as you suppose. For if the names were established by 
convention, then it would not matter whether some were 
used instead of others. But if they are dependent on the 
nature of real beings, then those that are better adapted to 
this will be more precious to the gods. It is therefore 
evident from this that the language of sacred peoples is 
preferred to that of other men, and with good reason. For 
the names do not exactly preserve the same meaning when 
they are translated; rather, there are certain idioms in 
every nation that are impossible to express in the language 
of another. Moreover, even if one were to translate them, 
this would not preserve their same power. For the 
barbarian names possess weightiness and great precision, 
participating in less ambiguity, variability and multiplicity 
of expression. For all these reasons, then, they are adapted 
to the superior beings.243  
 
As applied to hieroglyphic Egyptian the conception at stake is the textual tradition of recorded ‘perfect 
speech’ (mDt-nfrt), capable of a divine power or efficacy missing in, for example, Greek. The theme of the 
particular superiority of Egyptian over Greek (and of texts in the original language to translations) as the 
language of theology is in this sense far from incidental to the Neoplatonic project.244 Iamblichus explains that 
the origin of Egyptian symbolism lies in a desire born of Egyptian native superiority to inferior peoples to 
                               
241 For which we have the explicit and directly comparable ‘Middle’ Platonic precedent of Plutarch’s interpretation of various elements of 
Egyptian religion and their relation to theosophical speculation. Cf. Brenk, F. E., ‘“Isis is a Greek Word”. Plutarch’s Allegorization of 
Egyptian Religion’, Jiménez, A.P., López, J.G. & Aguilar, R.M., (edd.), Plutarco, Platón y Aristóteles in Actas del V Congresso Internacional de la 
I.P.S. (Madrid-Cuenca, 1999): pp.227-237 & Richter, ‘Plutarch on Isis and Osiris: Text, Cult, and Cultural Appropriation’, Transactions of the 
American Philological Association 131 (2001): pp.191-216.  
242 Iamblichus Phil., De mysteriis 7.5.1-19.  
243 Clarke, E. C., Dillon, J., & Hershbell, J. P., Iamblichus: On the Mysteries (Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2003).  
244 Porphyrius Phil., Epistula ad Anebonem 2.10a.4-6.   
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provide a mode of initiation into the mysteries through symbols.245 The particular form of ‘the terms that are 
unintelligible’ (τὰ ἄσημα ὀνόματα),246 identified as the language of the priests and the speech of the gods, must, 
for Iamblichus, remain untranslated because it preserves the most archaic, i.e. primitive and original form of 
a visible manifestation of the divine – the ideal being the intelligible manifestation of divinity in silence. For 
that reason conventionally determined concepts, which vary as such from people to people and from time to 
time, create ambiguity unsuitable for the superior purpose of forming concepts of the divine. To call such 
terms ‘unutterable and barbarous’ (τῶν ὀνομάτων τῶν τε ἀφθέγκτων καὶ τῶν βαρβάρων) is a trait of the 
Egyptian peasantry, who do not exhibit the superiority of those Egyptians who first were allotted communion 
with the gods.247  
 
To suppose, then, that the emphasis placed on the need to interpret hieroglyphs is explained as a consequence 
of a prior commitment to reading allegorical symbolism into Egyptian inscriptions and by tracing that 
commitment back either to earlier Christian-Gnostic or Jewish-Alexandrine tradition is to beg the question. In 
providing instruction in the interpretation of hieroglyphs neither Iamblichus nor the tradition more 
generally entertains any scruples in spelling out the esoteric meaning of hieroglyphic symbols. It cannot be 
maintained, therefore, that the need for interpretation arises simply from a desire attributed to the Egyptian 
scribes to preclude the possibility of profanation of doctrine by its being accessible to the uninitiated. Clearly, 
this may be one type of motivation, and Iamblichus is explicit that Egyptian αἰνίγματα do serve a concealing 
function.248 On the other hand, if initiatic secrecy were merely a matter of receiving proper instruction then 
esotericism could not be other than a contingent feature.  
 
[T319] Τῆς δ' αὐτῆς θεοσόφου Μούσης κἀκεῖνα δεῖται εἰς τὴν 
διάλυσιν τὰ ἀπορήματα· πρότερον δέ σοι βούλομαι τῶν 
Αἰγυπτίων τὸν τρόπον τῆς θεολογίας διερμηνεῦσαι· οὗτοι γὰρ 
τὴν φύσιν τοῦ παντὸς καὶ τὴν δημιουργίαν τῶν θεῶν 
μιμούμενοι καὶ αὐτοὶ τῶν μυστικῶν καὶ ἀποκεκρυμμένων καὶ 
ἀφανῶν νοήσεων εἰκόνας τινὰς διὰ συμβόλων ἐκφαίνουσιν, 
ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ φύσις τοῖς ἐμφανέσιν εἴδεσι τοὺς ἀφανεῖς λόγους 
διὰ συμβόλων τρόπον τινὰ ἀπετυπώσατο, ἡ δὲ τῶν θεῶν 
δημιουργία τὴν ἀλήθειαν τῶν ἰδεῶν διὰ τῶν φανερῶν εἰκόνων  
The following difficulties require the same theosophical 
Muse for their solution, but first of all, I would like to 
explain to you the mode of theology practised by the 
Egyptians. For these people, imitating the nature of the 
universe and the demiurgic power of the gods, display 
certain signs of mystical, arcane and invisible intellections 
by means of symbols, just as nature copies the unseen 
principles in visible forms through some mode of 
symbolism, and the creative activity of the gods indicates 
                               
245 Iamblichus Phil., De mysteriis 7.1.7-11: ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ  φύσις τοῖς ἐμφανέσιν εἴδεσι τοὺς ἀφανεῖς λόγους διὰ συμβόλων τρόπον τινὰ ἀπετυπώατο, 
ἡ δὲ τῶν θεῶν δημιουργία τὴν ἀλήθειαν τῶν ἰδεῶν διὰ τῶν φανερῶν εἰκόνων ὑπεγράψατο.  
246 Iamblichus Phil., De mysteriis 7.4.4-5.  
247 Iamblichus Phil., De mysteriis 7.5.57-58.  
248 Iamblichus Phil., De mysteriis 7.1.13-16: εἰκότως καὶ αὐτοὶ τὸν πρόσφορον αὐτῆς τρόπον τῆς κεκρυμμένης ἐν τοῖς συμβόλοις μυσταγωγίας 
προφέρουσιν.  
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ὑπεγράψατο. Εἰδότες οὖν χαίροντα πάντα τὰ κρείττονα 
ὁμοιώσει τῶν ὑποδεεστέρων καὶ βουλόμενοι αὐτὰ ἀγαθῶν οὕτω 
πληροῦν διὰ τῆς κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν μιμήσεως, εἰκότως καὶ αὐτοὶ 
τὸν πρόσφορον αὐτῆς τρόπον τῆς κεκρυμμένης ἐν τοῖς 
συμβόλοις μυσταγωγίας προφέρουσιν.249  
the truth of the forms in visible signs. Perceiving, 
therefore, that all superior beings rejoice in the efforts of 
their inferiors to imitate them, and therefore wish to fill 
them with good things, insofar as it is possible through 
imitation, it is reasonable that they should proffer a mode 
of concealment that is appropriate to the mystical doctrine 
of concealment in symbols.  
 
The answer to the question of the necessity of interpretation, then, can be discovered, I suggest, in the nature 
of the objects of theological or metaphysical language and thought. If what is elemental in language can also 
be assumed to be original, then some attempt to recover ancient linguistic elements might be expected to 
work as a route to original understanding of the natural appropriacy and divine power of names in denoting 
their objects.  
 
Though Plotinus had not provided any exegesis of the ‘particular knowledge and wisdom’ (τις καὶ ἐπιστήμη καὶ 
σοφία) hieroglyphic ἀγάλματα afford, Iamblichus enthusiastically obliges, specifically employing the 
intellective interpretative method to do so.  
 
[T320] Ἄκουε δὴ οὖν καὶ σὺ κατὰ τὸν τῶν Αἰγυπτίων νοῦν τὴν 
τῶν συμβόλων νοερὰν διερμήνευσιν, ἀφεὶς μὲν τὸ ἀπὸ τῆς 
φαντασίας καὶ τῆς ἀκοῆς εἴδωλον αὐτῶν τῶν συμβολικῶν, ἐπὶ 
δὲ τὴν νοερὰν ἀλήθειαν ἑαυτὸν ἐπαναγαγών.250  
 
Hear, therefore, the intellective interpretation of the 
symbols, according to Egyptian thought: banish the image 
of the symbolic things themselves, which depends on 
imagination and hearsay, and raise yourself up towards the 
intellectual truth.  
 
He introduces three samples of hieroglyphic exegesis. By ‘mud’ (ἰλύς) is denoted ‘everything corporeally-
formed and material’ (τὸ σωματοειδὲς πᾶν καὶ ὑλικὸν), which is nonetheless not sensible itself, but intelligible: 
‘the originating cause of the elements and of all the powers relating to the elements, which subsisted before 
in correspondence to a foundation’ (τῶν στοιχείων καὶ τῶν περὶ τοῖς στοιχείοις δυνάμεων πασῶν ἀρχηγὸν αἴτιον 
ἐν πυθμένος λόγῳ προϋποκείμενον). Secondly, by ‘sitting above the lotus-blossom’ (τὸ ἐπὶ λωτῷ καθέζεσθαι) is 
denoted exaltation above the ἰλύς since, in common with the motion of the mind, lotus leaves are circular – 
the uniform principle of life for Pythagoreans and Hermes alike. Third, by ‘one sailing in a boat’ (ὁ δ' ἐπὶ πλοίου 
ναυτιλλόμενος) is denoted ‘the power that directs the world’ (τὴν διακυβερνῶσαν τὸν κόσμον ἐπικράτειαν) as 
does god, who ‘from above, imparts without division from the first principles of Nature, the first-operative 
                               
249 Iamblichus Phil., De mysteriis 7.1.1–16.  
250 Iamblichus Phil., De mysteriis 7.2.1–7.  
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causes of motions’ (ἄνωθεν ἀπὸ τῶν πρώτων ἀρχῶν τῆς φύσεως τὰς πρωτουργοὺς αἰτίας τῶν κινήσεων ἀμεριστῶς 
ἐνδίδωσι).  
 
How does the process of intellective interpretation achieve its contribution to an understanding of 
hieroglyphs and how is it developed from the tripartite conception of universals? On a Porphyrian logical 
(λογικός) account, the tripartition would distinguish, the particular (e.g. a particular large thing), the 
Aristotelian universal (the predicable ‘largeness’), and the Platonic Form (largeness itself). However, 
Iamblichus’ example, ‘mud’ (ἰλύς), is not interpreted as a particular sample of mud, the concept ‘mud’, and 
mud itself. One possible avenue of explanation lies in the phrase ‘the image of the symbols themselves’ 
(εἴδωλον αὐτῶν τῶν συμβολικῶν). Though a hieroglyph is an image, it is a symbolic image, so that it is the 
symbol of which it is an image to which the interpretation applies, not any material particular – neither the 
image itself, nor the thing it depicts. If, then, the exegesis provides the ‘intellective’ content of the symbol, 
then the image of the symbol is an image of that ‘intellective’ content.  
 
On Porphyry’s account, the image of mud just is the written form of the utterance ‘mud’, the meaning (i.e. 
conceptual content) of which is mud, referring to particular mud, which participates in the intelligible Form 
of mud. As a symbol, however, standing in need of interpretation, it is not the logical relationship between 
the three ‘universals’ that is explained in intellective interpretation, but the metaphysical relationship 
between the originating cause of materiality and material particulars. The difference between the Greek word 
(ἰλύς) and the Egyptian image is precisely that the former is an image of a linguistic expression, i.e. a 
particular, whereas the image of a symbol in the form of a hieroglyph is an image of the ‘intellectual’ content 
that constitutes the symbol. If linguistic utterances, then, constitute an appropriate medium with which to 
give expression to the phenomena of sensible phenomena, how is it, one might ask, that the appropriate 
medium with which to give expression to intelligible objects is hieroglyphics?  
 
The gifts proper to incorporeal life, Iamblichus tells us, are themselves intellectual: virtue and wisdom.251 
These are appropriate offerings to ‘those gods that are in and of themselves uniform’ (τοὺς αὐτοὺς καθ' ἑαυτοὺς 
μονοειδεῖς ὄντας). Similarly, ‘natural forces’ (φυσικὰς δυνάμεις) are appropriate for ‘a mode of worship which is 
                               
251 Iamblichus Phil., De mysteriis 5.19.18–22.  
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suited to nature’ (τὴν θρησκείαν … τῇ φύσει πρόσφορον).252 Finally, there is the intermediate form of theurgic 
operation, appropriate to which are intermediate offerings.  
 
[T321] Καὶ μὴν τοῖς γε μέσοις καὶ τῶν μέσων ἡγεμονοῦσιν 
ἀγαθῶν ἐνίοτε μὲν ἂν διπλᾶ δῶρα συναρμόσειεν, ἐνιότε δ' ἂν 
ἐπίκοινα πρὸς ἀμφότερα ταῦτα, ἢ καὶ ἀποσχιζόμενα μὲν ἀπὸ 
τῶν κάτω πρὸς δὲ τὰ ὑψηλότερα ἀνήκοντα, ἢ πάντως ἑνί γε 
τῶν τρόπων συμπληροῦντα τὴν μεσότητα.253  
And further, the intermediate entities, which administer 
median goods, will sometimes be suitably served by a 
double set of gifts, sometimes by gifts common to both 
levels, or again by gifts that signal a breaking-away from 
the lower and an accession to the higher, or at any rate 
those that fulfil this median role in one way or another.  
 
The distinction appears to be that, while the ‘goods of the soul’ are properly immaterial and linguistic 
utterances are properly material, hieroglyphs are quite literally ‘compounds’ (συνθήματα) of the two, 
intellectual content and material images. 254  As such, hieroglyphs are the appropriate medium for 
intermediate theurgic operations directed towards ‘the intermediate entities’ (τοῖς γε μέσοις). The 
‘intellectual’ content of the symbol, therefore, is only one constituent part of it. Hieroglyphs are also properly 
material.  
 
[T322] πᾶσα γὰρ ἡ διὰ λόγου γνῶσις τῶν ὄντων ἐστὶ καὶ ἐν τοῖς 
οὖσιν ἔχει τὸ τῆς ἀληθείας καταληπτικόν (καὶ γὰρ νοημάτων 
ἐφάπτεται καὶ ἐν νοήσεσιν ὑφέστηκεν)· οἱ δὲ θεοὶ πάντων εἰσὶν 
ἐπέκεινα τῶν ὄντων. οὔτε οὖν δοξαστὸν τὸ θεῖον οὔτε 
διανοητὸν οὔτε νοητόν. πᾶν γὰρ τὸ ὂν ἢ αἰσθητόν ἐστι, καὶ διὰ 
τοῦτο δοξαστόν· ἢ ὄντως ὄν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο νοητόν· ἢ μεταξὺ 
τούτων, ὂν ἅμα καὶ γενητόν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο διανοητόν.255  
For all rational knowledge, inasmuch as it grasps 
intelligible notions and consists in acts of intellection, is 
knowledge of real existents and apprehends truth by an 
organ which is itself a real existent; but the gods are 
beyond all existents. Accordingly the divine is an object 
neither of opinion nor of discursive reason nor yet of 
intellection: for all that exists is either sensible, and 
therefore an object of opinion; or true Being, and therefore 
an object of intellection; or of intermediate rank, at once 
Being and thing of process, and therefore object of 
discursive reason.  
 
On this reading, then, non-hieroglyphic language is not ‘discursive’ (διανοητική) at all, but ‘conjectural’ 
(δοξαστική) and hieroglyphic Egyptian is not ‘intellective’ (νοερά), but ‘discursive’ (διανοητική). The reason 
hieroglyphs are amenable to ‘intellective interpretation’ (νοερὰ θεωρία) is that they are themselves 
‘discursive’ (διανοητικά), i.e. ‘at once Being and thing of process’ (ὂν ἅμα καὶ γενητόν), unlike Greek, which is 
purely ‘sensible’ (αἰσθητή), i.e. ‘an object of opinion’ (δοξαστή), though one might presumably apply the 
                               
252 Iamblichus Phil., De mysteriis 5.19.11–17.  
253 Iamblichus Phil., De mysteriis 5.19.22–28.  
254 Iamblichus Phil., De mysteriis 6.6.2.  
255 Proclus Phil., Institutio theologica 123.5-11.  
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‘analytic function’ (ἡ δύναμις τῆς ἀναλυτικῆς) of dialectic to Greek such that it ‘sometimes analytically comes 
to the causes, other times to the accessory causes, sometimes to both’ (τοτὲ μὲν ὡς ἐπὶ τὰ αἴτια γίγνεται 
ἀναλυτικῶς, τοτὲ δὲ ὡς ἐπὶ συναίτια, τοτὲ δὲ ὡς ἐπ' ἀμφότερα).256  
 
Whether ‘discursive’ is an appropriate translation of διανοητική in this context is perhaps a moot point. If it 
seems desirable to preserve discursive content for Greek or any other non-hieroglyphic language in the 
standard sense of that word, the distinction can simply be clarified in terms of the prior intelligibility 
requisite for what I have called a posteriori predicative thought above. This a posteriori predicative thought is 
just that kind of thought in which claims are made about sensible phenomena with a priori intelligibility, i.e. it 
is doxastic (δοξαστική) in the standard (non-technical) sense. Dianoetic thought is, then, just that thought that 
is made possible through intelligibility, i.e. the grasping of phenomena as intelligible, as opposed to doxastic 
thought which is capable of predicative conjecture concerning sensible phenomena by virtue of the a priori 
intelligibility grasped in dianoesis. Hieroglyphic Egyptian differs from orthographic Greek by virtue not 
merely of imitating the thought posterior to sensible phenomena, but by virtue not merely of imitating its 
dianoetic intelligibility, namely that which explains the possibility of a posteriori predicative thought.  
 
The hieratic aspect of the De mysteriis is, then, fully assimilated to Neoplatonic philosophical preoccupations 
more generally, despite Damascius’ claim that the hieratic and philosophical aspects are contrastive.257 Nor, it 
would seem, is the development of such assimilation a feature confined to the later pagan Platonists to whom 
he attributes it. Porphyry, who, according to Damascius, prefers philosophy, had himself been explicit on the 
point that the various levels of divinity necessitated their appropriate levels of worship. He had, in fact, 
characterized this appropriacy particularly in terms of linguistic appropriacy in the case of both ‘the god who 
is above all things’ (θεῷ μὲν τῷ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν), for whom ‘neither vocal language nor internal speech is 
appropriate’ (οὐδὲ λόγος τούτῳ ὁ κατὰ φωνὴν οἰκεῖος),258 and the ‘intelligible gods’ (νοητοῖς δὲ θεοῖς), to whom 
                               
256 For an example of the convese procedure whereby higher entities think on successively lower ontological levels, cf. Numenius Phil., 
Fragmenta 22=Proclus Phil., In Platonis Timaeum commentaria 1.303.27-32: 
Νουμήνιος δὲ τὸν μὲν πρῶτον κατὰ τὸ ‘ὅ ἐστι ζῷον’ τάττει καί φησιν ἐν 
προσχρήσει τοῦ δευτέρου νοεῖν, τὸν δὲ δεύτερον κατὰ τὸν νοῦν καὶ 
τοῦτον αὖ ἐν προσχρήσει τοῦ τρίτου δημιουργεῖν, τὸν δὲ τρίτον κατὰ τὸν 
διανοούμενον. 
Again, Numenius arranges the first god according to that which is 
animal and says that it intellectually sees for the use of the second; 
but he arranges the second after intellect, and says that it 
fabricates for the use of the third; and the third is arranged by him 
according to that which energizes dianoetically.   
 
257 Damascius Phil., In Phaedonem (versio 1) 172.1-3.  
258 Porphyrius Phil., De abstinentia 2.34.3-10.   
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‘hymns recited orally are also to be offered’ (τὴν ἐκ τοῦ λόγου ὑμνῳδίαν προσθετέον).259 To the lower order 
material offerings, such as meat and drink, are appropriate.260  
 
In contrast to the Greek word, which is an image of a doxastically available state of affairs, a hieroglyph is 
then an image of a dianoetic symbol. If, however, the dianoetic content of a hieroglyph is expressible in an 
exegesis in Greek, then the question arises as to why the hieroglyph was originally necessary to express that 
content. As we have already seen, hieroglyphs are ‘compounds’ (συνθήματα), part material image and part 
intellectual content in contrast to the wholly material medium of Greek linguistic expressions. The dianoetic 
component of the hieroglyph has doxastic implications, which the Greek can express and which is causally 
dependent on the dianoetic content, but the Greek exegesis of the intellectual content of a hieroglyph 
preserves only the content of the symbol, and only in doxastic form. In providing the intellective 
interpretation of a hieroglyph Iamblichus then supplies a doxastic and dependent account of what a 
hieroglyph delivers dianoetically at a higher order of ontological integrity. The Greek is no substitute for the 
Egyptian insofar as it necessarily lacks the ability to provide the ontological insight of the original of which it 
is a purely logical interpretation. Intellective interpretation in this sense is not an interpretation which is 
itself intellective, but an interpretation of the intellective content which properly belongs to the hieroglyph it 
interprets.  
 
Parallel with my earlier efforts to situate the Hieroglyphica within the twin Egyptian and Hellenic hieroglyphic 
traditions, it is essential here to undertake a detailed reading of Horapollo’s text in the context of Neoplatonic 
semantic theory as characterized above, and this in fact informs the broader purpose of the argument 
presented here. Attempts to rehabilitate the Ίερογλυφικά of Horapollo261 as a serious object of study have 
produced detailed and valuable contributions to late or post-Hellenistic, early Egyptological, and Renaissance 
studies alike. In situating the text in these particular lines of historical development, however, the 
understanding of semantics the text exhibits – partly in content, but also structurally – has, I think, been 
unduly neglected. By examining in particular the method of interpreting the meaning of hieroglyphic signs 
by reference to facts concerning the phenomena they depict the following chapter is intended to redress that 
neglect in light of the foregoing discussion.   
                               
259 Porphyrius Phil., De abstinentia 2.34.14-16.  
260 Porphyrius Phil., De abstinentia 2.42.1-12.  
261 Sbordone, F., Hori Apollonis Hieroglyphica (Georg Olms Verlag, 2002); Van de Walle, B., & Vergote, J., Chronique d’Égypte 18 (1943): pp.39-89, 
199-239; addenda ibid., 22 (1947): pp.251-59. 
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Chapter Four: Horapollo’s Hieroglyphica 
 
§1. Introduction 
 
Several material and explanatory parallels exist between the Ίερογλυφικά of Chæremon and Horapollo, 
fragmentary and intact respectively, 262  as well as between both and the broader Greek tradition of 
hieroglyphic exegesis examined in Chapter One. The subjects of Egyptian theosophy (or better, Egyptizing 
philosophy), which included ‘Egyptian animal worship, theology, iconography, symbolism and 
hieroglyphics’,263 had been subjects addressed not only in Alexandria (Chæremon, Clement), but also in 
Chæronia (Plutarch), Rome (Porphyry), and Apameia (Iamblichus).264  
 
[T401] οἱ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς Αἰγυπτίοις φιλοσοφήμασι τὸν Ἰσίδωρον 
σύνεργον καὶ συγκυνηγέτην παρελάμβανον τῆς ἐν βυθῷ 
κεκρυμμένης ὡς ἀληθῶς ἱερᾶς ἀληθείας.265 
Even in the Egyptian philosophical subjects they [i.e. 
Heraiscus and Asclepiades] took Isidore with them as a 
collaborator and fellow-seeker after the truly sacred truth 
which lies hidden in the depths.  
 
It is with this emphasis on hieroglyphics as belonging amongst ‘the Egyptian philosophical subjects’ (τὰ 
Αἰγύπτια φιλοσοφήματα) in late Platonism that the dual attribution to Horapollo of the titles γραμματικός and 
φιλόσοφος develops a significance that extends beyond the explanatory content and structure of the 
Hieroglyphica. It is, therefore, in light of a plausible philosophical context for the composition of the 
Hieroglyphica that the following sections are intended to address the question of the extent to which 
Horapollo’s text exemplifies, or otherwise elucidates two main issues. First, the conception of meaning 
current amongst Neoplatonists at the time and place of the text’s composition. This is motivated by what I 
take to be the uncontroversial observation that a text intended to provide explanations of the meaning of a 
series of hieroglyphs exhibits, explicitly or otherwise, some conception of what constitutes an explanation of 
meaning. Second, how such a conception of the explanation of meaning bears upon the reception of the 
hieroglyphic wisdom the glyphs themselves– in the context of the Neoplatonic interest in the Egyptian 
                               
262 Cf. Chæremon Hist. et Phil., Fragm. 12 (= Joannes Tzetzes Gramm. et Poeta, Exegesis in Iliadem 1.97) and Horapollo Gramm., Hieroglyphica, 
1.3,7,10,19,25, 62,169; Chæremon Fragm. 17D = Porphyrius Phil., Περὶ ἀγαλμάτων fragm. 10 (= Eusebius Præparatio Evangelica 3.11.45-13.2) 
and Horapollo, Hieroglyphica, 1.169; Chæremon Fragm. 19D (= Clemens Alexandrinus Theol., Stromata 5.7.41-43) and Horapollo, 
Hieroglyphica, 1.44; Chæremon Hist. et Phil., Fragm. 20D (= Clemens, Stromata 5.4.20.3-21.3) and Horapollo, Hieroglyphica, 1.10.  
263 Athanassiadi, P., (ed.) Damascius: The Philosophical History text with translation and notes (Athens: Apamea, 1999): pp.72-3.  
264 Plotinus’ extended commentary on Phædrus 246d-247e in treatise V of the Enneads, also explicitly appealing to hieroglyphic Egyptian, 
will further serve more clearly to orient a discussion of the philosophical foundations of Horapollo’s metaphysics.  
265 Damascius Phil., Vita Isidori (ap.Sudam, Hesychium, Photium et e cod. Vat. 1950) (Epitoma Photiana 243) 80.1–4.  
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philosophical subjects – are thought to offer. It was, after all, in this respect in particular that both pagan 
exegesis in general and hieroglyphic exegesis in particular had been the object of Christian critique.  
 
I am, above all, concerned to demonstrate that Horapollonian hieroglyphs plausibly serve as occasions to 
venture a methodologically principled essay consistent with the late Platonist philosophy of meaning and its 
metaphysical presuppositions as characterized by, for example, Iamblichus’ doctrine of ‘intellective 
interpretation’ (νοερὰ θεωρία).266 To this end in this chapter I develop an understanding of the various senses 
in which Horapollonian hieroglyphs conform with three modes of meaning of which hieroglyphic writing was 
traditionally and uniquely thought to be capable.267  
 
My argument has been that the interpretation of hieroglyphs is structured on the methodological principle of 
‘analytic ascent’ from the phenomena depicted, through the concepts under which they fall, to their 
intelligible causes. On the basis of this account I conclude that these three stages in the ascent correspond to 
the three modes of expression of which, according to Neoplatonic exegetes such as Porphyry, hieroglyphic 
Egyptian is capable. I also conclude that as composites of material images of sensible particulars and the 
intelligible content by virtue of which those particulars exist, Neoplatonic hieroglyphs lend themselves to 
analytic inferential procedures through discursive reason to metaphysical insights.  
 
Section 2, therefore, first of all examines the members of the Horapollonian signary as representative of or 
directly depicting natural phenomena unmediated either by spoken language or other preconditions. This is 
then used in section 3 as a basis for developing a picture of a semantic theory that may plausibly be thought 
to inform the explanatory claim in operation, a claim according to which glyphs, unmediated by speech, 
signify concepts, under which natural phenomena fall, rather than representing those phenomena 
themselves. Section 4 presents an account of the various possible rationales for a Neoplatonic understanding 
of allegorical interpretation as a means to their exegesis whereby the intelligible causes of phenomena are 
presented symbolically or allegoristically. Finally, in section 5, I address those issues arising from the 
Neoplatonists’ method of hieroglyphic exegesis related to the plausibility of establishing Horapollo’s 
hieroglyphics as a proper topic for metaphysical investigation.  
  
                               
266 Iamblichus Phil., De mysteriis 7.2.1–7.  
267 Excluding the ‘epistolographic’ (ἐπιστολογραφικός), in which mode Greek too operates.  
 Hieroglyphic Semantics in Late Antiquity - 88 - 
 Mark Wildish - 88 - 
 
§2. The Representative Mode 
 
The physiological interest of the Hieroglyphica is the most familiar of its curricular components. The text 
draws freely on Greek natural history and Egyptian cultural ethnography not only in its choice of 
hieroglyphs, but also in its explanation of the meanings of those glyphs. These physiological and cultural 
resources, of course, exercise a thematic emphasis on the generated realm, a feature to which the language 
employed draws particular attention. Horapollo also makes extensive use of cognates of γένεσις (generation): 
eighty-four occurrences altogether – eleven in section headings.268 Apart the structurally critical terms γράφω 
(concerning means or media of production of the glyphs) and σημαίνω (concerning performative aspects in 
use or function) and respective cognates, ‘generation’ is in this way not merely a prominent topic, but the 
only topic either textually explicit (as above) or thematically implicit (as in the examples of spontaneous 
generation 269  or cosmological elements 270) throughout both books. Nonetheless, the rôle this thematic 
emphasis on the realm of becoming occupies in the Hieroglyphica differs from the use of the same or related 
material in the context of a treatise on physiology or physics as such. Both in view of the self-identification of 
the Hieroglyphica as ἑρμηνεία, whereby it is presumably methodologically motivated, and in view of the fact 
that the material is cited in an explanatory capacity (rather than that which is to be explained), it will be 
necessary to clarify the techniques the use of which distinguishes its interpretative methodology from the 
mere collation of Egyptian hieroglyphs with Greek physiological material concerning the items they depict.  
 
My aim, then, is to demonstrate that Horapollo does not merely provide a one-for-one correspondence or 
parallel between a hieroglyphic sign and a natural phenomenon by cross-referenced analogies, nor the 
development of a systematic or exhaustive excursus on a subject suggested by the item glyphically depicted.271 
If Horapollo had been interested merely in compiling theological, astronomical, and natural historical 
ὑπομνήματα, as a work of comparative and historical empiricism (no matter how fantastic or unverifiable), it 
would have sufficed for him to note such correspondences and analogies. But as ἑρμηνεία it must, and of 
course does, involve recognizable figures of reasoning for the exegeses provided. To that end, I begin with a 
                               
268 These include nine nouns, seven zero-prefixed (γενεά, γένεσις, γενέτειρα, γέννησις, γένος, γονεύς, γόνος) plus two prefixed (ἀρχαιογονία, 
συγγένεια); seven adjectives, two zero-prefixed (γεννητικός, γόνιμος) plus five prefixed (ἄγονος, ἀρρενογόνος, αὐτογενής, μονογενής, 
πολύγονος); and five verbs, three zero-prefixed (γεννάω, γίγνομαι, γονάω) plus two prefixed (παραγίγνομαι, περιγίγνομαι).  
269 Horapollo Gramm., Hieroglyphica 2.44 [Πῶς δηλοῦσι σφῆκας].  
270 See Appendix 2.   
271 See Sbordone, F., Hori Apollonis Hieroglyphica (Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 2002): p.xlv. 
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closer look at the structure of the individual lemmata with a view to identifying the elements of which they 
are composed and a perspicuous presentation of the interrelations between them.  
 
Each lemma of the Hieroglyphica consists of three first-order elements: sign, meaning, and explanation.272 The 
signs are written (γράφω), drawn (ζωγραφέω), hieratically carved (ἱερογλυφέω), applied (προστίθημι), or arranged 
(τάσσω), and are in this respect specified by reference to their production. Explanations are introduced by any 
of several causal conjunctions (γάρ, διότι (or διὰ τὸ), ἐπειδή, ἐπειδήπερ, ἐπεὶ) or by a prepositional or adverbial 
phrase (ἐκ τῆς τοῦ ὀνόματος ἑρμηνείας, ἑρμηνευθὲν). Variously, both the sign-user and the sign itself are 
described as writing (γράφω), drawing (ζωγραφέω), or saying (λέγω) what they mean, in addition to the rarer 
alternatives alluding to (αἰνίσσομαι), acknowledging (νομίζω), indicating (μηνύω), exhibiting (ἐμφαίνω), and 
adumbrating (σκιάζω).273 The terms for the function of the glyphs that are most common by far are make known 
(δηλόω) and signify (σημαίνω).  
 
The arrangement of these elements in the structure of an entry can take one of two forms, depending on 
whether several glyphs will be identified as having a single meaning, or vice versa. In the majority of cases, the 
following form predominates: (i) the significandum is followed by (ii) a participial phrase (σημαίνοντες, 
γράφοντες, δηλοῦντες, &c.) governing it, then (iii) the hieroglyph itself, followed by (iv) the means or mode of 
its production (γραφοῦσιν, ζωγραφοῦσιν), and finally, (v) a clause introduced by a causal conjunction (γάρ, 
διότι, ἐπειδή, ἐπεὶ) providing the reason or logical link between the first and the second terms.274  
 
[T402] [Πῶς αἰῶνα σημαίνουσιν]. Αἰῶνα σημαίνοντες, ἥλιον 
καὶ σελήνην γράφουσι, διὰ τὸ αἰώνια εἶναι στοιχεῖα.275  
[How they signify eternity]. To denote Eternity they depict 
the Sun and Moon, because their elements are eternal.  
 
In a minority of cases the structure is reversed: (i) the hieroglyph is followed by (ii) a passive participial 
phrase (ζωγράφοῦμενον, γράφόμενος) denoting the means or mode of production, then (iii) the significandum, 
followed by (iv) δηλοῖ, σημαίνει, &c. governing it, often (though not always) followed by (v) a causal clause.  
 
[T403] [Πῶς διαμονὴν καὶ ἀσφάλειαν σημαίνουσιν]. Ὄρυγος 
ὀστοῦν ζωγραφούμενον διαμονὴν καὶ ἀσφάλειαν σημαίνει, 
[How they signify permanency and safety]. The bone of a 
quail when delineated symbolizes permanency and safety; 
                               
272 First-order because, as I will show, considerable second-order analysis is required (and some second-order detail is explicitly 
provided).  
273 See, e.g. Horapollo Gramm., Hieroglyphica: αἰνιττόμενοι (1.2,59); νομίζοντες καὶ μηνύοντες (1.61); ἐμφαίνουσιν (1.42);  σκιάζουσι (1.70).  
274 See Sbordone, F., Hori Apollonis Hieroglyphica (Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 2002): p.xlvii-xlviii.  
275 Horapollo Gramm., Hieroglyphica 1.1.   
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διότι δυσπαθές ἐστι τὸ τοῦ ζῴου ὀστοῦν.276 because the bone of this animal is difficult to be affected. 
 
The distribution of these two main variations in arrangement in general marks the main distinguishing 
features of the entries as presented in the two books of which the Hieroglyphica is comprised. Immediately 
following the incipit of Book Two we have a sequence of thirty lemmata following the second type of 
arrangement. The significance of this variation at this point in the text is perhaps best brought out by the 
incipit itself. At face value, the text from this point on will include ‘a sound account of what remains’ (περὶ τῶν 
λοιπῶν τὸν λόγον ὑγιᾶ) which is contrasted with ‘things from other copies, which do not have any exegesis, I 
have necessarily added’ (ἃ δὲ καὶ ἐξ ἄλλων ἀντιγράφων, οὐκ ἔχοντά τινα ἐξήγησιν, ἀναγκαίως ὑπέταξα). In other 
words, we have a distinction made between material thought by ‘Philip’ to belong to the original material 
presented by Horapollo and additional material added by the editor himself, which may or may not be 
original. As noted by subsequent (contemporary) editors of the text,277 these first thirty comments, like many 
of the hieroglyphs cited in Book One, contain signs for which genuinely hieroglyphic Egyptian antecedents 
can be found. Notwithstanding the switch in structural arrangement, then, the Egyptological evidence 
actually strengthens the case for the assumption that these constitute ‘what remains’ (τῶν λοιπῶν) of the 
originally Horapollonian material. The subsequent switch back to the original arrangement and glyphs 
apparently unattested in the Egyptian record, then, marks the beginning of the supplementary material.   
 
There are two uses of the word σημεῖον in the text, and five instances of its occurrence, all in Book One.278 In 
three instances Horapollo uses σημεῖον in the sense of what I shall call a natural sign: ‘the lion … when asleep 
keeps them (eyes) open, which is a sign of watching.’ (ὁ λέων … κοιμώμενος δὲ, ἀνεῳγότας τούτους (ὀφθαλμοὺς) 
ἔχει, ὅπερ ἐστὶ τοῦ φυλάσσειν σημεῖον) at 1.19. In this sense a sign is an indication of something in the nature of 
the item (in these cases, creatures) depicted (cf. a wet nose as a sign of good health in a dog) without reference 
to what the depiction of that indication in a hieroglyphic sign means. 1.49 and 1.70 are similarly natural signs 
in this sense – the first, the Oryx scraping the ground with its hooves,279 the second, ‘many other signs 
subsisting in the nature of crocodiles’ (Ἱκανῶν δὲ καὶ ἄλλων ὑπαρχόντων σημείων ἐν τῇ τῶν κροκοδείλων φύσει). 
On two occasions he also uses the word in the sense of hieroglyphic sign: ‘to signify the terrible they make use 
of the same sign’ (Φοβερόν δὲ σημαίνοντες, τῷ αὐτῷ χρῶνται σημείῳ) at 1.20. 1.50 is another signum 
                               
276 Horapollo Gramm., Hieroglyphica 2.10.   
277 Sbordone, F., (ed.), Hori Apollonis Hieroglyphica (Naples: Georg Olms, 1940 [2002]); Van de Walle, B. & Vergote, J., (trans.), ‘Traduction des 
Hieroglyphica d’Horapollon’ in Chronique d’Égypte 18 (1943): 39-89, 199-239; addenda ibid., 22 (1947): pp. 251-59.  
278 Horapollo Gramm., Hieroglyphica 1.19,20,49,50,70.  
279 Zoologically, a sign symptomatic of a range of social, dietary, and environmental sources of distress and discomfort; hieroglyphically, a 
sign of ‘impurity’ (ἀκαθαρσία).  
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hieroglyphicum: ‘they also make use of the same sign when they would want to write discernment,’ (τῷ αὐτῷ δὲ 
σημείῳ χρῶνται καὶ κρίσιν θέλοντες γράψαι). Each hieroglyphic sign furthermore bears a ‘form’ (σχῆμα), which 
is to say the character as written, for example, ‘a cynocephalus … standing upright, and raising its hands to 
heaven’ (κυνοκέφαλον … ἐστῶτα καὶ τὰς χεῖρας εὶς οὐρανὸν ἐπαίροντα), or ‘the form of the moon’ (σελήνης 
σχῆμα).280  
 
The chapter headings indiscriminately describe either what is meant by the glyph under consideration or 
how the ‘Egyptians’ signify some particular feature of broadly physiological interest, but the reader is in no 
doubt that the section is concerned with both, without direct indication of the method of juxtaposition of the 
two. In this section I raise the following question concerning the dual use of the term σημεῖον as hieroglyphic 
sign and natural sign: how are the written signs related to the objects they depict? In order to answer this 
question we first need to be clear about how linguistic samples (written or spoken) and features of the world 
(objects or facts) might be conceived of as related at all and in what sense, or under what circumstances the 
relation between the two is specifically semantic.  
 
Even if the Egyptological and polemical credentials of the Hieroglyphica can be salvaged, one feature likely still 
to provoke concern for modern readers is the apparent implausibility of many of the explanations Horapollo 
provides for the meanings he assigns to the hieroglyphs described. Amongst readers who conceive of the 
semantic relation as one in which the meaning of a glyph is explained by the truth-conditions of propositions 
about the features of the world supposed to be depicted by it, this concern might be abated by reflecting on 
the state of empirical research at the time the text was composed, at least to the extent of forgiving the 
perceived error if not actually according it credence. If we have discovered, for example, that lions do not in 
fact sleep with their eyes open, then perhaps we should concede that a hieroglyphic sign depicting a lion 
cannot after all signify vigilance. One alternative, however, would be to argue that Horapollonian semantics is 
not about reference in this way at all, but about inference – namely the inferences one can draw from 
empirical data as depicted by the formal features of hieroglyphs as to the meanings of those glyphs, whether 
or not the data itself happens to be true. And there is the further possibility that Horapollonian meanings are 
neither exclusively referential, nor exclusively inferential – a possibility I explore in the following section. 
                               
280 Horapollo Gramm., Hieroglyphica 1.15,66.  
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Finally, there is a fourth possibility: that the signs achieve their meaning by symbolising or allegorising – a 
possibility also explored in the final section.  
 
I begin, then, by elaborating on the nature of the relationship between natural signs and the hieroglyphs in 
explanation of which they are cited. In a general sense the relationship is perfectly clear. The Horapollonian 
index of signs is eo ipso an index of these natural items because hieroglyphs depict natural items (which 
include, for these purposes, artefacts, numerals, &c.). None of the examples provided by the text, however, 
are directly pictographic of their meaning. In the following text (2.82), for example, had the glyph of a lioness 
meant ‘lioness’, no further explanation of the meaning of the glyph would have been necessary.  
 
[T404] [Πῶς γυναῖκα γεννήσασαν ἅπαξ]. Γυναῖκα γεννήσασαν 
ἅπαξ βουλόμενοι σημῆναι, λέαιναν ζωγραφοῦσιν. αὕτη γὰρ δὶς 
οὐ κυΐσκει.281  
[How a woman that has given birth once]. When they want 
to signify a woman that has given birth once, they depict a 
lioness; for the latter does not conceive twice. 
 
Instead, to write or draw a glyph of a lioness is said to show or mean a woman who has given birth once. 
Therefore it is the observation, claim, or convention that a lioness gives birth only once that is used to 
establish that a woman who has given birth once can be signified by a glyph of a lioness. The connection 
between the sign and what it depicts differs from the connection between the sign and what it means. The 
connection between a glyph of a lioness and the animal itself is the fact that a lioness, or a glyph showing a 
lioness, can be used to teach us what the word ‘lioness’ means (via, for example, an ostensive definition). 
Since either the depiction or the item depicted may be used for the same purpose, namely to explain what 
‘lioness’ means, the glyph may be substituted for the animal it depicts. The connection between the glyph and 
its meaning, on the other hand, is mediated by the explanation.  
 
In any account of the relation between a glyph (which depicts an object) and the meaning of that glyph, the 
proper application of the glyph pivots around how the sign is used to signify. (This is set out in the causal 
clause of the lemma.) One possibility is that this relationship should be seen in the light of debates over the 
rôle of signs as evidence or grounds for inferential argumentation, particularly in the context of scientific 
methodology.282 On this reading it is part of Horapollo’s method to treat the form of the glyph, i.e. its 
depicting such-and-such an item, as something like the minor premiss of a syllogism, with the explanation 
                               
281 Horapollo Gramm., Hieroglyphica, 2.82.  
282 See especially Allen, J., Inference from Signs (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001).  
 Hieroglyphic Semantics in Late Antiquity - 93 - 
 Mark Wildish - 93 - 
 
acting as the major premiss. Together, they license an inference to the meaning of that glyph.283 So, for 
example:  
 
[T405] [Πῶς διαμονὴν καὶ ἀσφάλειαν σημαίνουσιν]. Ὄρυγος 
ὀστοῦν ζωγραφούμενον διαμονὴν καὶ ἀσφάλειαν σημαίνει, 
διότι δυσπαθές ἐστι τὸ τοῦ ζῴου ὀστοῦν.284 
[How they signify endurance and stability]. The bone of a 
quail when drawn signifies endurance and stability; 
because the bone of this animal is impassive. 
 
Allowing for conversion between the terms δυσπάθεια and διαμονὴ καὶ ἀσφάλεια, the lemma might be 
formalized as follows:  
 
Minor Premiss 
Major Premiss 
Conclusion 
A glyph of a quail-bone signifies the properties of a quail-bone. 
The properties of a quail-bone are impassivity. 
Therefore, a glyph of a quail-bone signifies impassivity (i.e. endurance and stability). 
S – M 
M – P 
∴ S – P 
 
This kind of formalization is constrained, however, by the necessity of supplying in a wide range of cases one 
or more intermediate inferential steps, for example, the commonly occurring assumption that a glyph 
depicting a non-human creature exhibiting certain properties signifies a human exhibiting the same 
properties. 
 
[T406] [Τί μέλαιναν περιστεράν]. Γυναῖκα χήραν ἐπιμείνασαν 
ἄχρι θανάτου θέλοντες σημῆναι, περιστερὰν μέλαιναν 
ζωγραφοῦσιν· αὕτη γὰρ οὐ συμμίγνυται ἑτέρῳ ἀνδρί, ἕως οὗ 
χηρεύσῃ.285 
[What a black dove]. When they would signify a woman 
who remains a widow till death, they draw a black dove; for 
this (bird) does not have intercourse with another male 
from the time that it is widowed. 
 
Minor Premiss 
Major Premiss 
Conclusion 
A glyph of a black dove signifies the properties of a black dove. 
The properties of a black dove are remaining a widow till death. 
Therefore, a glyph of a black dove signifies remaining a widow till death. 
S – M 
M – P 
∴ S – P 
 
This ‘inferential model’ of meaning suggests the possibility of inference not only from the sign to its meaning, 
but also from given meanings to appropriate signs to express those meanings, as a productive method for 
supplementing the signary.286 If this is right, it may shed some light on the process of editorial addition to the 
                               
283 Cf. an example of inference on a similarly physiological theme at Aristoteles Phil., Analytica Priora 70a10 ff.  
284 Horapollo Gramm., Hieroglyphica, 2.10.  
285 Horapollo Gramm., Hieroglyphica, 2.32. 
286 The structural switch can perhaps more plausibly explained than by reference to their being sourced ‘from other 
copies’ (ἃ δὲ καὶ ἐξ ἄλλων ἀντιγράφων) by supposing a corresponding shift in editorial method, namely, to the invention 
hieroglyphs whose meanings can then be explained by reference to pre-existing zoological observations. 
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range of glyphs included in the text alluded to in the incipit to Book Two. The variety of inferential 
applications available through the use of signs may therefore indicate logical reasons for variations in the 
exegetical strategies the Hieroglyphica exhibits.  
 
Even if this is the case, however, the question again arises as to what extent this might further commit 
Horapollo to the correspondence of the observations provided in explanation of hieroglyphs with factual 
conditions. Sbordone notes:  
 
Horap. ha ragione quando dichiara che siffatte decorazioni si 
facevano συμβολικῶς: ha torto invece dal momento che pone a 
base del simbolo una pretesa φύσις di conio ellenistico.287  
Horap. was right when he says that such decorations 
were συμβολικῶς: but was wrong since he placed at the 
base of the symbol a claimed φύσις of Hellenistic 
coinage.  
 
If the physiological observations adduced as ætiological explanations are, at least in principle, falsifiable, then 
not only might the status of the inferred meaning of signs may be thought susceptible to philological 
objections of the kind with which Sbordone is concerned, but also to the objection that if the evidence of a 
sign can be shown to be false, any inference drawn from it, even if valid, will be unsound, and, therefore, 
incapable of expressing the meaning the explanation supplies. What is more, the explanation, which serves as 
the middle terms between sign and inference, also relies on empirical claims which might turn out to be true 
or false. Here too is an opportunity for the inference to fail.  
 
One possible answer to this problem can be developed by examining a few of the more-or-less opaque 
lemmata. Consider, for example, the case of 2.34, where a connection is established between ants and 
origanum used as an insect-repellent: 
 
[T407] [Τί δηλοῦσιν ὀρίγανον ἱερογλυφοῦντες]. Λεῖψιν 
μυρμήκων βουλόμενοι σημῆναι, ὀρίγανον ἱερογλυφοῦσιν· αὕτη 
γὰρ ποιεῖ λείπειν τοὺς μύρμηκας, ἀποτιθεμένη ἐν τόπῳ ὁπόθεν 
ἐξέρχονται.288  
[What they show sacredly carving origanum]. When they 
want to signify the departure of ants, they sacredly carve 
‘origanum’. For if it is laid down in a place out of which 
ants come, it makes them leave. 
 
                               
287 Sbordone, F., Hori Apollonis Hieroglyphica (Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 2002): p.53.  
288 Horapollo Gramm., Hieroglyphica 2.34.  
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Here, the explanation of the meaning of the hieroglyph depicting origanum is clearly causal. The reason why 
a glyph of origanum means ‘the departure of ants’ (λεῖψιν μυρμήκων) is that origanum ‘makes ants leave’ 
(ποιεῖ λείπειν τοὺς μύρμηκας).  
 
Or, again, in 1.38, where the connection is between writing tools and writing :  
 
[T408] [Πῶς αἰγύπτια γράμματα]. Αἰγύπτια δὲ γράμματα 
δηλοῦντες, ἢ ἱερογραμματέα, ἢ πέρας, μέλαν καὶ κόσκινον καὶ 
σχοινίον ζωγραφοῦσιν. αἰγύπτια μὲν γράμματα διὰ τὸ τούτοις 
πάντα παρ' Αἰγυπτίοις τὰ γραφόμενα ἐκτελεῖσθαι· σχοίνῳ γὰρ 
γράφουσι καὶ οὐκ ἄλλῳ τινί.289  
[How Egyptian writing]. To show Egyptian writing, or a 
sacred scribe, or a boundary, they depict ink, a sieve, and a 
reed. All writing among the Egyptians is accomplished by 
means of these things; for they write with a reed and 
nothing else.  
 
In this example, there is also a clearly marked causal connection between writing implements and writing: ‘by 
means of these things all writings among the Egyptians are executed’ (διὰ τὸ τούτοις πάντα παρ' Αἰγυπτίοις τὰ 
γραφόμενα ἐκτελεῖσθαι). In the first example, the causal explanation that origanum has insect-repelling 
properties, i.e. that origanum is a reason that ants leave (or a cause of their leaving), is itself introduced in 
order to explain (i.e. clarify) the semantic connection between causing ants to leave and the absence of ants.  
In the second example, however, ink, sieve, and reed are connected to writing both as writing implements 
(where the emphasis is on the fact that, qua implements, they are causally effective in the production of 
writing), but also as implements for writing (where the emphasis is on the fact that what they are causally 
effective in producing is writing). In each of these cases two types of connection are established by the 
explanation between the glyph and its meaning. The difference between the two kinds of connection is that 
whereas qua effects (writing; the departure of ants) are symptomatic of their respective causes (ink, sieve, and 
reed; origanum), it is criterial of the characters depicting these causes meaning ‘writing’ and ‘the departure of 
ants’ that the items depicted be causes of the effects signified. The production of writing is symptomatic of the 
use of writing tools (there is a causal relation between the two), but it is criterial of their being writing tools 
that what they serve to produce is writing. Insofar as the causal relation between the two serves to explain the 
conceptual relation, the former is, as such, not identical with the latter. The distinction can be brought out in 
another way using the first example too. Although ants may, as a matter of fact, not leave a place in which 
there is origanum, despite its being in fact a reason for them to do so, there is no question of the ‘origanum’ 
                               
289 Horapollo Gramm., Hieroglyphica 1.38.  
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hieroglyph meaning ‘the departure of ants’ in a sense that does not preclude their still being present. The 
causal link, in other words, is defeasible; the conceptual link is not.  
 
The strength of claims concerning the meaning of glyphs by inference is not then exclusively a matter of 
determining whether the inference is sound (based on true premises). Indeed, the truth of the claims made is 
not clearly the basis for the explanatory of the meaning of the glyph at all. If it were not the case, for 
example, that Egyptian scribes wrote with ink and reed, the explanation that a glyph depicting ink and a reed 
signified Egyptian writing could not in fact do any explanatory work. But the only explanatory work the 
natural fact can do in the event of its being true is that of explaining why it is that the glyphic depiction of 
Egyptian writing tools is in fact in use as a sign signifying writing. Similarly, even if it were the case that ants 
avoided places in which origanum was to be found, an explanation in terms of origanum repelling ants 
merely explains why the glyph bears the meaning it in fact does, rather than that the meaning the glyph 
signifies is in fact ‘the departure of ants’.  
 
In other words, the absence in the text of examples that I described above as ‘pictographic’ is not a 
consequence of Horapollo being committed to a theory of meaning dependent on the existence of causal links 
between the item depicted by the glyph and what it signifies. Although such causal links do not feature in the 
case of ‘pictographic’ hieroglyphs (which are amenable to explanations in terms of ostensive definition), even 
in those cases where a causal explanation is available its purpose is to explain the semantic relation between 
a glyph and its meaning. For that reason causal explanations cannot be essential features of explanations of 
the meaning of hieroglyphs at all, even to the extent that they are amenable to them. Though he employs a 
method in accordance with which the meaning of glyphs is explained through objects of comparison, namely 
those items (largely of Egyptological provenance) depicted by the glyphs, in this respect he need not be 
understood to be reliant on the plausibility of his observations in artefactual and natural history for the 
semantic purposes to which he puts them. In other words, if the relevant beliefs about things turned out to be 
false, that would not necessitate the use of a different glyph to signify the same meaning; it would only 
require our leaning on different justifications for glyphs bearing the meanings they do (perhaps including 
explanations involving purely ostensive definitions).  
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Inferential procedures from empirical observations do not, then, establish the semantic content of a glyph, 
but only explain the origins of or reasons for the signary as appropriate to bear the meanings they do. They 
therefore do not establish a commitment on Horapollo’s part to an evidence-based theory of meaning. Upon 
seeing the hieroglyphic sign – in the case of 1.70, the tail of a crocodile (κροκοδείλου οὐρὰν) - one is licensed by 
what has so often been observed in connection with crocodiles’ tails generally, namely, the cause of ἀφανίσις 
and the destruction of seized prey, to understand a semantic relation between ‘disappearance’ (ἀφανίσις) and 
‘shadow’ (σκότος) which is quite independent of the natural historical facts. Therefore, a glyph of a crocodile’s 
tail can be used to signify σκότος.290 Similarly, in 2.38, in explanation of why a glyph depicting a lion tearing its 
cubs to pieces signifies immoderate anger, the natural fact that lion-cub bones emit fire when struck is cited. 
However, it is the connection drawn between fire and anger291 that legitimizes the inference from the natural 
fact that lion-cub bones emit fire when struck to the conclusion that a glyph depicting a lion tearing its cubs to 
pieces signifies immoderate anger.  
 
To illustrate the difficulty in certain cases of seeing in what sense an explanation actually explains the 
meaning of a glyph at all, 1.61 presents an instructive case. In this case the verb μηνύουσι, a legalistic term 
meaning to ‘make a disclosure, lay an information against’ is used to describe the function of the glyph. 
Though μηνύοντες syntactically corresponds to δηλοῦντες elsewhere in the text, the rôle of the explanation in 
establishing the reason for the sign (the serpent and in the middle a great palace) to signify its meaning (a cosmic 
ruler) is less straightforward.  
 
[T409] [Πῶς μηνύουσι κοσμοκράτορα]. Πάλιν δὲ τὸν βασιλέα 
κοσμοκράτορα νομίζοντες καὶ μηνύοντες, αὐτὸν μὲν ὄφιν 
ζωγραφοῦσιν, ἐν μέσῳ δὲ αὐτοῦ οἶκον μέγαν δεικνύουσιν 
εὐλόγως· ὁ γὰρ βασίλειος οἶκος παραύ, του<τέστι κρατῶν> ἐν τῷ 
κόσμῳ.292  
[How they disclose the cosmic ruler]. Again when they 
would indicate and disclose the cosmic ruler, they draw the 
same serpent, and in the middle of it they show a large 
house, and with reason: for the royal abode [signifies] the 
pharaoh, that is he who rules in the cosmos. 
 
In order to understand the explanation as an explanation, the reader must recall that the serpent had been 
associated with the cosmos in 1.2 by virtue of a formal resemblance between the scales of a serpent and the 
image of the stars against the background of the sky. However, attention is also drawn to the conceptual 
relation between the dwelling of a ruler and its inhabitant. What we have, therefore, is the conjunction of the 
                               
290 According to the LSJ: ‘in Il. always of the darkness of death’.  
291 Brought out in the Greek by the words πῦρ and πυρέττειν; in English perhaps flame/enflame, blaze/blaze up, or flare, flare up (the operative 
notion being a self-propagating nature common to both fire and immeasurable or extreme anger).  
292 Horapollo Gramm., Hieroglyphica 1.61.  
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two types of explanatory element, one empirical, the other conceptual. The first provides a hypothetical 
rationalization as to why the hieroglyph is to be understood as signifying cosmos-ruler, while the latter draws 
attention to the formal and semantic relations (between a serpent and the cosmos, a pharaoh and his royal 
abode) upon which the hypothetical rationalization is premissed.  
 
Both the glyphs and their meanings often display a composite structure formally supporting this analysis. 
The recognition that explanations are composite in this way, comprising discrete categorical elements, of 
why signs signifying their meanings and of what their meanings are, establishes not only that natural facts 
are conceived of as a hieroglyphic resource, but also that it is the semantic content of the glyph that provides 
the inferential warrant from that resource to an explanation of why the glyph has that particular semantic 
content. The explanatory momentum, in other words, is not from resource to meaning, but vice versa. Though 
the possibilities afforded by such a conception of ἱερογλυφικά are not explicitly exploited in the text of the 
first book, as an organizing principle it nonetheless constitutes a mnemonic apparatus for learning 
‘hieroglyphic’ writing and a technique (explicitly employed in the second book) for generating further 
combinations derived from those resources.  
 
A relatively direct statement of the means of composition occurs in 1.70 where the author notes that: ‘there 
are plenty of other signs in the nature of crocodiles’ (Ἱκανῶν δὲ καὶ ἀλλῶν ὑπαρχότων σημείων, ἐν τῇ τῶν 
κροκοδείλων φύσει). There is no predetermined range of meanings in need of signs, nor any predetermined 
range of signs in need of meanings. Where the sign is of genuinely Egyptian provenance, its referent (and 
possibly its meaning) is sourced there, but it becomes apparent that Book Two is less rich in interpretative 
scope than its predecessor. The lines of thought connecting the explanation to the meaning are clearer 
because the convention of natural history adduced can be presented in order to establish the form of the sign, 
rather than Horapollo having to reconstruct a line of inference from a natural fact to an existing sign. If one is 
working from a resource stipulating a finite range of features pertaining to a zoomorphic referent, then a pre-
existing sign or its given meaning may fall outside that range necessitating an imaginative or inventive 
reconstruction.  
 
It is perhaps for that reason the average number of meanings per glyph in Book One is much greater than in 
Book Two. For fifty more signs (two-thirds as many again) in the second book, there are only fourteen more 
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meanings (one-eighth as many again). This disparity between the two books then does seem likely to be a 
direct consequence of the method applied. The author of Book One must apply the zoological details of his 
Hellenistic-Alexandrian natural history sources to the glyphs of his Egyptian source without any guarantee 
that the two are complementary in the way the author of Book Two is at liberty to ensure. When providing 
the additional explanations of the second book the author-editor Philip, by virtue of not being constrained by 
a pre-existing range of historically Egyptian hieroglyphs which are to be explained, is free to suggest new 
hieroglyphic signs on the basis of information from the natural history sources which can be used to explain 
how such new signs might have the meanings he attributes to them.  
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§3. The Semantic Mode 
 
The claim of this section – plausibly motivated by the general historical context outlined in chapter three – is 
that Horapollonian semantics involves distinctions between linguistic expressions (λέξεις), their meanings 
(σημαινόμενα or λεγόμενα), and the objects or name-bearers (πράγματα) to which they refer.293 This claim is 
developed independently of my view of how Horapollo uses natural signs as evidence or grounds for inferential 
argumentation. (The relationship between these features and the Neoplatonic (specifically Iamblichean) 
theory of meaning, which itself exhibits both Peripatetic and Stoic features, will be the subject of part three.) 
 
My question is how Horapollo’s explanations establish a relation between the item depicted by the sign and 
its semantic content and this, in turn, involves some discussion of the problem of how to understand what kind 
of things Horapollonian meanings are.  
 
For Horapollo, πράγματα are not what is signified by λέξεις, in the sense that even if he maintains that a 
relation of representation between the two holds, this is nevertheless not the semantic (sign-meaning) 
relation. There might, however, still be a stronger sense in which signs represent objects. One sense in which 
this might be possible is that the substitution of a glyph for what it depicts may invoke an essentialist 
conception of ostensive definition, such that, even if the relation between Horapollonian signs and objects is 
representative, rather than semantic, still perhaps it exhibits a linguistic naturalism (as opposed to 
conventionalism).  
 
According to the version of linguistic naturalism espoused by Cratylus in Plato’s dialogue of that name 
linguistic forms – primarily nouns – must bear a mimetic relationship to the nominatum. Thus, objective 
natures are attributed to names. (A corollary of this is that there is an objective expertise of naming 
postulated for employing and deploying names accurately.) Each name, insofar as it is composed of elements, 
is significant because each element has significance: for example, the hardness of a consonant, for example, 
mimetically contributes ‘hardness’ as a semantic component of the word in which it is used. On the basis of 
                               
293 Cf. Barnes, J., ‘Meaning, Saying, Thinking’ in Döring, K. & Ebert, Th. (edd.) Dialektiker und Stoiker: zur Logik der Stoa und ihrer Vorläufer 
(Stuttgart: Steiner, 1993): pp. 47-61.  
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this hypothesis of descriptive content, compound names are given an analysis in terms of atomic names, 
which themselves are derived from imitative primary sounds (letters).294  
 
Thus etymology establishes the mimetic relationship between language (names) and reality (the Form of 
names), but not knowledge of things in themselves, without which, even if sounds/letters are etymological 
elements of natural names, convention might still determine the actual (if not ideal) use of names. The 
possibility of etymological exegesis of the phonetic elements of speech, and consequently the literal elements 
of writing, does not depend, then, on reading mimesis as the hypothesis that this is how language historically 
developed. If we are then to assume the possibility that the historical development of the actual use of names 
might, in the absence of knowledge of things in themselves, be determined by convention, rather than 
naturalism, it is the rather the permanence and singularity of the objects of philosophical thought (τὰ ἀεὶ ὄντα 
καὶ πεφυκότα), and not simply the correspondence of each sound to a discrete element of reality as established 
by the etymological method, that is thought to justify the etymological enterprise as furnishing reliable 
analyses. The usefulness of etymology, then, is constrained by the requirement of just such independent 
knowledge. One alternative to reading the Cratylus here as offering a substantive account of the historical 
development of language is to read the etymological passages of the Cratylus as an explanation of 
etymological method itself, rather than of specific insights to be gained by its application. If those passages 
are just such an illustration of the employment of a particular technique for analyzing words, rather than of 
any results it might in practice reach, then perhaps there is similar scope for an understanding of the πρῶτα 
στοιχεῖα of, for example, Clement’s hieroglyphic analysis too as implying independent epistemological 
objectives which are otherwise absent from the purely philologically-orientated Egyptological reading to 
which it is typically submitted.  
 
What evidence do we have in Horapollo for linguistic naturalism of this sort and what are the possible 
epistemological constraints on its application? The first of two key lemmata is 1.70.  
 
[T410] [Πῶς σκιάζουσι σκότος]. Σκότος δὲ λέγοντες, 
κροκοδείλου οὐρὰν ζωγραφοῦσιν, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἄλλως εἰς 
ἀφανισμὸν καὶ ἀπώλειαν φέρει ὁ κροκόδειλος, οὗ ἐὰν λάβηται 
ζῴου, εἰ μὴ τῇ οὐρᾷ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ διαπληκτίσας ἄτονον 
παρασκευάσει· ἐν τούτῳ γὰρ τῷ μέρει ἡ τοῦ κροκοδείλου ἰσχὺς 
[How they adumbrate darkness]. To say darkness, they 
draw the tail of a crocodile, for by no other means does the 
crocodile bring about the darkness of death and 
destruction of whichever animal which it may have caught, 
                               
294 Plato Phil., Cratylus 386d-397b. See Sedley, Plato’s Cratylus (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003): ch.6, §.2.  
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καὶ ἀνδρεία ὑπάρχει. Ἱκανῶν δὲ καὶ ἄλλων ὑπαρχόντων 
σημείων ἐν τῇ τῶν κροκοδείλων φύσει, αὐτάρκη τὰ δόξαντα ἐν 
τῷ πρώτῳ συγγράμματι εἰπεῖν.295  
than by first striking it with its tail, and rendering it 
immobile: for in this part the strength and power of the 
crocodile subsists. And even though there are sufficient 
other signs subsisting in the nature of the crocodile, those 
that appear in the first book are sufficient.  
 
Though the glyph of a crocodile-tail could be used to teach someone what the word ‘crocodile-tail’ means, 
just as pointing at a crocodile-tail can, i.e. by ostensive definition, examples from Horapollo in fact here 
maintain a distinction between what is directly named and what is indirectly signified precisely because the 
glyph does service for the nominatum. Since it as it were stands in for the thing that it names, it cannot be said 
to ‘signify’ that thing. Horapollonian hieroglyphic instruction, therefore, takes place both ostensively in one 
sense and discursively in another, through the specification of predicable attributes. The predicable 
attributes of a serpent in Horapollo include ‘variegation’, ‘heaviness’, and ‘smoothness’. (Alternatively, by 
virtue of sharing identically predicable attributes in an extended discursive sense (in this case, cyclical 
temporality), a serpent-sign can be used to mean ‘cosmos’.)296 By virtue of its predicable attributes, then, a 
serpent-sign can also be used to mean ‘variegated’, ‘heavy’, or ‘smooth’, but only by virtue of the serpent-sign 
itself being variegated.  Each sign, therefore, insofar as it is composed of predicable attributes it has in common 
with the object depicted, is significant because each element exists in the nature of the phenomenon itself: 
for example, something ‘subsisting in the nature of crocodiles’ (ὑπαρχόντων… ἐν τῇ τῶν κροκοδείλων φύσει), 
variegation in the nature of the serpent, contributing, by mimesis ‘variegation’ as a semantic component of 
the glyph in which it is depicted.  
 
The second of the two key lemmata, 1. 27, however, draws a further distinction which suggests an alternative 
theoretical influence on the text.297   
 
[T411] [Πῶς τὸ λέγειν]. Τὸ λέγειν δὲ γράφοντες, γλῶσσαν 
ζωγραφοῦσι καὶ ὕφαιμον ὀφθαλμόν, τὰ μὲν πρωτεῖα τῆς λαλιᾶς 
τῇ γλώσσῃ μερίζοντες, τὰ δευτερεῖα δὲ ταύτης τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς· 
οὕτω γὰρ οἵ γε λόγοι τελείως τῆς ψυχῆς καθεστήκασι, πρὸς τὰ 
κινήματα αὐτῆς συμμεταβάλλοντες. [Ἧιπερ καὶ ἑτέρᾳ λαλιὰ 
παρ' Αἰγυπτίοις ὀνομάζεται]. ἑτέρως δὲ τὸ λέγειν σημαίνοντες, 
[How (they signify) speaking]. To denote speaking they 
depict a tongue and a blood-shot eye because they assign 
the primary features of speech to the tongue, but the 
secondary features of it to the eyes. For these utterances 
are brought about entirely of the soul, changing in 
accordance with its movements; [just in the same way as 
                               
295 Horapollo Gramm., Hieroglyphica 1.70.1–6.  
296 Horapollo Gramm., Hieroglyphica 1.2. [Πῶς κόσμον].  
297 On the non-semantic aspects of which cf. nam et oculi nimis arguti, quemadmodum animo affecti simus, loquuntur (Marcus Tullius Cicero, de 
Legibus, 1.27); neque ulla ex parte (quam ex oculis) maiora animi indicia … homini maxime … profecto in oculis animus habitat … oculi ceu vasa 
quaedam visibilem eius partem accipiunt atque tramittunt (Gaius Plinius Secundus, Naturalis Historia, 11.145-6).  
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γλῶσσαν καὶ χεῖρα ὑποκάτω γράφουσι, τῇ μὲν γλώσσῃ τὰ 
πρωτεῖα τοῦ λόγου φέρειν δεδωκότες, τῇ δὲ χειρί, ὡς τὰ τῆς 
γλώσσης βουλήματα ἀνυούσῃ, τὰ δεύτερα.298  
speech is expressed in words in a different way by 
Egyptians]. And to signify speaking differently they draw a 
tongue and a hand beneath, giving the primary features of 
speech to the tongue to produce, and the secondary 
features to the hand, as effecting the intentions of the 
tongue.  
 
The crucial contribution here is the claim that there are ‘movements of the soul’ (τῆς ψυχῆς … κινήματα) in 
accordance with which utterances (λόγοι) change. This raises two further questions, namely, (iii) how are 
utterances related to movements of the soul, and (iv) how are movements of the soul related to factual 
conditions? 
 
As noted above, the two most prominent terms used of Horapollonian hieroglyphic signs in their signifying 
capacity are δηλόω and σημαίνω. The two terms are not applied in such a way as to distinguish what is directly 
named and what indirectly signified respectively.299 The first of these two lemmata, however, tells us how 
written signs are related to the objects they depict: namely, via shared predicable attributes. We can now look 
for specific evidence presented by the Horapollonian text indicating, if not explicit theoretical statements, 
then at least familiar assumptions with which to answer the second set of questions as to what kind of 
relations obtain between language and thought. Insofar as utterances (λόγοι) are ‘brought about entirely of 
the soul (τελείως τῆς ψυχῆς), changing in accordance with its movements (κινήματα) we have a conception of 
linguistic expressions as also corresponding to the internal λόγος of the soul.  
 
In the absence of any evidence of an historically Egyptian account of any relationship of correspondence 
between linguistic expressions and movements of the soul it may safely be inferred that the correspondence 
is not an otherwise unattested report of an Egyptian belief, but Horapollo’s own explanation of why it is that 
the Egyptians assign the various features of speech to the tongue and the eyes. That being the case, Horapollo 
offers a rare indication of an at least partially theorized account of language, involving at least two possible 
kinds of relation: first, a representational relation between written sign and object depicted, and second, a 
relation between sign and movements of the soul. If, as I have described it, Horapollo’s lemmata consist of the 
three elements of glyph, meaning, and the item depicted by the glyph (in terms of the properties of which the 
                               
298 Horapollo Gramm., Hieroglyphica 1.27.1–8.  
299 Cf. Ammonius Phil., in Aristotelis librum de interpretatione commentarius, 48.31: περὶ δὲ τοῦ δύο μόνα εἴδη τῶν σημαντικῶν εἶναι φωνῶν, 
ὄνομα καὶ ῥῆμα, τὸ μὲν ὑπάρξεων δηλωτικόν, τὸ δὲ ἐνεργειῶν ἢ παθῶν, ἃς κοινῶς ὠνόμασε πράξεις·  
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meaning is explained), then a plausible interpretation of the non-representational correspondence between 
sign and movements of the soul is that it describes a semantic relation.  
 
The Hieroglyphica makes several reference to speech (τὸ λέγειν), usually, as already noted, to identify the 
activity of the sign-user through the use of the sign.300 Not only might a given sign (σημεῖον) either show 
(δηλοῖ) or signify (σημαίνει) its meaning, then, but, in using a particular glyph, the scribes may also signify 
(σημαίνουσι) that meaning in a number of senses (αἰνιττόμενοι, μηνύοντες, νομίζοντες, &c.), suggestive not only 
of a variety of explanatory techniques, but also of formal and informal settings in which they may be 
applied.301 That Horapollo has something like this type of explanation for the semantic relation in mind is a 
view supported by the unique application of the term συμβολικῶς to the ὁ λέων … κοιμώμενος δὲ, ἀνεῳγότας 
τούτους (ὀφθαλμοὺς) ἔχει in 1.19.  
 
[T412] [Πῶς ἐγρηγορότα γράφουσιν]. Ἐγρηγορότα δὲ γράφοντες 
ἢ καὶ φύλακα, λέοντος γράφουσι κεφαλήν, ἐπειδὴ ὁ λέων ἐν τῷ 
ἐγρηγορέναι μέμυκε τοὺς ὀφθαλμούς, κοιμώμενος δὲ 
ἀνεῳγότας τούτους ἔχει, ὅπερ ἐστὶ τοῦ φυλάσσειν σημεῖον. 
διόπερ καὶ συμβολικῶς τοῖς κλείθροις τῶν ἱερῶν λέοντας ὡς 
φύλακας παρειλήφασι.302  
[How they write a watchful person.] To write a watchful 
person, or even a guard, they draw the head of a lion, 
because the lion, when awake, closes his eyes, but when 
asleep keeps them open, which is a sign of watchfulness. 
For this reason at the gates of the temples they have 
symbolically appropriated lions as guardians.  
 
In other words, because a lion sleeps with open eyes, which is a natural sign of watchfulness, a depiction of a 
lion is a hieroglyphic sign of watchfulness. But the setting of lions as guards is symbolic. One point which 
Horapollo does not spell out in this passage is what precisely the mark of distinction between a sign and a 
symbol is. Presumably it is uncontroversial to point out that there would be a difference between a sacred 
enclosure whose entrance is guarded by a lion and a sacred enclosure at the entrance of which is a sign of a 
lion such that only the latter could reasonably be described as symbolic in any sense. So, what exactly is the 
relationship between a sign and that which it depicts, that which it signifies, and anything which it might 
symbolize? A lion that sleeps with open eyes might be a sign of vigilance in two senses: (a) in the sense that it 
is indicative of vigilance by virtue of referring to it - which a sign of a lion could do equally well; or (b) in the 
sense that it is indicative of vigilance by virtue of such a lion exercising or demonstrating vigilance. The 
temptation is to emphasize the vigilance exercised by an actual lion, and the impassiveness of a lion-sign, so 
                               
300 Cf. Horapollo Gramm., Hieroglyphica 1.4: βουλόμενοί τε ἔτος εἰπεῖν; I.68: Ἀνατολὴν δὲ λέγοντες; 1.69: Δύσιν δὲ λέγοντες; 1.70: Σκότος δὲ 
λέγοντες.  
301 As, for example, by the legalistic connotations of μηνύουσι ‘make a disclosure, lay an information against’ noted above.   
302 Horapollo Gramm., Hieroglyphica 1.19.1–5.  
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that, in the case of an actual lion being set as a guard, sleeping with open eyes is a natural sign that lions are 
vigilant. But the Horapollonian lion (a depiction of a lion sleeping with open eyes) is a sign of vigilance only 
because actual lions sleep with open eyes (and so are vigilant). But in this case, it is difficult to imagine, if 
lions are supposed in fact to be vigilant, that the setting of lions ὡς φύλακας might be symbolic. Under what 
circumstances, then, might one describe the carved image or sign of a lion as a symbol? The answer seems to 
be that if τοῦ φυλάσσειν σημεῖον means that sleeping with open eyes is a sign of vigilance exhibited by lions, 
then to set images or signs of lions as guards is symbolic, since it is used to enact the rôle which the thing it 
depicts plays under ordinary (i.e. non-symbolic) conditions.  
 
I have, then, distinguished three senses in which a sign (or a symbol) signifies (or symbolizes) for Horapollo. 
In the first sense, we have natural signs, which are symptomatic of conditions, dispositions, or qualities that 
reside in the nature of the item depicted. These natural signs are, secondly, cited as explanations of the 
meanings of hieroglyphic signs, which are visual descriptions of natural signs, signifying that of which the 
latter are symptomatic. Thirdly, there are symbolic uses of hieroglyphic signs in which the sign is used under 
those circumstances in which the natural sign is used non-symbolically.  
 
Accordingly, the differences between the three types, or senses, of ‘sign’ are reflected in the terminology used 
to describe their respective functions. When the text states that a particular σημεῖον (hieroglyphic) δηλοῖ or 
σημαίνει its meaning, that sign is characterized as indicative of the meaning, not as exhibiting or displaying the 
quality (for example) which it means, as a natural σημεῖον does. For Horapollo (or Philip), the symbolic use of 
hieroglyphs is distinguished from both the representational use and the semantic use. Not only is the 
meaning not the same as what is depicted – i.e. the meaning of a sign is not that to which the sign refers (if it 
were, the meaning of hieroglyph 1.19 would be lion sleeping with open eyes, not on guard), but also what is 
symbolized by the fact that the Egyptians ‘employed lions as guards’ (λέοντας ὡς φύλακας παρειλήφασιν) is 
distinct from what a lion-sign signifies because it is neither the hieroglyphic sign, nor its referent that is 
symbolic (though the former is significant), but the employment or application (παράληψις) of images of lions 
as guards.  
 
Whether lions do sleep with open eyes or not does not affect the specifically semantic relation between the 
hieroglyph and its meaning (i.e. vigilance), only the choice of glyph to bear that significance because the 
 Hieroglyphic Semantics in Late Antiquity - 106 - 
 Mark Wildish - 106 - 
 
emphasis in the causal clause explaining the meaning of the glyph is not on the fact that it is a lion sleeping 
with open eyes, but on the fact that it is a lion sleeping with open eyes. Lions were said at one time to sleep with 
open eyes. For that reason, a lion, or an image or sign of a lion was used to mean vigilance. Now the 
connection between sleeping with open eyes and vigilance is internal to the two, by which I do not mean 
someone or something sleeping with open eyes is in fact vigilant (they are in fact asleep), but that vigilance 
might be indicated by the image of someone (something) sleeping with open eyes: not a demonstration of 
vigilance, but nonetheless illustrative of vigilance. Because lions (whether factually or conventionally) sleep 
with open eyes, a lion (or the image of one) can (grammatically, logically) be used to mean or signify 
vigilance. But it is hard to see why, if lions are in fact or by convention vigilant, this use is of itself symbolic, 
since in that case, lions are literally, not symbolically, vigilant. If, on the other hand, Egyptians set not lions 
(the beasts), but figures or signs of lions as guards to sacred enclosures, then the symbolism is clear, because a 
sign is not literally vigilant, even if that of which it is a sign is.  
 
A sign, a character, or a pictogram is symbolic depending on how it is used, not by virtue of simply depicting 
something, or by being a sign signifying something. The sign of a lion certainly shows a lion, but what it 
signifies (in this case) is vigilance. If the placement of a lion (as opposed to a sign depicting a lion) is symbolic, 
then the use of the signs as such cannot be conceived of as symbolic in the same (if any) sense. In 1.19 the lion 
might be considered somewhat misleading to a reader unacquainted with Plutarch or Ælian,303 but the 
connection between sleeping with open eyes and vigilance is clear: one cannot know if something that sleeps 
with open eyes is asleep or not, and one is forced to assume vigilance. One cannot, however, assume vigilance 
of a sign. A guard might wear the badge of a lion to signify his profession, but to post the badge as guard is 
symbolic, and presupposes a further pragmatic context wherein the use of the hieroglyphic badge is situated 
and employed. No other instance of such a context is explicitly provided within the Ἱερογλυφικά, but having 
established a pragmatic component to the use of hieroglyphs, several facets of symbolic usage in this sense 
are adduced.  
 
  
                               
303 Plutarchus Biogr., Phil., Quaestiones convivales 670c3: ὑπολάμπει τὰ ὄμματα καθεύδοντος; Claudius Aelianus Soph., De natura animalium 
5.39.9-10: κρείττων ὕπνου λέων ἐστὶν ἀγρυπνῶν ἀεί.  
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§4. The Symbolic Mode 
 
As I have argued in the previous section, there is, then, a third consistent sense in which Horapollonian 
hieroglyphs are given exegeses neither as representative (i.e. in their capacity as depictions of natural 
phenomena), nor as legitimizing semantic links.  
 
[T413] [Πῶς κόσμον]. Κόσμον βουλόμενοι γράψαι, ὄφιν 
ζωγραφοῦσι τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἐσθίοντα οὐράν, ἐστιγμένον φολίσι 
ποικίλαις, διὰ μὲν τῶν φολίδων αἰνιττόμενοι τοὺς ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ 
ἀστέρας. βαρύτατον δὲ τὸ ζῷον καθάπερ καὶ ἡ γῆ,  λειότατον δὲ 
ὥσπερ ὕδωρ· καθ' ἕκαστον δὲ ἐνιαυτὸν τὸ γῆρας ἀφείς, 
ἀποδύεται, καθ' ὃ καὶ ὁ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ ἐνιαύσιος χρόνος, 
ἐναλλαγὴν ποιούμενος, νεάζει· τῷ δὲ ὡς τροφῇ χρῆσθαι τῷ 
ἑαυτοῦ σώματι σημαίνει τὸ πάντα ὅσα ἐκ τῆς θείας προνοίας ἐν 
τῷ κόσμῳ γεννᾶται, ταῦτα πάλιν καὶ τὴν μείωσιν εἰς αὑτὰ 
λαμβάνειν.304  
[How the universe]. When they want to write the universe, 
they depict a serpent speckled with variegated scales, 
eating its own tail; by the scales alluding to the stars in the 
universe. The animal is also very heavy, as is the earth, and 
very slippery, like water: moreover, it every year sheds its 
skin and thus loses old age, as in the universe the annual 
period causes a change, and is renewed. And using its own 
body for food signifies that all things whatsoever, that are 
generated by divine providence in the universe, undergo a 
diminution into the same things again. 
 
The figure of the serpent alludes (αἰνιττόμενοι) to two qualities (heaviness, smoothness) of elements of the 
cosmos; the variegated scales allude to the stars in the cosmos; the serpent of which this is a figure alludes, 
through the natural fact of shedding skin in rejuvenation and devouring its own tail, either to the principle of 
the cyclical temporality of the cosmos, or to the reciprocal nature of growth and decay within the cosmos. 
The feature that characterizes the three elements as allusive, as opposed to representative or semantic, is 
that the details depicted by the glyph neither directly signify the natural phenomena depicted, nor are they 
criterially related to them in such a way as legitimize inference from those phenomena to the meaning of the 
depicted elements. What is consistently allusive in this mode of hieroglyphic expression is the use of features 
belonging to the observed natural phenomena as depicted by the glyphs themselves not as criterial of the 
conceptual content of the glyph (as in the case of the semantic mode of hieroglyphic expression), but as 
symbolically performed by the glyph itself. In other words, it is not the rôle that natural phenomena play in 
the semantic mode of expression in explaining the meanings of the hieroglyphs that depict them (whether 
pre-existing or invented) that I shall distinguish with the terms symbolic, allusive, or enigmatic 
(αἰνιγματικός). It is rather the performative rôle of the glyphs in the capacity those natural phenomena 
ordinarily occupy that so characterizes them.  
 
                               
304 Horapollo Gramm., Hieroglyphica, 1.2.  
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The symbolic technique, then, is premissed both on a hieroglyph depicting a natural phenomenon, and on a 
shared semantic relation between the relevant phenomenon and its depiction. In other words, it depends for 
its viability as a symbol on both the representative and semantic modes of expression described above. 
However, it is not, qua symbol, directly concerned with depicting a natural phenomenon, or with a shared 
meaning between the phenomenon depicted and the glyph. Rather it establishes the glyph as symbolically 
fulfilling the condition met by the phenomenon in non-symbolic circumstances.  
 
To clarify with a few examples: the connection between the figure of a moon and a month305 is not only 
empirically observable, but semantic. What is meant by ‘moon’ is that celestial body by which one measures 
the course of a month, not, for example, the body during the eclipse of which baboons decline to eat.306 In 
other words, one way of explaining what ‘moon’ means is to specify its relationship with the duration of a 
month. This is the semantic relation upon which depends the second mode of hieroglyphic expression. A bee, 
on the other hand, signifying ‘a people obedient to their king’ (λαὸν πειθήνιον βασιλεῖ)307 is not eusocial by 
definition, but by nature; one doesn’t identify a bee by whether it lives in a eusocial colony with a dominant 
reproductive female and it is possible to identify a eusocial species without specifying that it is a bee. In the 
first example, the explanation specifies criterial conditions under which the item may be called a moon, 
whereas, in the second, it is merely symptomatic of the bee that it is eusocial: its hierarchical social 
arrangements can be inferred from its depicted form or natural condition, but these are not defining 
characteristics. In other cases, however, the relevant point of comparison between a sign and the 
phenomenon it depicts, which in the semantic mode of expression identifies its meaning, in the symbolic 
mode identifies a natural feature of the phenomenon depicted as a feature of the glyph itself. When 
‘appropriated’ (παρειλήφασι) in its capacity as displaying this natural feature a glyph is being used in the 
symbolic mode (συμβολικῶς).  
 
Though examples in which the natural properties or qualities of the phenomena depicted by hieroglyphs are 
emphasized (usually by virtue of the absence of any elaboration of how those feature are to be construed as 
establishing specifically semantic links) are far more frequent in the second book than the first. This is 
possibly a result of the fact that Philip’s additions are no longer constrained by the predetermined features of 
                               
305 Horapollo Gramm., Hieroglyphica, 1.66.  
306 Horapollo Gramm., Hieroglyphica, 1.14.  
307 Horapollo Gramm., Hieroglyphica, 1.62.  
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genuinely Egyptian signs, thereby allowing for a diversification of natural features that constitute the 
possible symbolic range of the hieroglyphic resource. On the other hand, the same brevity of explanation 
excludes any explicit statement to the effect that these glyphs have specifically symbolic uses of the type 
found in the ‘lion’s head’ glyph.308 Nonetheless, these passages occupy the long Hellenizing sequence in Book 
Two and constitute a kind of catalogue of traits and occupations which brings emphasis to bear on key moral, 
social, and human themes relying on particularly zoomorphic signs. In this respect the ‘catalogue’ is 
recognizably in the vein of the latter tradition of allegorical and more clearly emblematic hieroglyphic 
exegeses309  
 
[T414] [Πῶς ἄνθρωπον ἰατρεύοντα ἑαυτὸν ἀπὸ χρησμοῦ]. 
Ἄνθρωπον ἀπὸ χρησμοῦ ἰατρεύοντα ἑαυτὸν βουλόμενοι 
σημῆναι,  φάσσαν κρατοῦσαν φύλλον δάφνης ζωγραφοῦσιν· 
ἐκείνη γάρ, ὅτε ἀρρωστεῖ, φύλλον ἐπιτίθησι δάφνης εἰς τὴν 
νεοσσιὰν ἑαυτῆς καὶ ὑγιαίνει.310  
[How a man who cures himself by an oracle]. When they 
want to signify a man who cures himself by an oracle, they 
depict a wood-pigeon carrying a laurel-branch; for this 
bird, when it is unwell, places a branch of laurel in its nest, 
and recovers. 
 
So, for example, in 2.46, an oracle is to a man what a laurel-leaf is to a dove, i.e. a cure. The cure is the point of 
comparison then assigned criterial significance for the symbolic meaning of the glyph, but is not itself the 
meaning. A glyph depicting a dove carrying a laurel-leaf, by virtue of the curative properties of both laurel-
leaves and oracles, signifies a man who cures himself by an oracle.  
 
The same structure is present in 2.49, where a city is to a man dwelling safely what a stone is to an eagle’s nest 
holding safely, i.e. security. Therefore, a glyph of an eagle carrying a stone signifies a man who dwells securely 
in a city. Again, in 2.50: a (long-eared feathered) bustard is, when a horse sees it, what a man is, when closely pursued 
by another, i.e. weak. Therefore, a glyph of a bustard and a horse signifies a weak man persecuted by a 
stronger. Three things are established here: (1) that the glyph depicts a horse and a bustard; (2) that the 
natural fact of a bustard taking flight on seeing a horse signifies weakness; (3) that the depiction of a bustard 
taking flight upon seeing a horse signifies the weakness of a man pursued by another. These three elements – 
sign, natural fact, and symbol – are significant in distinct senses. The glyph signifies the natural phenomenon 
descriptively; the natural phenomenon signifies the point of comparison symptomatically; the semantic link 
between the hieroglyphic sign and the natural phenomenon, i.e. the weak confronted with the strong, through 
                               
308 Horapollo Gramm., Hieroglyphica 1.19.1–5.  
309 Within which tradition the Hieroglyphica, Sive De Sacris Aegyptiorum aliarumque gentium litteris of Ioannes Pierius Valerianus Bellunensis 
(Basel: 1556) and Emblematum libellus by Giovanni Andrea Alciato (Augsburg: 1531) are early successors of Horapollo.  
310 Horapollo Gramm., Hieroglyphica, 2.46.  
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the recontextualization of the sign from the perspective of natural history to that of ethics, signifies the 
symbolic meaning of the glyph. In other words, had 2.50 read: “When they want to signify the weak confronted 
with the strong, they draw a bustard in flight upon seeing a horse”, there would be little if any grounds for doubt as 
to the appropriate analysis: the glyph is a depiction, or visual description, of a natural and typical indication 
of the meaning the weak confronted with the strong. Therefore, the natural reading may be reconstructed as 
follows: “When they want to signify a man in a weak condition and pursued by another (stronger) man [i.e. a 
particular instance of the weak confronted with the strong], they draw a bustard in flight upon seeing [because it is 
weaker than] a horse.”  
 
Similarly, in 2.52, flight to a featherless bat is what a headlong rush is to a weak man: rash.  
 
[T415] [Πῶς ἄνθρωπον δηλοῦσιν ἀσθενῆ καὶ προπετευόμενον]. 
Ἄνθρωπον ἀσθενῆ καὶ προπετευόμενον βουλόμενοι σημῆναι, 
νυκτερίδα ζωγραφοῦσιν· ἐκείνη γάρ, μὴ ἔχουσα πτερά, 
ἵπταται.311  
[How they show a man who is weak and audacious]. When 
they want to signify a man who is weak and audacious, 
they portray a bat, for it flies without having any feathers. 
 
2.48, for which Leemans’ text lacks chapter numeration in the Greek, is more difficult to read in this way.  
 
[T416] [Πῶς ἄνδρα μὴ ἔχοντα χολήν, ἀλλ' ἀφ' ἑτέρου 
δεχόμενον]. Ἄνδρα μὴ ἔχοντα χολὴν αὐτοφυῶς, ἀλλ' ἀφ' ἑτέρου 
δεχόμενον γράφοντες, περιστερὰν ζωγραφοῦσιν, ἔχουσαν τὰ 
ὀπίσθια ὀρθά· ἐν ἐκείνοις γὰρ τὴν χολὴν ἔχει.312  
[How a man who has no bile but receives it from another]. 
When they write a man who has naturally no bile but 
receives it from another, they depict a dove with her hind 
parts erect; for in them she has her bile. 
 
A man without bile naturally is, when receiving it from another, what a dove is, with upright hind-parts, in which it 
has bile. In other words, a man not inclined to anger naturally, but who is incited to anger by another is to be 
compared to a dove which (1.57) is not choleric, but has bile in its tail,313 which it generically holds erect 
(indicating the presence of the otherwise foreign bile?).  
 
The sequence continues with 2.53. Here, only the barest distinction between ‘meaning/showing’ and 
‘writing/drawing’ is observed (… βουλόμενοι ζωγραφῆσαι, … ζωγραφοῦσιν), marked solely by aspect.  
 
                               
311 Horapollo Gramm., Hieroglyphica, 2.52.  
312 Horapollo Gramm., Hieroglyphica, 2.48.  
313 Cf. Aristoteles Phil., Historia Animalium. 2.15.  
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[T417] [Πῶς γυναῖκα θηλάζουσαν, καὶ καλῶς ἀνατρέφουσαν]. 
Γυναῖκα θηλάζουσαν, καὶ καλῶς ἀνατρέφουσαν βουλόμενοι 
ζωγραφῆσαι, νυκτερίδα πάλιν ἔχουσαν ὀδόντας καὶ μαστοὺς 
ζωγραφοῦσιν· αὕτη γάρ, μόνη τῶν ἄλλων πτηνῶν, ὀδόντας καὶ 
μαστοὺς ἔχει.314  
[How a woman suckling and bringing up her children well]. 
When they want to write a woman suckling and bringing 
up her children well, they again depict a bat with teeth and 
breasts; for this is the only one of the winged creatures 
which has teeth and breasts. 
 
The sense of the elements themselves: teeth and breasts are to a bat what giving suck is to a woman, i.e. tokens 
of good-nursing, provides an equally minimal distinction to the referents of sign and meaning, and the overall 
contribution is little more than the alignment of bat and woman, neither foregrounded in such a way as to 
specify the priority of one over the other, except by the aspect-marker: they imperfectively draw a bat, when 
they perfectively want to draw a woman &c. Other chapters, on the other hand, use the imperfective in both 
clauses.  
 
The unique contribution of these kinds of exegeses in the Hieroglyphica was recognized by Champollion 
himself:  
 
il est aisé de voir que l’ouvrage d’Horapollon se rapporte bien 
plus spécialement à l’explication des images dont se 
composaient les anaglyphs, qu’aux elements ou caractères de 
l’écriture hiéroglyphiques proprement dite: le titre si vague de 
ce livre, Ἱερογλυφικὰ [sculptures sacrées ou gravures sacrées], 
est la seule cause de la méprise.315  
it is easy to see that the work of Horapollo relates 
more specifically to the explanation of images which 
are composed of anaglyphs, than to elements or 
characters of hieroglyphic writing itself: the vague 
title of this book, Ἱερογλυφικὰ [sacred sculptures or 
sacred engravings], is the sole cause of the mistake.  
 
In the context of a discussion of Clement of Alexandria’s treatment of hieroglyphic Egyptian Vergote316 offers 
several possible explanations for the distinctive characteristics of ἀνάγλυφα (i.e. ornaments or inscriptions 
carved in low relief) used in theologized myths in the praises of kings employing details of Egyptian 
orthography, which appeal to morpho-syntactically marked hieroglyphic practice, contra the explanations of 
his predecessors, Maréstaing, Dulaurier, and Deiber. The latter had, by contrast, conceived of these anaglyphs 
as exhibiting formal differences associated with glyphic practice in bas-reliefs in particular, in which not all 
that is depicted is grammatically marked script, but includes the depiction of items as compositional elements 
in scenic tableaux without playing a specifically morpho-phonological or morpho-syntactic rôle. In this 
respect his predecessors were undoubtedly closer to the mark.  
                               
314 Horapollo Gramm., Hieroglyphica, 2.53.  
315 Cited in Sbordone, 2002, p.XI.  
316 Vergote, J., ‘Clément d’Alexandrie et l’écriture égyptienne’, Le Muséon 52 (1939): pp. 199-221); Clemens Alexandrinus Theol., Stromata 
5.4.21.1.   
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The Greek conception of symbolic hieroglyphs in general, standing in need of interpretation (ἑρμηνεία), and 
Horapollo’s conception in particular, is exactly the situation we are faced with in the tableaux of Egyptian bas-
reliefs. The relationship between the two elements of script and tableau is characterized by the fact that the 
script supplies the interpretation of the tableau; the relationship between glyph and explanation in the 
exegetical sources is characterized by the fact that it is the explanation that supplies the interpretation of the 
glyph. Though both may fairly be described as allegorical, the glyphs for which the Greek exegesis supplies 
the interpretation are not semantically determined according to the same principles as the morpho-
syntactically marked Greek sequences. Neither the script in the tableaux, nor the explanation in the exegeses 
themselves is subject to further interpretation. That is because the Greek exegesis is not susceptible of 
interpretation precisely insofar as it serves as the explanation of the meaning of the glyph.  
 
The contention here, however, is not to deny the Horapollonian glyphs the status of hieroglyphic writing on 
the grounds that they resemble historically Egyptian anaglyphs more than the phonetic and ideographic 
models of decipherment. Symbolic Horapollonian hieroglyphs are rather to be explained as symbols precisely 
in virtue of being representative signs depicting referents which are specifically capable of use symbolically, 
in the context of the particular aims and structural elements of the text, because presented as bearing 
semantic content. That is, against a background of what might be called the natural language of signs, the 
hieratic intent of the glyphs not only does not preclude them from semantic analysis, but in fact depends on 
that very possibility.  
 
Such a language has occupied prominent positions in philosophical linguistics in more than one historical 
setting, but is ultimately a Greek conception. The signs, insofar as they are signs at all, must be capable of 
being understood, which of course means they are also capable of being misunderstood, which is why their 
applications, their uses, are dependent on the explanations provided. The use of a glyph to signify a quality 
(vid. the non-Egyptian material informing most of Book Two), tropologically, so to speak, is nonetheless distinct 
from the use of the same glyph as symbolizing that quality, which is the manner in which what Horapollo 
describes as symbolic representations proceed.  
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The aims and presuppositions of the Hieroglyphica differ not in detail, but in kind from the endeavour of 
decipherment. The unique and original contribution of the text is precisely the technique for producing 
either a sign-resource, or a range of tropic significance, through natural facts used to define semantic 
content. Dempsey in Merkel & Debus317 misconstrues the importance of this point while simultaneously 
making several crucial observations on the development of Renaissance interest in hieroglyphics. Wishing to 
ease the emphasis placed on the Horapollo manuscripts in explanation of later developments in the area, he 
writes that the Hieroglyphica ‘contained no statement of the linguistic or pictographic principles of 
hieroglyphs, no grammar or syntax’. As demonstrated above, the informing linguistic principles are 
embedded in the structure of the work; the meaning of a sign is circumscribed by the account given of it, not 
by otherwise unstated grammatical considerations. On the other hand, there does appear to be some basis 
upon which to attribute to Horapollo an elementary conception of hieroglyphic grammar in the availability of 
a number of compound signs:  
 
1.1 ἥλιον καὶ σελήνην (sun and moon) 
1.12 κάνθαρον καὶ γῦπα (beetle [scarab] and vulture) 
1.22 θυμιατήριον καιόμενον καὶ ἐπάνω καρδίαν (burning censer and heart above it) 
1.27 γλῶσσαν καὶ ὕφαιμον ὀφθαλμόν (tongue and bloodshot eye) 
1.38 μέλαν καὶ κόσκινον καὶ σχοινίον (ink and sieve and reed) 
1.43 πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ (fire and water) 
1.59 ὄφιν κοσμοειδῶς ἐσχηματισμένον, οὗ τὴν οὐρὰν ἐν τῷ στόματι, τὸ δὲ ὄνομα τοῦ βασιλέως ἐν μέσῳ τῷ εἱλίγματι (serpent 
represented as cosmos, with its tail in its mouth and name of king written in middle of coils) 
1.61 ὄφιν ἐν μέσῳ δὲ αὐτοῦ οἶκον μέγαν (serpent and in middle great palace) 
2.35 σκορπίον καὶ κροκόδειλον (a scorpion and a crocodile) 
2.43 ὠτίδα καὶ ἵππον (a horse and a bustard) 
2.51 στρουθὸν καὶ γλαῦκα (a sparrow and a dog-fish) 
2.64 μύρμηκα καὶ πτερὰ νυκτερίδος (an ant and bat's wings) 
2.74 λύκον καὶ λίθον (a wolf and a stone) 
2.75 λέοντας καὶ δᾷδας (lions and torches) 
2.85 ἐλέφαντα καὶ κριὸν (an elephant and a ram) 
2.86 ἐλέφαντα μετὰ χοίρου (an elephant with a pig) 
2.87 ἔλαφον καὶ ἔχιδναν (a deer and a viper) 
2.91 ἔλαφον μετὰ αὐλητοῦ ἀνθρώπου (a deer and a flute-player) 
2.93 ἔποπα καὶ ἀδίαντον τὴν βοτάνην (an owl and some maiden-hair) 
2.106 κάραβον καὶ πολύποδα (a spiny lobster and an octopus) 
2.108 πίνναν καὶ καρκίνον μικρὸν (an oyster and a crab) 
 
                               
317 Merkel, I. & Debus, A. G., (1988), (edd.) Hermeticism and the Renaissance Intellectual History and the Occult in Early Modern Europe (London: 
Folger Books).  
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Several elements of these do have semantic content in isolation, ‘moon’, ‘scarab’, and ‘serpent’, for example.318 
Also, the juxtaposition of independently meaningful elements with other elements (whose meaning is not on 
the whole otherwise specifically explained), does seem to entail some form of operative grammatical 
distinction, either as a form of morphological inflection, or in terms of syntactical/clausal construction. The 
clearest example of this is the ‘moon’ hieroglyph, which in isolation means ‘month’ and in combination with 
the ‘sun’ hieroglyph means ‘eternity’. It is difficult to envisage here the addition of the ‘sun’ hieroglyph as 
performing any determinately morphological, as opposed to syntactical work. The addition of the ‘sun’ glyph 
appears to establish a syntactical relation since it functions at the very least as an external modifier of the 
meaning of the ‘moon’ glyph. However, the modification it entails clearly belongs to the same semantic field 
as the ‘moon’ glyph in isolation (i.e. both ‘head’ and modifier have a temporal meaning). In that sense the 
connection between ‘moon’ and ‘sun and moon’ correlates better with that between ‘month’ and ‘months’, 
than between ‘moon’ and ‘moons’. Whether construed as a morphological or a syntactic feature, however, 
compositionality of glyphs in Horapollo evidently is capable of marking semantic variation and to that extent 
(however underdeveloped in the text) exhibits grammaticality.  
 
The use of natural signs in this way, as a semiotic resource, itself, however, indicates an underlying principle 
of exegetic judgement whereby hieroglyphic signs are semantically analogous to natural signs. The 
agreement in significance between the formal properties of the glyph and the predicable properties of the 
item depicted without corresponding intermediate instances establishes those properties themselves as both 
factual and logical conditions under which hieroglyphs are capable of the third, symbolic mode of expression. 
To predicate of a serpent, or the glyph of a serpent, that it is smooth or speckled is to describe the natural 
properties of the creature; to explain the meaning of a serpent-sign by reference to smoothness or speckling 
is to define the use of that sign as a precondition for its predicative use in reference to natural facts. What is 
almost completely absent in the Hieroglyphica is linguistic context. No hieroglyphic inscription is adduced 
which might be examined in the light of its exegeses, and consequently no predicative uses of a hieroglyphic 
sign is in evidence.  
 
The status of the natural fact as such is not, semantically speaking, relevant to the viability of the 
hieroglyphic sign in its symbolic sense. Cats, for example, do not always land on their feet after a fall, but the 
                               
318 E.g. ‘moon’ 1.4, 66; ‘scarab’ 1.10, 2,41; ‘serpent’ 1.45, 60, 62, 63, 64. 
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currency of the notion legitimizes the picture of a cat landing on its feet as a sign of stability or balance. 
Philip might have written in this case: when they want to signify a man who regains his balance after losing 
it, they draw a cat, for a cat, when it falls, lands on its feet. On this reading of symbolic glyphs, the claim that 
hieroglyphic sign of a sparrow on fire (2.115) is used to mean a fecund man, can be restated as: the sign depicts a 
natural indication of fecundity. On Horapollo’s use of the term ‘symbolic’, on the other hand, and in contrast to 
his use of the term ‘allusive’, is the claim that the signs themselves are used indicatively. Kissing a loved one 
may be considered a natural sign of affection, but there is nothing symbolic in the act as such. Kissing the 
photograph of a loved one, however, while a sign of my affection for the loved one shown in the photograph, 
is nonetheless a symbolic kiss. Using the photograph, on the other hand, simply to identify the loved one, 
does not render the former symbolic, merely visually representative.  
 
Read purely as a catalogue of signs, the Hieroglyphica does not put the signs to any symbolic use in the 
Horapollonian sense, but merely notes that they depict certain natural signs and can therefore be used 
allusively or symbolically in the broader sense. In general, what we have in the text is not an attempt to 
decipher the historical values of Egyptian hieroglyphics, but an attempt to interpret the meanings of 
hieroglyphic signs by means of natural signs. An investigation to determine the extent of the influence of 
Aristotelian natural history on the structure of the Hieroglyphica, except insofar as this might further support 
observations on categorically composite elements (vid. sup. on 2.38), or on inherited paradoxography (vid. sup. 
on 2.48), as source-analysis will provide only a reconstruction of an historical line of development of 
philosophical linguistics, not a clarification of the conditions under which it is presented in Horapollo and the 
conditions are precisely those which juxtapose hieroglyphic signs and natural signs.   
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§5. Horapollonian Metaphysics 
 
In the absence of any explicitly addressed Christian objection the difficulties of establishing a strong form of 
the claim that Horapollo is working to produce a polemical tool for use against Coptic suppression are, I think, 
insurmountable. Even the weaker claim that the Hieroglyphica is a specifically Neoplatonic work is 
underdetermined by the available evidence. On the other hand, on the basis of broadly historical 
considerations the composition of the text within a pagan revivalist movement in late fifth century Egypt 
does seem likely and given both the linguistic subject-matter and the theosophical and Egyptizing interests of 
a number of Platonists of the period, evidence of some influence of that context on a text by a self-declared 
philosopher might reasonably be expected. At the very least investigating elements of that context serves as a 
useful heuristic strategy by which to assess the text’s own explanatory strategies. 
 
More important, perhaps, is the fact that hieroglyphic exegeses from sources less controversially aligned with 
Neoplatonic interests and commitments are occasionally identical in detail. We have, for example, several 
examples of hieroglyphic exegesis in Photius’ report of Damascius.319  
 
[T418] ὁ ἱπποπόταμος ἄδικον ζῷον, ὅθεν καὶ ἐν τοῖς 
ἱερογλυφικοῖς γράμμασιν ἀδικίαν δηλοῖ· τὸν γὰρ πατέρα 
ἀποκτείνας βιάζεται τὴν μητέρα.320 
The hippopotamus is an unjust animal, hence in 
hieroglyphic characters it means injustice, for it kills its 
father and does violence to its mother. 
 
[T419] τὰς δώδεκα ὥρας ἡ αἴλουρος διακρίνει, νύκτας καὶ 
ἡμέρας οὐροῦσα καθ’ ἑκάστην ἀεί, δίκην ὀργάνου τινὸς 
ὡρογνωμονοῦσα.321 
The cat marks the twelve hours by always urinating in each 
one both day and night, telling the hour like an instrument. 
 
[T420] ὁ ὄρυξ τὸ ζῷον πταρνύμενος ἀνατέλλειν διασημαίνει 
τὴν Σῶθιν.322 
By sneezing the oryx signifies the rising of Sirius. 
 
Each of these three explanations of the meanings of hieroglyphic characters have parallels or variants in 
Horapollo.  
 
[T421] [Πῶς ἄδικον καὶ ἀχάριστον]. Ἄδικον δὲ καὶ ἀχάριστον, [How an unjust and ungrateful man]. (To signify) an unjust 
                               
319 See Maspero, J., ‘Horapollon et la fin du paganisme égyptien’ in Bulletin de l’Institut Français d’Archéologie Orientale 11 (1914): p.192.  
320 Damascius Phil., Vita Isidori fr. 98 (ap. Photium, Bibl. codd. 181, 242).  
321 Damascius Phil., Vita Isidori fr. 100.1-2 (ap. Photium, Bibl. codd. 181, 242).  
322 Damascius Phil., Vita Isidori fr. 102 (ap. Photium, Bibl. codd. 181, 242). 
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ἱπποποτάμου ὄνυχας δύο κάτω βλέποντας γράφουσιν. οὗτος 
γάρ, ἐν ἡλικίᾳ γενόμενος, πειράζει τὸν πατέρα, πότερόν ποτε 
ἰσχύει μαχόμενος πρὸς αὐτόν, καὶ ἐὰν μὲν ὁ πατὴρ ἐκχωρήσῃ, 
τόπον αὐτῷ μερίσας, οὗτος πρὸς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ μητέρα ἐπὶ γάμον 
ἥκει, καὶ ἐᾷ τοῦτον ζῆν· εἰ δὲ μὴ ἐπιτρέψειεν αὐτῷ ποιήσασθαι 
πρὸς τὴν μητέρα γάμον, ἀναιρεῖ αὐτόν, ἀνδρειότερος καὶ 
ἀκμαιότερος ὑπάρχων·323 
and ungrateful man, they depict two claws of an 
hippopotamus turned downwards. For when this animal 
has arrived at its prime it contests its father by fighting, to 
try which is the stronger, and should the father give way 
he cedes him terrain and consorts with its mother, 
permitting him to live; but if his father should not permit 
the union with his mother, he kills him, being the stronger 
and more vigorous of the two.  
 
[T422] φασὶ γὰρ τὸν ἄρρενα αἴλουρον συμμεταβάλλειν τὰς 
κόρας τοῖς τοῦ ἡλίου δρόμοις·324 
For they say that the male cat changes the shape of the 
pupils of his eyes according to the course of the sun.  
 
[T423] Ἀκαθαρσίαν δὲ γράφοντες, ὄρυγα ζωγραφοῦσιν, ἐπειδὴ 
ἐπ' ἀνατολὴν ἐρχομένης τῆς σελήνης, ἀτενίζων εἰς τὴν θεόν, 
κραυγὴν ποιεῖται, … τὰ δ' αὐτὰ ποιεῖ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἡλίου θείου 
ἄστρου ἀνατολῆς.325 
[How they show impurity]. To denote impurity, they 
delineate an Oryx (a species of wild goat), because when 
the moon rises, this animal looks intently towards the 
goddess and raises an outcry, … And it acts in the same 
manner at the rising of the divine star the sun. 
 
The suggestive introduction in Photius, immediately after a sequence of examples from which the above are 
excerpted, of the figure of Heraiscus, Horapollo’s uncle, is unlikely to be a direct line of transmission of 
material from shared sources. The differences in details between the three parallel examples, as well as 
earlier parallels to the first in Plutarch,326 makes the plausible explanation a generic interest in Alexandrian 
philosophical circles in precisely the Egyptizing philosophical subjects alluded to by Damascius.  
 
For that reason the question of whether there are background Hellenized metaphysical presuppositions that 
the Hieroglyphica might reflect is not implausible. For example, concerning the two rival conceptions of the 
ungenerated world which are explicitly at stake in the Christian critique itself, in the absence of revelation, so 
the objection goes, what means can there be by which the ungenerated world that is such an important part 
of Platonic as well as Christian metaphysics may be known? I shall argue that this is a question addressed by 
the Hieroglyphica – at least indirectly – insofar as Horapollo provides us with a number of examples of 
hieroglyphs whose exegesis invoke instances of immutability, eternity, self-sufficiency, and unity.  
 
                               
323 Horapollo Gramm., Hieroglyphica 1.56.1-7.  
324 Horapollo Gramm., Hieroglyphica 1.10.19-20.  
325 Horapollo Gramm., Hieroglyphica 1.49.1-7.  
326 Plutarchus Biogr., Phil., De Iside et Osiride, 32. 
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The clearest examples are those hieroglyphs whose meanings include Egyptian or Græco-Roman deities: Isis, 
Ares, Aphrodite, Athene, and Hephaistus.327 There are also several culturally neutral glyphs with meanings 
involving immutability or eternity: a god, something sublime, the soul, foreknowledge, the cosmic god, a 
cosmic ruler, a king ruling part of the cosmos, the almighty, a man’s soul, the infinite.328 Whereas most of the 
examples of glyphs with meanings related to the divine occur in Book One, we have seen in the previous 
section that Book Two includes a long catalogue of virtues and vices: temperance, the permanent and 
steadfast, impiety, an initiate.329 In each case, of course, the phenomenon the glyph depicts is a natural 
phenomenon, occurring within the generated, sensible world.  
 
[T424] [Πῶς αἰῶνα σημαίνουσιν]. Αἰῶνα σημαίνοντες, ἥλιον 
καὶ σελήνην γράφουσι, διὰ τὸ αἰώνια εἶναι στοιχεῖα. Αἰῶνα δ' 
ἑτέρως γράψαι βουλόμενοι, ὄφιν ζωγραφοῦσιν, ἔχοντα τὴν 
οὐρὰν ὑπὸ τὸ λοιπὸν σῶμα κρυπτομένην, ὃν καλοῦσιν Αἰγύπτιοι 
οὐραῖον, ὅ ἐστιν ἑλληνιστὶ βασιλίσκον, ὅνπερ χρυσοῦν 
ποιοῦντες, θεοῖς περιτιθέασιν. αἰῶνα δὲ λέγουσιν Αἰγύπτιοι διὰ 
τοῦδε τοῦ ζῴου δηλοῦσθαι, ἐπειδὴ τριῶν γενῶν ὄφεων 
καθεστώτων, τὰ μὲν λοιπὰ θνητὰ ὑπάρχει, τοῦτο δὲ μόνον 
ἀθάνατον, ὃ καὶ προσφυσῆσαν ἑτέρῳ παντὶ ζῴῳ, δίχα καὶ τοῦ 
δακεῖν, ἀναιρεῖ· ὅθεν, ἐπειδὴ δοκεῖ ζωῆς καὶ θανάτου κυριεύειν, 
διὰ τοῦτο αὐτὸν ἐπὶ τῆς κεφαλῆς τῶν θεῶν ἐπιτιθέασι.330  
[How they signify eternity]. To signify eternity they depict 
the sun and moon, on account of being eternal elements. 
But when they want to write eternity differently, they 
draw a serpent with its tail hidden by the rest of its body: 
the Egyptians call this ‘ouraios’, which in Greek is basilisk, 
which they make in gold and they place on the gods. The 
Egyptians say that eternity is shown by means of this 
animal; because of the three existing species of serpents, 
the others are mortal, but this alone is immortal, and 
because it destroys any other animal just by breathing on it 
without even biting. Since it appears to have power over 
life and death, on account of this they place it upon the 
head of the gods.  
 
The claim that the elements (the sun and the moon), or certain species of serpent, are eternal is necessarily 
problematic for Christianity as belonging to the generated – and therefore temporally finite – world. Nothing 
within the cosmos, including celestial bodies, is eternal.331 Indeed, all Platonists (Christian or otherwise) would 
consider everything within the cosmos ‘part of the generated world’, even if they thought that it was 
everlasting. It seems, however, that Horapollo’s understanding is to agree that the universe is both ‘part of 
the generated world’ and eternal, though in a qualified sense.  
 
[T425] [Πῶς κόσμον]. Κόσμον βουλόμενοι γράψαι, ὄφιν 
ζωγραφοῦσι τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἐσθίοντα οὐράν, ἐστιγμένον φολίσι 
[How the universe]. When they want to write the universe, 
they depict a serpent speckled with variegated scales, 
                               
327 Horapollo, Hieroglyphica, 1.3,6,8,11,12.  
328 Horapollo, Hieroglyphica, 1.6,7,8,11,13,61,63,64; 2.1,29. Furthermore, in Iamblichus’ hieroglyphic exegeses the gifts proper to the 
incorporeal life are intellectual: virtue and wisdom. Iamblichus Phil., De mysteriis 5.19.18–22.  
329 Horapollo Gramm., Hieroglyphica 2.7,10,19,55.  
330 Horapollo Gramm., Hieroglyphica 1.1.1–10.  
331 Sinuthius Theol.,]rmoeihe nnetseei = I am amazed = Contra Origenistas et Gnosticos (W54, Discourses 7, Work 5), HB 39.2–41.1; 0384-8.  
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ποικίλαις, διὰ μὲν τῶν φολίδων αἰνιττόμενοι τοὺς ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ 
ἀστέρας. βαρύτατον δὲ τὸ ζῷον καθάπερ καὶ ἡ γῆ,  λειότατον δὲ 
ὥσπερ ὕδωρ· καθ' ἕκαστον δὲ ἐνιαυτὸν τὸ γῆρας ἀφείς, 
ἀποδύεται, καθ' ὃ καὶ ὁ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ ἐνιαύσιος χρόνος, 
ἐναλλαγὴν ποιούμενος, νεάζει· τῷ δὲ ὡς τροφῇ χρῆσθαι τῷ 
ἑαυτοῦ σώματι σημαίνει τὸ πάντα ὅσα ἐκ τῆς θείας προνοίας ἐν 
τῷ κόσμῳ γεννᾶται, ταῦτα πάλιν καὶ τὴν μείωσιν εἰς αὑτὰ 
λαμβάνειν.332  
eating its own tail; by the scales alluding to the stars in the 
universe. The animal is also very heavy, as is the earth, and 
very slippery, like water: moreover, it every year sheds its 
skin and thus loses old age, as in the universe the annual 
period causes a change, and is renewed. And using its own 
body for food signifies that all things whatsoever, that are 
generated by divine providence in the universe, undergo a 
diminution into the same things again.  
 
Here ‘the stars in the universe’ (τοὺς ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ ἀστέρας) belong among things ‘generated by divine 
providence in the world’ (ἐκ τῆς θείας προνοίας ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ γεννᾶται), and as such they are also subject to 
change and corruption, but in a cycle of continuous regeneration. This, however, does not preclude their 
identification of a particular divinity, Isis, with a star.  
 
[T426] [Πῶς ἐνιαυτόν]. Ἐνιαυτὸν δὲ βουλόμενοι δηλῶσαι, Ἶσιν, 
τουτέστι γυναῖκα ζωγραφοῦσι, τῷ δὲ αὐτῷ καὶ τὴν θεὸν 
σημαίνουσιν. Ἶσις δὲ παρ' αὐτοῖς ἐστιν ἀστήρ, αἰγυπτιστὶ 
καλούμενος Σῶθις, ἑλληνιστὶ δὲ Ἀστροκύων, ὃς καὶ δοκεῖ 
βασιλεύειν τῶν λοιπῶν ἀστέρων, ὁτὲ μὲν μείζων ὁτὲ δὲ ἥσσων 
ἀνατέλλων, καὶ ὁτὲ μὲν λαμπρότερος, ἔσθ' ὅτε δ' οὐχ οὕτως· ἔτι 
δὲ καί, διότι κατὰ τὴν τούτου τοῦ ἄστρου ἀνατολὴν σημειούμεθα 
περὶ πάντων τῶν ἐν τῷ ἐνιαυτῷ μελλόντων τελεῖσθαι, διόπερ 
οὐκ ἀλόγως τὸν ἐνιαυτὸν Ἶσιν λέγουσι. καὶ ἑτέρως δὲ ἐνιαυτὸν 
γράφοντες, φοίνικα ζωγραφοῦσι, διὰ τὸ τὸ δένδρον τοῦτο μόνον 
τῶν ἄλλων κατὰ τὴν ἀνατολὴν τῆς σελήνης μίαν βάϊν γεννᾶν, 
ὡς ἐν ταῖς δώδεκα βάεσιν ἐνιαυτὸν ἀπαρτίζεσθαι.333  
[How a year]. When they want to show a year, they depict 
Isis, i.e. a woman. By the same they also signify the 
goddess. Now among them Isis is a star, in Egyptian called 
Sothis, but in Greek Astrocuon, [the dog-star], which seems 
also to rule over the other stars, inasmuch as it sometimes 
rises more, and at other times less, and is sometimes 
brighter, and at other times not so; and moreover, because 
according to the rising of this star we signify all the events 
of the coming year, therefore not without reason do they 
call the year Isis. And writing the year otherwise, they 
depict a palm-frond, because of all others this tree alone at 
each rising of the moon produces one branch, so that in 
twelve branches the year is completed.  
 
How does Horapollo resolve the difficulty of celestial bodies belonging to the generated world under divine 
providence while also being both eternal and divine themselves?  
 
[T427] [Τί ἀστέρα γράφοντες δηλοῦσι]. Θεὸν δὲ ἐγκόσμιον 
σημαίνοντες, ἢ εἱμαρμένην, ἢ τὸν πέντε ἀριθμόν, ἀστέρα 
ζωγραφοῦσι. Θεὸν μέν, ἐπειδὴ πρόνοια θεοῦ τὴν νίκην 
προστάσσει, ᾗ τῶν ἀστέρων καὶ τοῦ παντὸς κόσμου κίνησις 
ἐκτελεῖται· δοκεῖ γὰρ αὐτοῖς δίχα θεοῦ μηδὲν ὅλως συνεστάναι· 
εἱμαρμένην δέ, ἐπεὶ καὶ αὕτη ἐξ ἀστρικῆς οἰκονομίας 
συνίσταται· τὸν δὲ πέντε ἀριθμόν, ἐπειδὴ πλήθους ὄντος ἐν 
[What they show by drawing a star]. When they signify the 
encosmic god, or fate, or the number 5, they depict a star. 
And [by it they signify] god, because the providence of god 
maintains the order by which the motion of the stars and 
the whole universe is achieved; for it appears to them that 
without a god nothing whatsoever could endure. And [by it 
they signify] fate, because even this is regulated by the 
                               
332 Horapollo Gramm., Hieroglyphica 1.2.1–8.  
333 Horapollo Gramm., Hieroglyphica 1.3.1–11.  
 Hieroglyphic Semantics in Late Antiquity - 120 - 
 Mark Wildish - 120 - 
 
οὐρανῷ, πέντε μόνοι ἐξ αὐτῶν κινούμενοι τὴν τοῦ κόσμου 
οἰκονομίαν ἐκτελοῦσι.334  
arrangement of the stars:—and also the number 5, because, 
though there are a multitude of stars in the sky, only five of 
them accomplish the natural order of the world by their 
motion.  
 
The answer appears to be – in line with standard Platonist doctrine – that he envisages the eternity and 
divinity at issue as encosmic (ἐγκόσμιον), but subject to supracosmic governance. In this it is not inconceivable 
that Proclus had some influence on Horapollo. Specifically, the expression ‘encosmic god’ (Θεὸν … ἐγκόσμιον) 
is likely evidence of just such influence. The term appears sparsely in Greek, occurring perhaps only two 
dozen times in a dozen authors335 outside Proclus and Damascius and three times that often in Proclus 
alone.336 Whether the term so used is specifically an innovation of Proclus or not, it is clearly characteristic of 
the fifth century Neoplatonism of Alexandria and Athens, though the family connection with Proclus through 
Heraiscus and Damascius through Horapollo himself would seem to the most economical basis upon which to 
locate the source of influence.  
 
One answer to the question of what kind of objects of interest are at play in the Hieroglyphica might be 
precisely those objects discernible through the application of the exegetical procedures concerned. The 
concern might still arise, however, that this is equally likely to be the case even if it were not uniformly 
Platonic objects at which we arrived. As a matter of fact, in one or two places what we do arrive at appears to 
support a Stoic interpretation.  
 
[T428] [Πῶς παντοκράτορα]. Παντοκράτορα δὲ ἐκ τῆς τοῦ ζῴου 
τελειώσεως σημαίνουσι, πάλιν τὸν ὁλόκληρον ὄφιν 
ζωγραφοῦντες· οὕτω παρ' αὐτοῖς τοῦ παντὸς κόσμου τὸ διῆκόν 
ἐστι πνεῦμα.337  
[How the one who governs all things]. They signify one 
who governs all things by depicting again the perfection of 
the same animal, again depicting the entire serpent: for 
amongst them it is the spirit that pervades the universe.  
  
The ‘Almighty’ (παντοκράτωρ) cannot be observed, or depicted, directly, so it is signified, namely by glyph 
depicting the ‘perfection’ (τελείωσις) of the ‘entire serpent’ (ὁλόκληρον ὄφιν). The expression ‘the spirit that 
pervades the universe’ (τοῦ παντὸς κόσμου τὸ διῆκόν ἐστι πνεῦμα) in particular might make one suppose a Stoic 
                               
334 Horapollo Gramm., Hieroglyphica 1.13.1–7.  
335 Cf., e.g., Synesius Phil., De insomniis 14.40; Sallustius Phil., De deis et mundo 6.1.3-4; Hermias Phil., In Platonis Phaedrum scholia 132.25, 
167.23, 171.34, 172.4, 260.22; Hierocles Phil., In aureum carmen 1.1.4, 11.32.12; Syrianus Phil., In Aristotelis metaphysica commentaria 25.11, 
41.14;  Simplicius Phil., In Aristotelis quattuor libros de caelo commentaria 7.117.16; Joannes Philoponus Phil., De aeternitate mundi 603.27, 604.4; 
De opificio mundi 252.18.  
336 Proclus Phil., Theologia Platonica passim.; In Platonis rem publicam commentarii passim.; In Platonis Parmenidem passim.; In Platonis Timaeum 
commentaria passim.; Damascius Phil., De principiis 1.255.13, 1.268.14, &c.; In Parmenidem 10.5, 94.13, 137.21, &c.; In Phaedonem (versio 1) 
478.1; In Phaedonem (versio 2) 95.1.   
337 Horapollo Gramm., Hieroglyphica 1.64.1–3.  
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influence, since the Stoics talk about god in precisely these terms.338 Similar material with apparent Stoic 
credentials appears elsewhere in Book One.339 The problem with such a supposition, however, is that on its 
own it is insufficient for determining how the author used and understood terminology which is prima facie 
Stoic (in the case of τοῦ παντὸς κόσμου τὸ διῆκόν ἐστι πνεῦμα), or Platonist (in the case of Θεὸν … ἐγκόσμιον).  
 
It is, however, the analytic process itself that demands a Platonist reading of the metaphysical status of the 
object. If Horapollo’s exegetical procedure is (i) to infer, in his extension of the hieroglyphic semantic range, 
from sensible phenomena to eternal realities, (ii) by analogy or allusion, (iii) to provide pre-eminent examples 
of metaphysical objects for contemplation,340 then he is not motivated in his use of physiological data or 
otherwise empirical observations on material artefacts or cultural practices by an independent interest in 
recording those observations. The reason for their inclusion is, however, connected with the fact that they 
are nonetheless empirically accessible items. Derivable from the sensible particulars, and therefore amenable 
to discursive reason hieroglyphs are hierarchically intermediate items which lend themselves to analytic 
inferential procedures to conceptual and metaphysical content. Again in line with standard Platonist practice, 
then, the procedure involves the incorporation of originally Stoic material341 not as a concession to Stoic 
interpretation in strictly physical terms in preference to Platonist alternatives, observing objective 
metaphysical determinants, but in order to allocate it both its proper place and its proper function in the 
Platonist ontology. On this reading, the proper place and function of the ‘encosmic god’ (Θεὸν … ἐγκόσμιον) is 
within the sensible realm. The ‘star’ hieroglyph signifies a reality that remains an explicitly cosmic entity.  
 
If on this reading the encosmic realities signified by the hieroglyph of a star are then to be understood as 
secondary causes, then under the appropriate interpretation and in its application according to the guidance 
of a broader metaphysical objective, the ultimate objects of the explanatory exegesis ought to be understood 
as those first causes which are not cosmic entities at all, but supracosmic.342  
 
                               
338 Cf. Pseudo-Galenus Med., Introductio seu medicus 14.698.10: καὶ πέμπτον παρεισάγει κατὰ τοὺς Στωϊκοὺς τὸ διῆκον διὰ πάντων πνεῦμα; 
Sextus Empiricus Phil., Pyrrhoniae hypotyposes 3.218.13: Στωικοὶ δὲ πνεῦμαvδιῆκον καὶ διὰ τῶν εἰδεχθῶν; Sextus Empiricus Phil., Adversus 
mathematicos 9.127.5: ἓν γὰρ ὑπάρχει πνεῦμα τὸ διὰ παντὸς τοῦ κόσμου διῆκον ψυχῆς τρόπον.  
339 Horapollo Gramm., Hieroglyphica 1.2: ‘all things whatsoever, that are generated by divine providence in the world, undergo a 
corruption into it again’ (πάντα ὅσα ἐκ τῆς θείας προνοίας ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ γεννᾶται, ταῦτα πάλιν καὶ τὴν μείωσιν εἰς αὑτὰ λαμβάνειν).  
340 Cf. Alcinous Phil., Epitome doctrinae Platonicae sive Διδασκαλικός 10.  
341 Perhaps traces of the influence of which canbe found in the emphasis in Book One on φύσις, στοιχεῖον, τὸ διῆκόν πνεῦμα, κόσμος, 
εἱμαρμένη, αἰνίττεσθαι; Horapollo Gramm., Hieroglyphica; φύσις: 1.8,11,14,37,46,47,49,70; 2.37,40,61; στοιχεῖον: 1.1,43; τὸ διῆκόν πνεῦμα: 1.64; 
κόσμος: 1.2,10,12,13,21,34,49,59,60,61,63,64; εἱμαρμένη: 1.13; αἰνίττεσθαι: 1.2,44,59,62.  
342 Cf. e.g. Plutarch’s criticisms of Stoic physical explanations at De Iside et Osiride 45.369A, though he more than once argues favourably on 
that basis himself (De Iside et Osiride 40.367C; 41.367E).  
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The relevant objective, which I described in chapter three, is that of the (post-Iamblichean) Neoplatonic 
conception of the nature of the relationship between the physical realm and the intelligible, according to 
which emanation from the Neoplatonic One does not decrease with proximity to the sensible realm, but 
extends as far as matter. As a consequence of matter itself being a product of emanation there is a sense in 
which the bridge between the divine, conceptual, and physiological is provided for unattenuated, which helps 
to explain how entities in the physical world can be used to provoke thought about the latter. Within such a 
methodology the possibility of applying intellective interpretations to the work of natural science is precisely 
entailed by the latter’s continuity with and complementarity to the conceptual and metaphysically causal 
realities on which they depend for their being.  
 
The question here, however, is how we might know whether ‘the Pantocrator’ is in fact supracosmic and not 
itself encosmic. We can identify two points that allow for an understanding of ‘Pantocrator’ as a supracosmic 
entity. First, it is the serpent depicted by the hieroglyph that amongst the Egyptians is identified as ‘the spirit 
that pervades the universe’ (παρ' αὐτοῖς τοῦ παντὸς κόσμου τὸ διῆκόν ἐστι πνεῦμα). The hieroglyph depicting the 
serpent, on the other hand, signifies not the encosmic spirit the image of the complete serpent (ἐκ τῆς τοῦ 
ζῴου τελειώσεως) depicts, but a third item, namely ‘the Pantocrator’. On its own, this still requires us to 
suppose that  it is not only on the grounds of plausible historical context that Horapollo’s glyph, meaning, and 
object triad might plausibly be aligned with the Neoplatonic tripartite conception of expression (λέξις), 
thought (νόημα), and reality (πρᾶγμα). On the other hand, without the presupposition of such a division we 
have no explanation for either the exegetical procedure the exhibited in the Hieroglyphica quite generally, or 
for the specific exegetical example in which the distinction of an encosmic deity is offered. The second point 
concerns the distinction involved in using the term ‘encosmic’ itself. That distinction, as per the sources from 
which it appears to be derived, is standardly used to highlight the familiar Platonic distinction between, on 
the one hand, the cosmic governance of the course of the ‘natural order of the cosmos’ (τὴν τοῦ κόσμου 
οἰκονομίαν) by the ‘encosmic god’ and, on the other, the supracosmic governance, here of ‘the Pantocrator’.  
 
That Horapollo does in fact envisage an extra- or supracosmic principle is also attested in another of the early 
lemmata of Book One. In his account of why the Egyptians depict a scarab to signify ‘generation’ (γένεσιν) 
Horapollo explains that on the twenty-ninth day after a scarab has buried a ball of ox-dung there is a 
conjunction of the moon and sun ‘as well as the generation of the cosmos’ (ἔτι τε καὶ γένεσιν κόσμου). 
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Furthermore, the generation of the cosmos occupies a position in a hierarchically arranged encosmic 
generation of the genus of scarabs for which it is explicitly the model.  
 
[T429] [Πῶς μονογενές]. Μονογενὲς δὲ δηλοῦντες, ἢ γένεσιν, ἢ 
πατέρα, ἢ κόσμον, ἢ ἄνδρα, κάνθαρον ζωγραφοῦσι. μονογενὲς 
μὲν ὅτι αὐτογενές ἐστι τὸ ζῷον, ὑπὸ θηλείας μὴ κυοφορούμενον. 
μόνη γὰρ γένεσις αὐτοῦ τοιαύτη ἐστίν· ἐπειδὰν ὁ ἄρσην 
βούληται παιδοποιήσασθαι, βοὸς ἀφόδευμα λαβών, πλάσσει 
σφαιροειδὲς παραπλήσιον τῷ κόσμῳ σχῆμα, ὃ ἐκ τῶν ὀπισθίων 
μερῶν κυλίσας ἀπὸ ἀνατολῆς εἰς δύσιν, αὐτὸς πρὸς ἀνατολὴν 
βλέπει, ἵνα ἀποδῷ τὸ τοῦ κόσμου σχῆμα· (αὐτὸς γὰρ ἀπὸ τοῦ 
ἀπηλιώτου εἰς λίβα φέρεται, ὁ δὲ τῶν ἀστέρων δρόμος ἀπὸ λιβὸς 
εἰς ἀπηλιώτην). ταύτην οὖν τὴν σφαῖραν κατορύξας, εἰς γῆν 
κατατίθεται ἐπὶ ἡμέρας εἰκοσιοκτώ, ἐν ὅσαις καὶ ἡ σελήνη 
ἡμέραις τὰ δώδεκα ζῴδια κυκλεύει, ὑφ' ἣν ἀπομένον, 
ζῳογονεῖται τὸ τῶν κανθάρων γένος· τῇ ἐνάτῃ δὲ καὶ εἰκοστῇ 
ἡμέρᾳ ἀνοίξας τὴν σφαῖραν, εἰς ὕδωρ βάλλει, (ταύτην γὰρ τὴν 
ἡμέραν νομίζει σύνοδον εἶναι σελήνης καὶ ἡλίου, ἔτι τε καὶ 
γένεσιν κόσμου), ἧς ἀνοιγομένης ἐν τῷ ὕδατι, ζῷα ἐξέρχεται, 
τουτέστιν οἱ κάνθαροι. γένεσιν δὲ διὰ τὴν προειρημένην αἰτίαν· 
πατέρα δέ, ὅτι ἐκ μόνου πατρὸς τὴν γένεσιν ἔχει ὁ κάνθαρος· 
κόσμον δέ, ἐπειδὴ κοσμοειδῆ τὴν γένεσιν ποιεῖται· ἄνδρα δέ, 
ἐπειδὴ θηλυκὸν γένος αὐτοῖς οὐ γίνεται. Εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ κανθάρων 
ἰδέαι τρεῖς. πρώτη μὲν αἰλουρόμορφος καὶ ἀκτινωτή, ἥνπερ καὶ 
ἡλίῳ ἀνέθεσαν διὰ τὸ σύμβολον· φασὶ γὰρ τὸν ἄρρενα αἴλουρον 
συμμεταβάλλειν τὰς κόρας τοῖς τοῦ ἡλίου δρόμοις· 
ὑπεκτείνονται μὲν γὰρ κατὰ πρωῒ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ ἀνατολήν, 
στρογγυλοειδεῖς δὲ γίνονται κατὰ τὸ μέσον τῆς ἡμέρας, 
ἀμαυρότεραι δὲ φαίνονται δύνειν μέλλοντος τοῦ ἡλίου, ὅθεν καὶ 
τὸ ἐν Ἡλιουπόλει ξόανον τοῦ θεοῦ αἰλουρόμορφον ὑπάρχει. ἔχει 
δὲ πᾶς κάνθαρος καὶ δακτύλους τριάκοντα διὰ τὴν 
τριακονταήμερον τοῦ μηνός, ἐν αἷς ὁ ἥλιος ἀνατέλλων, τὸν 
ἑαυτοῦ ποιεῖται δρόμον. δευτέρα δὲ γενεά, ἡ δίκερως καὶ 
ταυροειδής, ἥτις καὶ τῇ σελήνῃ καθιερώθη, ἀφ' οὗ καὶ τὸν 
οὐράνιον ταῦρον ὕψωματῆς θεοῦ ταύτης λέγουσιν εἶναι παῖδες 
Αἰγυπτίων. τρίτη δὲ ἡ μονόκερως καὶ ἰβιόμορφος, ἣν Ἑρμῇ 
διαφέρειν ἐνόμισαν, καθὰ καὶ ἶβις τὸ ὄρνεον.343  
[How an only begotten]. To denote an only-begotten, or 
generation, or a father, or the world, or a man, they depict 
a scarab. And [they signify by this] an only-begotten, 
because it is a self-produced creature, being unconceived 
by a female; for the generation of it is unique as follows: 
when the male wants to procreate, he takes dung of an ox, 
and shapes it into a spherical form like the world; he then 
rolls it from the hinder parts from the rising to the setting, 
and looks himself towards the east, in order to he may 
impart to it the form of the world; (for that is borne from 
the east wind to west wind, while the course of the stars is 
from the west wind to the east wind): then, having dug a 
hole, it puts this sphere in the earth for twenty-eight days, 
(for in so many days the moon circulates through the 
twelve signs of the zodiac). By thus remaining under the 
moon, the genus of scarabs is brought to life; and on the 
twenty-ninth day after having opened the sphere, it throws 
it into water, (for it recognizes that on that day there is a 
conjunction of the moon and sun, as well as the generation 
of the cosmos). From [the sphere] thus opened in the 
water, the creatures, that is the scarabs, come forth. [The 
scarab also signifies] generation, for the reason before 
mentioned – and a father, because the scarab is generated 
by a father only – and the world, because in its generation 
it is made in the form of the world – and a man, because 
there is no female kind among them. Also there are three 
species of scarabs, the first like a cat, and illuminated by 
rays, which species they have consecrated to the sun on 
account of this correspondence: for they say that the male 
cat changes [the shape of] the pupils of his eyes according 
to the course of the sun: for in the morning at the rising of 
the god, they are dilated, and in the middle of the day 
become round, and when the sun is about to set appear less 
brilliant, whence, also, the statue of the god in Heliopolis is 
in the form of a cat. Every scarab also has thirty toes, 
corresponding with the thirty days of the month, during 
which the rising sun [moon?] fulfils its course. The second 
species is two-horned and in the form of a bull, which is 
consecrated to the moon; whence the children of the 
                               
343 Horapollo Gramm., Hieroglyphica 1.10.1–29.  
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Egyptians say, that the celestial bull is the exaltation of this 
goddess. The third species is one-horned and in the form of 
an ibis, which they regard as consecrated to Hermes 
[Thoth], like the ibis-bird.  
 
The Horapollonian hieroglyph of a dung-beetle344 might mean, first, in accordance with the representative 
mode of hieroglyphic expression, Scarabæus pilularius; second, conceptually, the predicable attribute ‘self-
begotten’; or, third, allusively, by virtue of a shared predicable attribute, a rolling, circular passage, a periodic 
generative capacity, ‘the sun’.345 That the predicate be equally predicable of both scarab-sign and scarab also 
explains why in the catalogue of virtues and vices occupying the bulk of Book Two the subject depicted by the 
sign can uniformly be explained as ‘man’ or ‘woman’, of whom the identified attribute of the subject depicted 
is predicable. There is no figurative meaning involved at all (as Champollion outlined and moderns 
presuppose) in the sense of employing metonymy or synecdoche. It is the same predicate that is at stake, 
whether it occurs in the object/name-bearer, the propositional content of the explanation, or the sign itself. 
To allude (αἰνίσσομαι) in Horapollo is indirect only insofar as the relationship is theorized as we find it in 1.27. 
It is direct in terms of equality of sign-resource, a point made explicit at the end of Book One where Horapollo 
does not simply correlate one to the other, but identifies hieroglyphic signs with natural signs. This single 
example spans the empirical, semantic, and metaphysical: (i) the empirically accessible item, Scarabæus 
pilularius, and (ii) the conceptual content, ‘self-begotten’. In the case of ‘the sun’ the item is clearly itself 
empirically accessible, but Horapollo is here also concerned with the meaning ‘self-begotten’, not the sun 
itself, which makes it conceptual, and therefore universal, rather than particular. Finally, there is the 
metaphysical principle which is allusively signified, namely, a ‘periodic generative capacity’. A hieroglyph for 
Horapollo is not the sensible object it depicts for perception, the conceptual content it signifies for thought, 
nor the first cause upon which the former are dependent – not, that is, unmixedly. Hieroglyphic writing is 
composite, and as such, a symbol in precisely the etymological sense.  
 
 
  
                               
344 Horapollo Gramm., Hieroglyphica 1.10. [Πῶς μονογενές].  
345 Cf. above, Horapollo Gramm., Hieroglyphica 2.46. [Πῶς ἄνθρωπον ἰατρεύοντα ἑαυτὸν ἀπὸ χρησμοῦ]; 2.49. [Πῶς ἄνθρωπον ἀσφαλῶς οἰκοῦντα 
πόλιν]; 2.50.  [Πῶς ἄνθρωπον ἀσθενῶς ἔχοντα, καὶ ὑφ' ἑτέρου καταδιωκόμενον]; 2.52. [Πῶς ἄνθρωπον δηλοῦσιν ἀσθενῆ καὶ προπετευόμενον]; 
2.53. [Πῶς γυναῖκα θηλάζουσαν, καὶ καλῶς ἀνατρέφουσαν].  
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Conclusion 
 
I began by setting out an objective to be met in the course of the preceding chapters, namely, a 
reconstruction of a development in the history of philosophical linguistics on the subject of hieroglyphic 
Egyptian as a language uniquely adapted to the purposes and concerns of late Platonist metaphysics.  
 
By way of situating this reconstruction I began by describing the relationship between the standard 
philological account of hieroglyphs as theorized within Egyptology and the broader classical Greek tradition 
of hieroglyphic interpretation. The use of hieroglyphic Egyptian in the latter tradition was not conceived of 
as a purely orthographical expedient, extrinsic to the purposes of the material which it was employed to 
record, but, on the contrary, as constitutive of those purposes. Exegesis of hieroglyphs in Greek was 
legitimate because the purpose of the Greek glosses was precisely exegetical, not liturgical (or theurgic) as the 
original use of the glyphs had been. This difference in use was explained in terms of the metaphysical 
possibilities provided for by the doxastic, dianoetic, or intellective properties of the scripts themselves, but 
insofar as they are explanations, the facts that are explained are precisely the use of the scripts for their 
respectively secular and religious purposes. The decisive characteristic of hieroglyphic Egyptian which 
motivated the tradition’s explanatory endeavour, in other words, was not, as with modern historical and 
philological inquiries, the script’s relation to the morpho-syntactical substrate, but its sapiential function.  
 
For that reason, within the framework of the contrast between the classical and Egyptological purposes in 
examining hieroglyphs, the absence from the Greek accounts of sustained philological observations in favour 
of a symbolic or allegoristic conception of Egyptian hieroglyphs is neither an accidental feature of those 
accounts, conditioned by a declining understanding of their historical use, nor an obstacle to a developed 
hieroglyphic semantics. In fact, the absence of philological form from symbolic or allegoristic Egyptian 
hieroglyphics is both explicitly acknowledged as a classificatory feature, distinctly characterized by its 
function, and given independent theoretical justification. Crucially, from the historical and philological 
perspective, as such the account also answers to features of genuinely Egyptian inscriptional practice.  
 
Coptic Christians, including, prominently, Shenoute had raised objections to the pagan revivalist practice of 
exploiting hieroglyphs for the purpose of deriving metaphysical truths. The force of those objections is, 
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however, somewhat obscured by the Christian propensity for employing variations on the very 
hermeneutical strategies that Shenoute, for example, takes pains to discredit when practiced by pagans. This 
propensity may nevertheless be legitimized by either or both of two considerations. First is the direction of 
argumentative momentum from prior causes to posterior effects, contrary to the practice of his pagan 
interlocutors. Insofar as pagan allegory reasons from posterior effects to prior causes it is liable (so the 
Christian objection runs) to arrive at extra-Scriptural – and to that extent potentially erroneous – first 
principles. Within that context, however, the two procedures are not conceived of as dichotomous, but as 
opposite poles of the same axis equally accessible αἰτίας λογισμῷ. Pagan practice might still, then, be 
methodologically sound, but suspect on substantive doctrinal grounds. The second possible legitimizing 
consideration is Shenoute’s use of the contentious hermeneutical strategies in the context of dialectical 
polemic, such that allegoristic reasoning is not employed in propria persona, but rather as a dialectical 
technique deployed to highlight errors and improprieties within paganism on the latter’s own terms. If this is 
at the root of Shenoute’s accusations of sophistry and allegorical obscurity on the part of the Hellenizing 
pagans, the contention that Horapollo’s Hieroglyphica is developed in an environment responsive to Christian 
objections would have to address not only substantive accusations of doctrinal error, but also the implied 
dialectical charge of methodological inadequacy.  
 
The pagan account of the methodological adequacy of its exegetical procedure is as follows. Neoplatonic 
linguistic theory develops in two stages, each deriving from Porphyrian reflection on Aristotelian texts. The 
first stage includes a bipartite theory of ‘nominal assignment’ (ὀνομασία), ‘the first imposition of expressions’ 
(τῆς πρώτης θέσεως τῶν λέξεων), in which names (broadly construed) are directly assigned to objects. This first 
imposition is complemented by an open-ended theory of ‘second imposition’ (τῆς δευτέρας θέσεως), in which 
terms for ‘forms of linguistic expression’ (σχήματα λέξεως) are directly assigned to the linguistic expressions 
assigned in the first imposition. The second stage is a tripartite theory whereby ‘any simple significant 
expression is spoken and said of the thing signified’ (πᾶσα ἁπλῆ λέξις σημαντικὴ ὅταν κατὰ τοῦ σημαινομένου 
πράγματος ἀγορευθῆ τε καὶ λεχθῇ) through the medium of concepts (νοήματα). To this tripartite analysis 
corresponds a tripartite theory of modes of hieroglyphic expression via ‘three different types of letters’ 
(γραμμάτων δὲ τρισσὰς διαφοράς), namely, as we learn from Proclus, ‘doxastic’ (δοξαστική), ‘discursive’ 
(διανοητική), and ‘intellective’ (νοερά). The first, mediated by spoken language, is the capacity to represent 
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sensible phenomena. The second presents those phenomena conceptually, unmediated by speech. The third 
presents the intelligible causes of phenomena symbolically or allegoristically.  
 
These three forms of meaningful hieroglyphic expression are possible, according to the Neoplatonic account I 
have argued for, because of the availability of a metaphysical framework to support the tripartite analysis. 
Doxastic predications accordingly concern and are intelligible by virtue of empirically accessible states of 
affairs; in discursive thought one grasps particulars as intelligibly expressible by virtue of falling under 
universal concepts; and in intellective thought the first causes are intelligibly expressible. The specifically 
hieroglyphic expression of this tripartite metaphysics is possible because hieroglyphic signs are themselves 
composites of sensible and intelligible elements which are therefore susceptible to interpretation as material 
images, as mediating concepts, or as intelligible realities.  
 
The claim then is that the three modes of hieroglyphic expression – ‘epistolographic, hieroglyphic, and 
symbolic’ (ἐπιστολογραφικῶν τε καὶ ἱερογλυφικῶν καὶ συμβολικῶν) – signify neither three purely formal 
markers, nor three means of articulating exclusively predicative significance, but three distinct modes of 
expression as such, corresponding to three metaphysically discrete realms susceptible of linguistic expression 
by those means. A physiologist might then appropriately employ epistolographic Egyptian with its capacity to 
render the spoken language to express doxastic thought with predicative significance concerning sensible 
phenomena. A logician would use (Porphyrian) hieroglyphic Egyptian with its capacity to render discursive 
thought through universal concepts. Thirdly, a theologian (metaphysician) would use symbolic Egyptian with 
allegorical significance to express intellective thought concerning intelligible realities.  
 
Though the text of the Hieroglyphica does not offer any explanatory hypotheses of a kind which explicitly 
address, for example, Iamblichus’ theoretical considerations of how hieroglyphs might be thought to bear 
sapiential significance by means of similar independent or analytically simple principles, I have argued that it 
does reflect other features of Neoplatonic analysis and exegesis. First, it uncontroversially maintains the 
tripartite distinction between linguistic expressions, their meanings, and the objects or name-bearers which 
they depict. Second, I have argued that the distinction is further aligned with three modes of hieroglyphic 
expression: representative, semantic, and symbolic. Third, in certain cases a procedure of principled (if not 
systematic) analytic explanatory ascent from empirical observation through discursive reason to 
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metaphysical or cosmological insights is arguably employed in the exegesis of the sapiential content of the 
hieroglyphs.  
 
The historical argument intended to address the possibility of situating the Hieroglyphica in the broader 
hieroglyphic tradition on which it might be thought to depend, either generically or as a resource for specific 
exegetical content, is not, however, conclusive evidence of specifically Neoplatonic philosophical 
commitments. Though at various points I have in fact suggested that certain aspects of Neoplatonic theory 
cited as parallel to those in the Hieroglyphica are matters of historical contiguity, these cannot on their own 
establish direct historical influence on the presuppositions of the latter. They do, however, exhibit a number 
of formal similarities which justify the possibility of reading the Hieroglyphica with a view not to descriptive 
clarifications or explanatory hypotheses it offers ad intra, but to its reflection of broader methodological 
commitments ad extra. For that reason drawing as far as possible on points of comparison from at least 
minimally plausible historical influences is instructive in emphasizing that an account informed by 
independent semantic and metaphysical concerns may highlight the relevance of the hermeneutic concerns 
of the text over and above (but also in contrast to) its purely historical interest in the sequence of 
developments resulting in the decipherment of hieroglyphic Egyptian according to strictly philological 
criteria.  
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Appendixes  
 
Appendix 1: Text, transcription, transliteration, normalization, and translation for the ‘marriage’ scarab of 
Amenhotep III (UC12259).  
 
                               
346 Text and transcription read top-right to bottom-left.   
347 anx = phonogram/logogram 
<>  = phonetic complement 
() = syllable marker 
raised = ideographic determinative 
lowered = phonetic determinative 
[Text]346 
 
[Transcription] 
 
  
[Transliteration]347 
anx Hr kA nxt m xai mAat 
nbty s mn <n> mDAt h p xmt w s g r H gbA tA tA 
Hr-nbw aA a xpS H Hwi sT t tyw 
amaAt xmt nsw bity nb tA tA 
ra nb mAat sA ra i mn <n> Htp HqA wAst di anx 
nsw Hm t wr <r> t ti y y anx ti r n n t 
it s 
y w i A Sps r n n t mwt s T w 
i A st Hm t st p w t n nsw <t> <n> n xt <x> 
<t> nxt t tA S 
Hdi tA f rsw y tA r k(A) wa r(A) wa 
y amaAt xAst mH t y idb snw n h (A) 
r (y) n (A) amaAt xAst 
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[Normalization] 
¡r anx KA-nxt #ai-m-mAat 
nbty ¤mn-hpw sgrH-tAwy 
¡r-nbw aA-xpS Hwi-¤Ttyw nsw-bity nb tAwy 
Nb-mAat-Ra sA-Ra Imn-Htp HqA-WAst di anx 
Hmt-nsw wrt &iy anx.ti rn n it=s 
YwiA rn n mwt=s §w- 
iA Hmt pw nt nsw nxt 
tAS=f rsy r Kr- 
y mHty Nh- 
rn 
 
[Translation] 
Living Horus mighty bull appearing in truth;  
two-ladies establishing laws, pacifying the two lands  
golden Horus great of strength, smiting the Asiatics, dual king, lord of the two lands,  
lord of the justice of Ra, son of Ra, Amenhotep, ruler of Thebes, given life.  
The great wife of the king Tiy, may she live. The name of her father is  
Yuia, the name of her mother is Tju-  
ia. She is the wife of the mighty king  
whose southern boundary is at Kara-  
y, whose northern is at Naha-  
rin.  
 Hieroglyphic Semantics in Late Antiquity - 131 - 
 Mark Wildish - 131 - 
 
Appendix 2: Horapollonian Hieroglyphs and their Meanings. 
 
CH. GLYPHS MEANINGS 
I.1 
ἣλιον καὶ σελήνην  
(the sun and the moon); 
ὄφιν ἔχοντα τὴν οὐρὰν ὑπὸ τὸ λοιπὸν σῶμα κρυπτομένην  
(a serpent with its tail concealed by the rest of its body) 
αἰῶνα  
(eternity) 
I.2 
ὄφιν τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἐσθίοντα οὐράν, ἐστιγμένον φολίσι ποικίλαις 
(a serpent devouring its own tail, marked with variegated scales) 
κόσμον  
(the universe) 
I.3 
Ἶσιν, τουτέστι γυναῖκα 
(Isis, that is a woman) 
ἐνιαυτόν 
(the year); 
τὴν θεὸν 
(the goddess [Isis]) 
I.4 
βάϊν 
(a branch); 
σελήνην ἐπεστραμμένην εἰς τὸ κάτω 
(the moon with its horns turned downward) 
μῆνα 
(the month) 
I.5 
τέταρτον ἀρούρας 
(the fourth part of an aroura) 
τὸ ἐνιστάμενον ἔτος 
(the current year) 
I.6 
ἱέρακα 
(a hawk) 
Θεὸν 
(a god); 
ὕψος 
(something sublime); 
ταπείνωσιν 
(something lowly); 
ὑπεροχήν 
(superiority); 
αἷμα 
(blood); 
νίκην 
(victory); 
Ἄρεα 
(Ares); 
Ἀφροδίτην 
(Aphrodite) 
I.7 
ὁ ἱέραξ 
(the hawk) 
ψυχήν 
(the soul) 
I.8 
δύο ἱέρακας 
(two hawks [the male, the female]) 
Ἄρεα καὶ Ἀφροδίτην 
(Ares and Aphrodite) 
I.9 
δύο κορώνας 
(two crows) 
γάμον 
(marriage) 
I.10 
κάνθαρον 
(a scarab) 
μονογενές 
(the only begotten); 
γένεσιν 
(birth); 
πατέρα 
(a father); 
κόσμον 
(the world); 
ἄνδρα 
(man) 
I.11 
γῦπα 
(a vulture) 
μητέρα 
(a mother); 
βλέψιν 
(sight); 
ὅριον 
(boundaries); 
πρόγνωσιν 
(foreknowledge); 
ἐνιαυτόν 
(the year); 
οὐρανίαν 
(the heavens); 
ἐλεήμονα 
(pity); 
Ἀθηνᾶν 
(Athene); 
Ἥραν 
(Hera); 
δραχμὰς δύο 
(two drachmas) 
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CH. GLYPHS MEANINGS 
I.12 
κάνθαρον καὶ γῦπα 
(a beetle [scarab] and a vulture); 
γῦπα καὶ κάνθαρον 
(a vulture and a beetle) 
Ἥφαιστον 
(Hephaistus); 
Ἀθηνᾶν 
(Athene) 
I.13 
ἀστέρα 
(a star) 
Θεὸν ἐγκόσμιον 
(the cosmic God); 
εἱμαρμένην 
(fate); 
τὸν πέντε ἀριθμόν 
(the number 5) 
I.14 
κυνοκέφαλον 
(a baboon) 
σελήνην 
(the moon); 
οἰκουμένην 
(the inhabited earth); 
γράμματα 
(letters); 
ἱερέα 
(a priest); 
ὀργήν 
(anger); 
κόλυμβον 
(a diver) 
I.15 
κυνοκέφαλον σχήματι τοιῷδε· ἑστῶτα καὶ τὰς χεῖρας εἰς οὐρανὸν 
ἐπαίροντα, βασίλειόν τε ἐπὶ τῆς κεφαλῆς ἔχοντα 
(a baboon, but in this way: standing, with its hands raised to heaven 
and a crown on  its head) 
σελήνης ἀνατολήν 
(moonrise) 
 
I.16 
κυνοκέφαλον καθήμενον ζῷον 
(the baboon, but seated) 
ἰσημερίας δύο 
(the two equinoxes) 
I.17 
λέοντα 
(a lion) 
θυμὸν 
(spiritedness) 
I.18 
λέοντος τὰ ἔμπροσθεν 
(the forequarters of a lion) 
ἀλκὴν 
(strength) 
I.19 
λέοντος κεφαλήν 
(the head of a lion) 
ἐγρηγορότα ἢ καὶ φύλακα 
(that one is wide awake and on guard) 
I.20 
τῷ αὐτῷ σημείῳ 
(the same sign) 
φοβερόν 
(fear) 
I.21 
λέοντα 
(a lion); 
τρεῖς ὑδρίας μεγάλας 
(three great water-jars);  
οὐρανὸν καὶ γῆν ὕδωρ ἀναβλύζουσαν 
(water gushing forth over heaven and earth) 
Νείλου ἀνάβασιν 
(the rising of the Nile) 
I.22 
θυμιατήριον καιόμενον καὶ ἐπάνω καρδίαν 
(a burning censer and a heart above it) 
Αἴγυπτον 
(Egypt) 
I.23 
ὀνοκέφαλον 
(a man with an ass's head) 
ἄνθρωπον μὴ ἀποδημήσαντα τῆς πατρίδος 
(a man who has never travelled) 
I.24 
δύο κεφαλὰς ἀνθρώπων ζωγραφοῦσι, τὴν μὲν τοῦ ἄρσενος ἔσω 
βλέπουσαν, τὴν δὲ θηλυκὴν ἔξω 
(two human heads, one a male, looking in, the other a female, looking 
out) 
φυλακτήριον 
(a phylactery) 
I.25 
βάτραχον 
(a frog) 
ἄνθρωπον ἄπλαστον 
(an unformed man) 
I.26 
λαγωὸν 
(a hare) 
ἄνοιξιν 
(an opening) 
I.27 
γλῶσσαν καὶ ὕφαιμον ὀφθαλμόν 
(a tongue and a bloodshot eye) 
τὸ λέγειν 
(speech) 
I.28 
ἀριθμὸν ͵αϞεʹ 
(the number 1095, which is the number of a triennium) 
ἀφωνίαν 
(silence) 
I.29 
ἀέρος φωνὴν 
(the sound of air, that is thunder) 
φωνὴν μακρόθεν 
(a distant voice) 
I.30 
παπύρου δέσμην 
(a bundle of papyri) 
ἀρχαιογονίαν 
(ancient descent) 
I.31 
ἀρχὴν στόματος 
(the beginning of the mouth) 
γεῦσιν 
(taste) 
I.32 
δεκαὲξ ἀριθμὸν 
(the number 16) 
ἡδονήν 
(pleasure) 
I.33 
δύο δεκαὲξ ἀριθμοὺς 
(two 16s) 
συνουσίαν 
(copulation) 
I.34 
φοίνικα τὸ ὄρνεον 
(the phœnix) 
ψυχὴν ἐνταῦθα πολὺν χρόνον διατρίβουσαν 
(the soul delaying here a long time); 
πλήμμυραν 
(a flood) 
I.35 
φοίνικα τὸ ὄρνεον 
(a phœnix) 
τὸν χρονίως ἀπὸ ξένης ἐπιδημοῦντα 
(the return of the long-absent traveller) 
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I.36 
ἶβιν 
(an ibis) 
καρδίαν 
(the heart) 
I.37 
οὐρανὸν δρόσον βάλλοντα 
(the heavens dropping dew) 
παιδείαν 
(education) 
I.38 
μέλαν καὶ κόσκινον καὶ σχοινίον 
(ink, and a sieve and a reed) 
αἰγύπτια γράμματα 
(Egyptian letters); 
ἱερογραμματέα 
(a scribe); 
πέρας 
(a limit) 
I.39 
κύνα 
(a dog) 
ἱερογραμματέα 
(a sacred scribe); 
προφήτην 
(a prophet); 
ἐνταφιαστήν 
(an embalmer); 
σπλῆνα 
(the spleen); 
ὄσφρησιν 
(odour); 
γέλωτα 
(laughter); 
πταρμόν 
(sneezing); 
ἀρχήν 
(rule); 
δικαστὴν 
(a judge) 
I.40 
τῷ κυνὶ καὶ βασιλικὴν στολὴν παρακειμένην, [σχῆμα γυμνόν] 
(the royal stole beside the dog, who is naked) 
ἀρχὴν ἢ δικαστήν 
(a magistrate or judge) 
I.41 
φύλακα οἰκίας 
(a house-guard) 
παστοφόρον 
(the shrine-bearer) 
I.42 
ἄνθρωπον τὰς ὥρας ἐσθίοντα 
(a man eating the hours) 
ὡροσκόπον 
(the horoscopist) 
I.43 
πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ 
(fire and water) 
ἁγνείαν 
(purity) 
I.44 
ἰχθὺν 
(a fish) 
ἀθέμιτον ἢ καὶ μύσος 
(the lawless or abominable) 
I.45 
ὄφιν 
(a serpent) 
στόμα 
(the mouth) 
I.46 
ταῦρον ὑγιῆ φύσιν ἔχοντα 
(a bull with his member erect) 
ἀνδρεῖον μετὰ σωφροσύνης 
(courage with temperance) 
I.47 
ταύρου ὠτίον 
(the ear of a bull) 
ἀκοήν 
(hearing) 
I.48 
τράγον 
(a goat) 
αἰδοῖον ἀνδρὸς πολυγόνου 
(the member of a fecund man) 
I.49 
ὄρυγα 
(an oryx) 
ἀκαθαρσίαν 
(impurity) 
I.50 
μυῖαν 
(a mouse) 
ἀφανισμόν 
(disappearance) 
I.51 
μύρμηκα  
(a fly) 
ἰταμότητα 
(impudence) 
I.52 
μύρμηκα 
(an ant) 
γνῶσιν 
(knowledge) 
I.53 
χηναλώπεκα 
(a vulpanser [Chenopolex]) 
υἱὸν 
(a son) 
I.54 
πελεκᾶνα 
(a pelican) 
ἄνουν 
(a fool, foolishness); 
ἄφρονα 
(imprudence) 
I.55 
κουκουφὰν 
(a stork) 
εὐχαριστίαν 
(gratitude) 
I.56 
ἱπποποτάμου ὄνυχας δύο κάτω βλέποντας 
(two hippopotamus claws, turned down) 
ἄδικον καὶ ἀχάριστον 
(the unjust and the ungrateful) 
I.57 
περιστερὰν 
(a dove) 
ἀχάριστον πρὸς τοὺς ἑαυτοῦ εὐεργέτας 
(ingratitude for kindness to oneself) 
I.58 
πόδας ἀνθρώπου ἐν ὕδατι περιπατοῦντας 
(men walking on water) 
τὸ ἀδύνατον γενέσθαι 
(what cannot happen) 
I.59 
ὄφιν κοσμοειδῶς ἐσχηματισμένον, οὗ τὴν οὐρὰν ἐν τῷ στόματι 
ποιοῦσι, τὸ δὲ ὄνομα τοῦ βασιλέως ἐν μέσῳ τῷ εἱλίγματι 
(a serpent represented as the cosmos, with its tail in its mouth and the 
name of the king written in the middle of the coils) 
βασιλέα κράτιστον 
(a very powerful king) 
I.60 
τὸν ὄφιν ἐγρηγορότα 
(the serpent in a state of watchfulness) 
βασιλέα φύλακα 
(the king as guardian) 
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I.61 
αὐτὸν ὄφιν ἐν μέσῳ δὲ αὐτοῦ οἶκον μέγαν 
(the serpent and in the middle a great palace) 
κοσμοκράτορα 
(a cosmic ruler) 
I.62 
μέλισσαν 
(a bee) 
λαὸν πειθήνιον βασιλεῖ 
(the people obedient to the king) 
I.63 
ἡμίτομον ὄφιν 
(a serpent cut in half) 
βασιλέα μέρους κόσμου κρατοῦντα 
(the king ruling part of the cosmos) 
I.64 
τὸν ὁλόκληρον ὄφιν 
(a complete serpent) 
παντοκράτορα 
(the almighty (pantocrator)) 
I.65 
δύο πόδας ἀνθρώπου ἐν ὕδατι 
(two human feet in water) 
γναφέα 
(a fuller) 
I.66 
σελήνης σχῆμα 
(the figure of a moon) 
μῆνα 
(a month) 
I.67 
κροκόδειλον 
(a crocodile) 
ἅρπαγα 
(a plunderer); 
πολύγονον  
(a fecund man); 
μαινόμενον 
(a madman) 
I.68 
δύο ὀφθαλμοὺς κροκοδείλου 
(two crocodile's eyes) 
ἀνατολήν 
(the rising [sun]) 
I.69 
κροκόδειλον κεκυφότα 
(a crocodile hunched up) 
δύσιν 
(a sunset) 
I.70 
κροκοδείλου οὐρὰν 
(the tail of a crocodile) 
σκότος 
(shadows) 
II.1 
ἀστέρα 
(a star) 
θεὸν 
(a god); 
δείλην 
(twilight); 
νύκτα 
(night); 
χρόνον 
(time); 
ψυχὴν ἀνθρώπου 
(a man's soul) 
II.2 
ἀετοῦ νεοσσόν 
(an eagle's chick) 
ἀρρενογόνον  
(the bearing of male children); 
κυκλοειδὸν  
(a circle); 
σπέρμα ἀνθρώπου  
(a man’s sperm) 
II.3 
δύο πόδας συνηγμένους καὶ βεβηκότας 
(two feet together and standing) 
δρόμον ἡλίου τὸν ἐν ταῖς χειμερίαις τροπαῖς 
(the course of the sun at the winter solstice) 
II.4 
ἀνθρώπου καρδίαν φάρυγγος ἠρτημένην 
(a man’s heart hanging from his gullet) 
ἀγαθοῦ ἀνθρώπου στόμα 
(the mouth of a good man) 
II.5 
χεῖρες ἡ μὲν ὅπλον κρατοῦσα, ἡ δὲ τόξον 
(a man's hands, one of them holding a shield and the other a bow) 
πολέμου στόμα 
(the jaws of battle) 
II.6 
δάκτυλον  
(a finger) 
Ἀνθρώπου στόμαχον 
(a man’s stomach) 
II.7 
αἰδοῖον χειρὶ κρατούμενον  
(a penis pressed by a hand) 
σωφροσύνην ἀνθρώπου 
(temperance in a man) 
II.8 
Ἄνθη ἀνεμώνης 
(an anemone flower) 
νόσον 
(human disease) 
II.9 
τὸ νωτιαῖον ὀστοῦν 
(a spine) 
ὀσφὺν 
(the loins); 
<στάσιν> ἀνθρώπου 
(masculinity) 
II.10 
ὄρυγος ὀστοῦν 
(a quail's bone) 
διαμονὴν καὶ ἀσφάλειαν  
(the permanent and steadfast) 
II.11 
ἄνθρωποι δύο δεξιούμενοι 
(two men in an attitude of greeting) 
ὁμόνοιαν  
(unanimity) 
II.12 
ἄνθρωπος καθωπλισμένος καὶ τοξεύων 
(a man in armour shooting an arrow) 
ὄχλον 
(the mob) 
II.13 
ἀνθρώπου δάκτυλος 
(a man's finger) 
ἀναμέτρησιν  
(measurement) 
II.14 
ἡλίου κύκλον σὺν ἀστέρι μετὰ ἡλίου δίσκου δίχα τετμημένου 
(a solar disk with stars, and the disk is cut in two) 
γυναῖκα ἔγκυον  
(a pregnant woman) 
II.15 
<εἰς> τὴν ἀνατολὴν ἱέραξ ἐπὶ μετεώρου θέων ἀνέμους 
(a hawk rising towards the gods); 
ἱέραξ διατεταμένος τὰς πτέρυγας ἐν ἀέρι οἷον πτέρυγας ἔχοντα 
(a hawk with its wings expanded in the air) 
ἄνεμον 
(wind) 
II.16 
καπνὸς εἰς οὐρανὸν ἀναβαίνων 
(smoke mounting towards heaven) 
πῦρ 
(fire) 
II.17 
βοὸς ἄρρενος κέρας 
(a bull's horn) 
ἔργον  
(work) 
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II.18 
βοὸς θηλείας κέρας 
(a cow's horn) 
ποινήν  
(punishment) 
II.19 
προτομὴ σὺν μαχαίρᾳ 
(the bust with a sword) 
ἀνοσιότητα 
(impiety) 
II.20 
ἵππος ποτάμιος  
(a hippopotamus) 
ὥραν 
(an hour) 
II.21 
ἔλαφος κατ' ἐνιαυτὸν βλαστάνει τὰ κέρατα  
a stag's horns 
πολυχρόνια  
(a long space of time) 
II.22 
λύκος ἀπεστραμμένος 
(a wolf turning back); 
κύων [ἀπεστραμμένος] 
(a dog [turning back]) 
ἀποστροφήν 
(escape) 
II.23 
ἀκοὴ 
(an ear) 
μέλλον ἔργον 
(future work) 
II.24 
σφὴξ ἀεροπετὴς 
(a wasp in flight); 
αἷμα κροκοδείλου βλαπτικὸν 
(the poisonous blood of a crocodile) 
βλαπτικὸν 
(noxious); 
φονέα 
(murderer) 
II.25 
νυκτικόραξ  
(the night-owl) 
αἰφνίδιον θάνατον 
(a sudden death) 
II.26 
παγὶς 
(a snare); 
ὠὸν 
(an egg) 
ἔρωτα ὡς θήραν θανάτου  
(love as a wild beast); 
πτερὸν ἀέρα 
(winged air); 
υἱόν 
(son) 
II.27 
λόγοι καὶ φύλλα 
(word and leaves); 
βιβλίον ἐσφραγισμένον 
(a signed book) 
παλαιότητα 
(the very old) 
II.28 
κλίμαξ 
(a ladder) 
πολιορκίαν 
(a siege) 
II.29 
γράμματα ἑπτά, ἐν δυσὶ δακτύλοις περιεχόμενα 
(seven letters surrounded by two fingers) 
ἄπειρον 
(the infinite); 
μοῦσαν  
(a muse); 
μοῖραν 
(fate) 
II.30 
γραμμὴ ὀρθὴ μία ἅμα γραμμῇ ἐπικεκαμμένῃ  
(a line superimposed on another) 
[<ἕνδεκα> γραμμὰς ἐπιπέδους  
(ten straight lines) 
II.31 
χελιδόνα  
(a swallow) 
τὴν ὁλοσχερῆ κτῆσιν γονικὴν καταλειφθεῖσαν  τοῖς υἱέσι 
(the entire wealth of parents left to children) 
II.32 
μέλαιναν περιστεράν 
(a black dove) 
γυναῖκα χήραν ἐπιμείνασαν ἄχρι θανάτου  
(a widow remaining faithful to death) 
II.33 
ἰχνεύμονα 
(a weasel [ichneumon]) 
ἄνθρωπον ἀσθενῆ καὶ μὴ δυνηθέντα ἑαυτῷ βοηθῆσαι δι' ἑαυτοῦ, 
ἀλλὰ διὰ τῆς ἄλλων ἐπικουρίας 
(a man who is weak and unable to take care of himself, but is 
dependent on others) 
II.34 
ὀρίγανον 
(origanum) 
λεῖψιν μυρμήκων 
(the absence of ants) 
II.35 
σκορπίον καὶ κροκόδειλον 
(a scorpion and a crocodile) 
ἄνθρωπον ἐχθρόν, ἑτέρῳ ἴσῳ ἐναντιούμενον  
(a man at war with another) 
II.36 
γαλῆν 
(the marten) 
γυναῖκα ἀνδρὸς ἔργα πράττουσαν 
(a woman who has acted like a man) 
II.37 
χοῖρον 
(a pig) 
ἄνθρωπον ἐξώλη  
(a pernicious man) 
II.38 
λέοντα γράφουσιν ἐξοστεΐζοντα τοὺς ἰδίους σκύμνους 
(a lion tearing its cubs to pieces) 
θυμὸν ἄμετρον, ὥστε καὶ ἐκ τούτου πυρέττειν τὸν θυμούμενον  
(unmeasurable anger, as if the spirits were in a fever from it) 
II.39 
κύκνον 
(a swan) 
γέροντα μουσικόν 
(a musical old man) 
II.40 
δύο κορώνας 
(two crows) 
ἄνδρα συγγινόμενον τῇ ἑαυτοῦ γυναικί 
(a man mating with his wife) 
II.41 
κάνθαρον τυφλὸν 
(a blind beetle) 
ἄνδρα δὲ ὑπὸ ἡλιακῆς ἀκτῖνος πυρέξαντα καὶ ἐντεῦθεν 
ἀποθανόντα 
(a man dead from a sunstroke) 
II.42 
ἡμίονον 
(a mule) 
γυναῖκα δὲ στεῖραν 
(a barren woman) 
II.43 
ταῦρον ἐπὶ τὰ ἀριστερὰ νεύοντα 
(a bull facing the left); 
ταῦρον ἐπὶ τὰ δεξιὰ νεύοντα 
(a bull facing the right) 
γυναῖκα γεννήσασαν θήλεα βρέφη 
(a woman who has borne female infants); 
γυναῖκα γεννήσασαν ἄρρενα βρέφη 
(a woman who has borne male infants) 
II.44 
νεκρὸν ἵππον 
(a dead horse) 
σφῆκας 
(wasps) 
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II.45 
ἵππον πατοῦσαν λύκον 
(a mare kicking a wolf) 
γυναῖκα ἐκτιτρώσκουσαν 
(a woman who has aborted) 
II.46 
φάσσαν κρατοῦσαν φύλλον δάφνης 
(a pigeon holding a laurel-leaf) 
ἄνθρωπον ἰατρεύοντα ἑαυτὸν ἀπὸ χρησμοῦ 
(a man who has been cured by the answer of an oracle) 
II.47 
σκώληκας 
(worms [maggots]) 
κώνωπας πολλούς 
(gnats swarming) 
II.48 
περιστερὰν ἔχουσαν τὰ ὀπίσθια ὀρθά 
(a pigeon with its hind parts erect) 
ἄνδρα μὴ ἔχοντα χολήν, ἀλλ' ἀφ' ἑτέρου δεχόμενον 
(a man who by his own nature has no bile but receives it from 
another) 
II.49 
ἀετὸν λίθον βαστάζοντα 
(an eagle carrying off a stone) 
ἄνθρωπον ἀσφαλῶς οἰκοῦντα πόλιν 
(a man who lives safely in a city) 
II.50 
ὠτίδα καὶ ἵππον  
(a horse and a bustard) 
ἄνθρωπον ἀσθενῶς ἔχοντα, καὶ ὑφ' ἑτέρου καταδιωκόμενον 
(a weak man pursued by another) 
II.51 
στρουθὸν καὶ γλαῦκα 
(a sparrow and a dog-fish) 
ἄνθρωπον προσφεύγοντα τῷ ἰδίῳ πάτρωνι καὶ μὴ βοηθούμενον 
(a man fleeing to his patron and not being aided by him) 
II.52 
νυκτερίδα 
(a bat) 
ἄνθρωπον δηλοῦσιν ἀσθενῆ καὶ προπετευόμενον 
(a weak man who is rash) 
II.53 
νυκτερίδα πάλιν ἔχουσαν ὀδόντας καὶ μαστοὺς 
(a bat with teeth and breasts) 
γυναῖκα θηλάζουσαν, καὶ καλῶς ἀνατρέφουσαν 
(a woman giving suck and nursing her children well) 
II.54 
τρυγόνα 
(a turtle-dove) 
ἄνθρωπον κηλούμενον ὀρχήσει καὶ αὐλητικῆς κηλούμενον 
(a man who loves dancing and flute playing) 
II.55 
τέττιγα  
(a cicada) 
ἄνθρωπον μυστικόν καὶ αὐλητικῆς κηλούμενον 
(a man of the mysteries and initiated) 
II.56 
ἀετὸν 
(an eagle) 
βασιλέα ἰδιάζοντα, καὶ μὴ ἐλεοῦντα ἐν τοῖς πταίσμασι 
(a king living in retirement and giving no pity to those in fault) 
II.57 
φοίνικα τὸ ὄρνεον 
(the phœnix) 
ἀποκατάστασιν πολυχρόνιον 
(a long-enduring restoration) 
II.58 
πελαργὸν 
(a stork) 
φιλοπάτορα 
(filial affection) 
II.59 
ἔχιν 
(a viper) 
γυναῖκα μισοῦσαν τὸν ἑαυτῆς ἄνδρα, καὶ ἐπιβουλεύουσαν αὐτῷ εἰς 
θάνατον, μόνον δὲ διὰ μῖξιν κολακεύουσαν αὐτὸν 
(a wife who hates her husband and plots his death, and mates with 
him only through flattery) 
II.60 
ἔχιδναν 
(a viper) 
τέκνα δηλοῦσιν ἐπιβουλεύοντα ταῖς μητράσι  
(children who hate their mother) 
II.61 
βασιλίσκον 
(a basilisk) 
ἄνθρωπον δηλοῦσιν ὑπὸ κατηγορίας λοιδορηθέντα καὶ 
ἀσθενήσαντα 
(a man reviled by denunciation and fallen sick because of it) 
II.62 
σαλαμάνδραν 
(a salamander) 
ἄνθρωπον ὑπὸ πυρὸς <οὐ> καιόμενον 
(a man <not> burned by fire) 
II.63 
ἀσπάλακα  
(a mole) 
ἄνθρωπον τυφλόν 
(a blind man) 
II.64 
μύρμηκα καὶ πτερὰ νυκτερίδος 
(an ant and bat's wings) 
ἄνθρωπον ἀπρόϊτον 
(a man who stays indoors) 
II.65 
κάστορα 
(a beaver) 
ἄνθρωπον διὰ τῆς οἰκείας ἐξωλείας βλαπτόμενον  
(a man prevented from committing suicide) 
II.66 
πίθηκον ἔχοντα ὀπίσω ἕτερον μικρὸν πίθηκον  
(a monkey with a little monkey behind him) 
ἄνθρωπον κληρονομηθέντα ὑπὸ μεμισημένου τέκνου 
(a man whose heir is a son whom he hates) 
II.67 
πίθηκον οὐροῦντα 
(a monkey urinating) 
ἄνθρωπον τὰ ἴδια ἐλαττώματα κρύπτοντα  
(a man concealing his inferiority) 
II.68 
αἶγα 
(a goat) 
τινα κατὰ τὸ μᾶλλον ἀκούοντα 
(a man of sharp hearing) 
II.69 
ὕαιναν  
(a hyena) 
τινὰ δὲ ἄστατον, καὶ μὴ μένοντα ἐν ταὐτῷ, ἀλλ' ὁτὲ μὲν ἰσχυρόν, 
ὁτὲ δὲ ἀσθενῆ  
(someone unstable and not remaining in the same state, either 
because of strength or weakness) 
II.70 
δύο δέρματα, ὧν τὸ μὲν ὑαίνης ἐστί, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο παρδάλεως 
(two skins, one of which is a hyena-skin, the other a leopard-skin) 
ἄνθρωπον ὑπὸ ἐλαττόνων ἡττώμενον 
(a man who is worsted by weaker men) 
II.71 
ὕαιναν ἐπὶ τὰ δεξιὰ στρεφομένην 
(a hyena facing the right) 
ἄνθρωπον τοῦ ἰδίου ἐχθροῦ περιγενόμενον 
 (a man superior to his enemies) 
II.72 
δέρμα ὑαίνης 
(a hyena-skin) 
ἄνθρωπον παρελθόντα τὰς ἐπενεχθείσας αὐτῷ συμφορὰς ἀφόβως 
(a man confronting fearlessly misfortunes which have come upon 
him, even to the point of death) 
II.73 
λύκον ἀπολέσαντα τὸ ἄκρον τῆς οὐρᾶς 
(a wolf who has lost the tip of his tail) 
ἄνθρωπον σιανθέντα ὑπὸ τῶν ἰδίων ἐχθρῶν 
(a man assailed by his enemies, and delivered after small harm) 
II.74 
λύκον καὶ λίθον 
(a wolf and a stone) 
ἄνθρωπον φοβούμενον τὰ ἐπισυμβαίνοντα αὑτῷ ἐκ τοῦ ἀφανοῦς  
(a man afraid of what may happen to him from invisible causes) 
II.75 
λέοντας καὶ δᾷδας 
(lions and torches) 
ἄνθρωπον ἐπὶ θυμῷ σωφρονισθέντα ὑπὸ πυρὸς 
(a man whose anger is chastened by fire and that because of his 
anger) 
II.76 
λέοντα πίθηκον τρώγοντα 
(a lion devouring a monkey) 
ἄνθρωπον πυρέττοντα καὶ ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ θεραπευθέντα 
(a man in fever cured by himself) 
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CH. GLYPHS MEANINGS 
II.77 
ταῦρον περιδεδεμένον ἀγριοσυκέᾳ 
(a bull girt with wild figs) 
ἄνθρωπον ὕστερον σωφρονισθέντα ἀπὸ τῆς πρώην ἐξωλείας 
(a man made temperate by recent misfortunes) 
II.78 
ταῦρον ζωγραφοῦσι, περιδεδεμένον τὸ δεξιὸν γόνυ 
(a bull with his right knee bound) 
ἄνθρωπον σωφροσύνην ἔχοντα εὐμετάβλητον 
(a temperate man who is easily swayed and not stable) 
II.79 
αὐτὰ τὰ ζῷα τρώγοντα κόνυζαν 
(these animals grazing on flea-bane) 
ἄνθρωπον προβάτων καὶ αἰγῶν φθορικόν 
(a man who kill sheep and goats) 
II.80 
κροκόδειλον ἔχοντα τὸ στόμα ἀνεῳγμένον 
(a crocodile with its mouth open) 
ἄνθρωπον τρώγοντα 
(a man eating) 
II.81 
κροκόδειλον ἔχοντα ἴβεως πτερὸν ἐπὶ τῆς κεφαλῆς 
(a crocodile with an ibis feather on his head) 
<ἅρπαγα> ἄνθρωπον <καὶ> ἀνενέργητον σημαίνουσιν 
(the rapacious and idle man) 
II.82 
λέαιναν 
(a lioness) 
γυναῖκα γεννήσασαν ἅπαξ 
(a woman who has conceived once) 
II.83 
ἄρκτον ἐγκυμονοῦσαν 
(a pregnant she-bear) 
ἄνθρωπον γεννηθέντα κατὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἄμορφον 
(a man born deformed, but later taking on a normal shape) 
II.84 
ἐλέφαντα ἔχοντα τὴν προβοσκίδα 
(an elephant with his trunk) 
ἄνθρωπον ἰσχυρόν, καὶ τῶν συμφερόντων ὀσφραντικόν 
(a strong man sensitive to what is expedient) 
II.85 
ἐλέφαντα καὶ κριὸν 
(an elephant and a ram) 
ἄνθρωπον βασιλέα φεύγοντα μωρίαν καὶ ἀφροσύνην 
(a king fleeing from folly and intemperance) 
II.86 
ἐλέφαντα μετὰ χοίρου 
(an elephant with a pig) 
βασιλέα φεύγοντα φλύαρον ἄνθρωπον 
(a king fleeing from a fool) 
II.87 
ἔλαφον καὶ ἔχιδναν 
(a deer and a viper) 
ἄνθρωπον ὀξὺν μὲν κατὰ τὴν κίνησιν, ἀσκέπτως δὲ καὶ ἀνοήτως 
κινούμενον 
(a man swift in motion but moved heedlessly and thoughtlessly) 
II.88 
ἐλέφαντα κατορύττοντα τοὺς ἰδίους ὀδόντας 
(an elephant burying his tusks) 
ἄνθρωπον προνοούμενον τῆς ἰδίας ταφῆς  
(a man who has prepared his own tomb) 
II.89 
κορώνην ἀποθανοῦσαν 
(a dead crow) 
ἄνθρωπον ζήσαντα τέλειον βίον 
(a man who has come to the end of his days) 
II.90 
πάρδαλιν 
(a leopard) 
ἄνθρωπον ἐμφωλεύοντα ἑαυτῷ κακίαν, καὶ ἀποκρύπτοντα ἑαυτὸν 
ὥστε μὴ γνωσθῆναι τοῖς ἰδίοις 
(a man who has dwelt in evil and concealed his own evil, so that it is 
not known to his intimates) 
II.91 
ἔλαφον μετὰ αὐλητοῦ ἀνθρώπου 
(a deer and a flute-player) 
ἄνθρωπον ἐξαπατώμενον διὰ κολακείας 
(a man deceived by flattery) 
II.92 
ἔποπα  
(an owl) 
πρόγνωσιν εὐκαρπίας οἴνου 
(foreknowledge of an abundant vintage) 
II.93 
ἔποπα καὶ ἀδίαντον τὴν βοτάνην 
(an owl and some maiden-hair) 
ἄνθρωπον ὑπὸ σταφυλῆς βλαβέντα, καὶ ἑαυτὸν θεραπεύοντα 
(a man injured by the grape and curing himself) 
II.94 
γέρανον γρηγοροῦσαν  
(a crane on watch) 
ἄνθρωπον ἑαυτὸν φυλάττοντα ἀπὸ ἐπιβουλῆς ἐχθρῶν 
(a man guarding himself against the plots of his enemies) 
II.95 
δύο πέρδικας 
(two partridges) 
παιδεραστίαν 
(pederasty) 
II.96 
ἀετὸν ἀποκεκαμμένον ἔχοντα τὸ ῥάμφος 
(an eagle with twisted beak) 
γέροντα ὑπὸ λιμοῦ ἀποθανόντα 
(an old man dying of hunger) 
II.97 
κορώνης νεοσσοὺς 
(some young crows) 
ἄνθρωπον ἀεὶ ἐν κινήσει καὶ θυμῷ διάγοντα, καὶ μήτε ἐν τῷ 
τρέφεσθαι ἡσυχάζοντα 
(a man passing his time in constant motion and irascibility and not 
even resting to eat) 
II.98 
γέρανον ἱπτάμενον  
(a crane in flight) 
ἄνθρωπον εἰδότα τὰ μετέωρα 
(a man who knows the higher things) 
II.99 
ἱέρακα ἐγκύμονα 
(a hawk big with young) 
ἄνθρωπον ἀποταξάμενον τὰ ἴδια τέκνα δι' ἀπορίαν  
(a man getting rid of his own children because of poverty) 
II.100 
κάμηλον 
(a camel) 
ἄνθρωπον ὀκνοῦντα τὴν διὰ ποδῶν κίνησιν ποιεῖσθαι 
(a man who hesitates to move his feet) 
II.101 
βάτραχον 
(a frog) 
ἄνθρωπον ἀναιδῆ καὶ κατὰ τὴν ὅρασιν ὀξύν 
(a shameless man of keen sight) 
II.102 
βάτραχον ἔχοντα τοὺς ὀπισθίους πόδας 
(a frog with hind legs) 
ἄνθρωπον πολὺν χρόνον μὴ δυνηθέντα κινεῖσθαι, ὕστερον δὲ 
κινηθέντα τοῖς ποσὶ 
(a man incapable of movement for some time but later recovers the 
use of his feet) 
II.103 
ἔγχελυν 
(an eel) 
ἄνθρωπον πάντων ἐχθρὸν καὶ ἀπεσχοινισμένον 
(a man hostile to everyone and living in isolation) 
II.104 
νάρκην τὸν ἰχθὺν 
(an electric ray) 
ἄνθρωπον σῴζοντα πολλοὺς ἐν θαλάσσῃ  
(a man saving many others from drowning) 
II.105 
πολύποδα  
(an octopus) 
ἄνθρωπον τὰ χρήσιμα <καὶ τὰ ἄχρηστα> κακῶς ἀνηλωκότα 
(a man who has squandered necessities and superfluities badly) 
II.106 
κάραβον καὶ πολύποδα 
(a spiny lobster and an octopus) 
ἄνθρωπον τῶν ὁμοφύλων κρατήσαντα 
(a man ruling his fellow citizens) 
II.107 
πίννας ἐγκύους 
(oysters big with young) 
ἄνδρα συζευχθέντα γυναικὶ ἀπὸ πρώτης ἡλικίας, ἐν ᾗ ἐτέχθησαν 
(a man yoked from an early age to the woman who bore him) 
II.108 
πίνναν καὶ καρκίνον μικρὸν 
(an oyster and a crab) 
πατέρα ἢ ἄνθρωπον μὴ προνοούμενον ἑαυτοῦ, ἀλλ' ὑπὸ τῶν 
οἰκείων προνοούμενον  
(a father or a man careless of his welfare, but who is provided for by 
his household) 
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CH. GLYPHS MEANINGS 
II.109 
σκάρον 
(a scarus [fish]) 
ἄνθρωπον λάμιαν ἔχοντα 
(a glutton) 
II.110 
ἐνάλιον γαλεὸν 
(a shark) 
ἄνθρωπον τὴν ἑαυτοῦ τροφὴν ἐμοῦντα 
(a man vomiting his food and eating again his fill) 
II.111 
σμύραιναν ἰχθὺν 
(a lamprey) 
ἄνθρωπον ἀνθρώπων ἀλλοφύλων χρώμενον μίξει  
(a man who mates with foreigners) 
II.112 
τρυγόνα περιπεπλεγμένην ἀγκίστρῳ 
(a roach caught in a hook) 
ἄνθρωπον ἐπὶ φόνῳ κολασθέντα 
(a man punished for murder who has repented) 
II.113 
πολύποδα 
(an octopus) 
ἄνθρωπον ἀφειδῶς κατεσθίοντα τὰ ἀλλότρια 
(a man who has fed lavishly on another’s food, and later devours his 
own) 
II.114 
σηπίαν 
(a squid) 
ἄνθρωπον ἐπὶ καλῷ ὁρμήσαντα 
(a man who has a yearning for the right but has fallen in with evil) 
II.115 
στρουθίον πυργίτην  
(a sparrow on fire) 
ἄνθρωπον γόνιμον  
(a fecund man) 
II.116 
λύραν 
(a lyre) 
ἄνθρωπον συνοχέα καὶ ἑνωτικόν  
(a man who binds together and unites his fellows) 
II.117 
σύριγγα 
(the pipes of Pan) 
ἄνθρωπον πάλαι μὲν ἀποστάντα τῶν ἰδίων νοημάτων, ὕστερον δὲ 
τῆς ἑαυτοῦ γεγονότα φρονήσεως 
(a man who once lost his mind but later recovered his senses and led 
an orderly life) 
II.118 
στρουθοκαμήλου πτερὸν 
(an ostrich-wing) 
ἄνθρωπον ἴσως πᾶσι τὸ δίκαιον ἀπονέμοντα 
(a man who distributes justice equally to all) 
II.119 
χεῖρα ἀνθρώπου  
(a man's hand) 
ἄνθρωπον φιλοκτίστην 
(the man fond of building) 
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Appendix 3: Thematic Grouping of Horapollonian Hieroglyphs.  
 
The text exhibits thematic groupings of the glyph-sequences it presents. The glyphs themselves fall into one 
or more of several broad categories (as derived from Gardiner’s sign-list) as follows:  
 
Mammals (46 signs) 
I.14,15,16,17,21,26,39,40,46,48,49,50,56 
II.20,22(x2),33,37,38,42,43(x2),44,45,50,52,53,63,65,66,67,68,69,73,74,75,76,77,78,79,82,83,87,88,90,100 
 Parts of Mammals (18 signs) 
I.15,18,19,20,23,46,47 
II.17,18,21,53,64,70,72,73,78,84,88 
 Birds (38 signs) 
I.6,7,8,9,11,12,34,35,36,51,54,55,57 
II.2,15,25,31,32,36,39,40,48,49,50,51,54,56,57,89,92,93,94,95,96,97,98,99,115 
 Parts of Birds (5 signs) 
II,10,48,81,96,118 
 Fishes and Parts of Fishes (15 signs) 
I.44 
II.51,103,104,105,106,107,108,109,110,111,112,113,114 
 Amphibious Animals, Reptiles, &c. (16 signs) 
I.1,2,25,45,59,60,61,63,64 
II.59,60,61,62,87,101,102 
 Invertebrata and Lesser Animals (12 signs) 
I.10,12,12,51,52,62 
II.24,35,41,47,55,64 
 Parts of the Human Body (13 signs) 
I.22,24,31,65 
II.3,4,5,7,9,13,19,29,119 
 Man and his occupations (12 signs) 
I.23,41,42,58 
II.4,5,11,12(x2),13,91,119 
 Woman and female deity (1 sign) 
I.3 
 Trees and Plants (6 signs) 
I.1 
II.8,34,46,77,93 
 Sky, Earth, Water (14 signs) 
I.1,5,13,21,29,37,43,58,65,66 
II.1,14,16,115 
 Writing, Music, Strokes, Geometrical Figures, &c. (12 signs) 
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I.28,30,32,33,38 
II.27,27,29,30,91,116,117 
 Warfare and Professions (8 signs) 
I.5,41,42 
II.5,12(x2),28,91 
 Buildings, Domestic and Temple Furniture (3 signs) 
I.21,22,61 
 Crowns, Dress &c. (2 signs) 
I.15,40 
 
The distribution of meanings across the signs listed above is, in one sense, more difficult to classify. This is 
due not only to the homogeneity of the explanations provided (especially in Book Two), but presumably also 
to the fact that the meanings of glyphs are precisely not constrained by the finite range of items they depict. 
Nonetheless, the two-hundred and forty meanings given can be broadly grouped as follows:  
 
People, their professions and qualities 
I.10(x3),11,14,23,25,38,39(x4),40,41,42,53,59,60,62,63,65,67(x3) 
II.12,14,32,33,35,36,37,39,40,41,42,43(x2),45,46,48,49,50,51,52,53,54(x2) ,55,56,59,60,61,62,63,64,65,66,67,68,69,70,71,72,73,74,
75,76,77,78,79,80,81,82,83,84,85,86,87,88,89,90,91,93,94,96,97,98,99,100,101,102,103,104,105,106,107,108,109,110,111,112,113,
114,115,116,117,118,119 
 Qualities, parts, and occupations 
I.6(x4),7,9,10,11(x4),14(x2),17,18,19,20,24,26,27,28,29,30,31,32,33,34(x2),35,36,38(x2),39(x5),43,44,45,46,47,48,49,50,51,52,54(
x3),55,56,57,58(x2) 
II.1,2(x2),3,4,5,6,7,8,9(x2),10,11,17,18,19,22,23,24,25,26,28,29(x3),30,31,34,38,44,47,58,92,95 
 Deities 
I.3,6(x3),8,11(x2),12(x2),13,61,64 
II.1 
 Celestial or natural phenomena 
I.2,10,11,13,14(x2),15(x2),16,21,22,68,69,70 
II.15,16 
 Measurement and the parts of language 
I.1,3,4,5,11(x2),13,14,37,38,66 
II.1(x3),2,13,20,21,27,57 
 
The following forty-three glyphs (something less than a quarter) are more or less correctly identified as 
Egyptian signs:  
 
I.1 ὄφιν ἔχοντα τὴν οὐρὰν ὑπὸ τὸ λοιπὸν σῶμα κρυπτομένην (a serpent with its tail concealed by the rest of its body) 
I.1 ἣλιον καὶ σελήνην (the sun and the moon) 
I.2 ὄφιν τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἐσθίοντα οὐράν, ἐστιγμένον φολίσι ποικίλαις (a serpent devouring its own tail, marked with variegated 
scales) 
I.3 Ἶσιν, τουτέστι γυναῖκα (Isis, that is a woman) 
I.4 βάϊν (a branch) 
I.4 σελήνην ἐπεστραμμένην εἰς τὸ κάτω (moon with its horns turned downward) 
I.5 τέταρτον ἀρούρας (fourth part of aroura) 
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I.6 ἱέρακα (hawk) 
I.7 ὁ ἱέραξ (hawk) 
I.8 δύο ἱέρακας (two hawks [the male, the female]) 
I.10 κάνθαρον (scarab) 
I.11 γῦπα (vulture) 
I.13 ἀστέρα (star) 
I.14 κυνοκέφαλον (baboon) 
I.15 κυνοκέφαλον σχήματι τοιῷδε· ἑστῶτα καὶ τὰς χεῖρας εἰς οὐρανὸν ἐπαίροντα, βασίλειόν τε ἐπὶ τῆς κεφαλῆς ἔχοντα (baboon, 
but in this way: standing, with its hands raised to heaven and crown on  its head) 
I.16 κυνοκέφαλον καθήμενον ζῷον (baboon, but seated) 
I.18 λέοντος τὰ ἔμπροσθεν (forequarters of lion) 
I.19 λέοντος κεφαλήν (head of lion) 
I.21 λέοντα (lion) 
I.21 τρεῖς ὑδρίας μεγάλας (three great water-jars) 
I.24 δύο κεφαλὰς ἀνθρώπων ζωγραφοῦσι, τὴν μὲν τοῦ ἄρσενος ἔσω βλέπουσαν, τὴν δὲ θηλυκὴν ἔξω (two human heads, one 
male, looking in, other female, looking out) 
I.26 λαγωὸν (hare) 
I.27 γλῶσσαν καὶ ὕφαιμον ὀφθαλμόν (tongue and bloodshot eye) 
I.30 παπύρου δέσμην (bundle of papyri) 
I.36 ἶβιν (ibis) 
I.38 μέλαν καὶ κόσκινον καὶ σχοινίον (ink, and a sieve and a reed) 
I.39 κύνα (dog) 
I.41 φύλακα οἰκίας (house-guard) 
I.43 πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ (fire and water) 
I.44 ἰχθὺν (fish) 
I.46 ταῦρον ὑγιῆ φύσιν ἔχοντα (bull with his member erect) 
I.47 ταύρου ὠτίον (ear of bull) 
I.53 χηναλώπεκα (vulpanser [Chenopolex]) 
I.55 κουκουφὰν (stork) 
I.60 τὸν ὄφιν ἐγρηγορότα (serpent in state of watchfulness) 
I.62 μέλισσαν (bee) 
I.64 τὸν ὁλόκληρον ὄφιν (complete serpent) 
I.66 σελήνης σχῆμα (figure of moon) 
I.70 κροκοδείλου οὐρὰν (tail of crocodile) 
II.1 ἀστέρα (star) 
II.5 χεῖρες ἡ μὲν ὅπλον κρατοῦσα, ἡ δὲ τόξον (man's hands, one of them holding shield and other bow) 
II.13 ἀνθρώπου δάκτυλος (man's finger) 
II.15 <εἰς> τὴν ἀνατολὴν ἱέραξ ἐπὶ μετεώρου θέων ἀνέμους (hawk rising towards gods) 
II.26 παγὶς (snare) 
II.30 γραμμὴ ὀρθὴ μία ἅμα γραμμῇ ἐπικεκαμμένῃ (line superimposed on another) 
II.118 στρουθοκαμήλου πτερὸν (ostrich-wing) 
 
Specifically, phonological information on Egyptian in the text is more limited again.348  
 
                               
348 See Appendix 3 below.  
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Appendix 4: The Coptic Content of the Hieroglyphica. 
 
1. ἀμβρής (I, 38): <ἀμβρίζειν>· θεραπεύειν ἐν τοῖς ἱεροῖς349; n.b. Ἰαμβρής350 
2. βαῒ (I, 7): bai O nn, peb bai, lord of spirit(s), DM 28 1, gloss. βαί = ψυχή, acc. to Horapollo I vii. Cf? above, 
bai owl as soul, also in gnostic name bai p,ww, spirit of darkness (Erman Aegypt. Relig.2 250) & in 
βαινεφώθ Glos 405 (v evwt), cf AZ 62 35.351  
3. βαιήθ (I, 7): see notes to items 2. & 5.  
4. βάϊς (I, 3, 4): ba (bae, baei, bai, bei, beei, boi) nn m, once f = βάϊον, branch of date-palm.352  
5. ἣθ (I, 7): hyt (het); hty¹ (hte¹, h;y¹, yt¹, ehty¹); pl hete (he]); -yt in compounds; nn m, heart, 
mind: καρδία; νοῦς; διάνοια; ψυχή.353  
6. κουκούφας (I, 55): kakoupat (koukouvat, kouk[ou]pet), κουκούφα, nn m f, hoopoe.354  
7. μεισί (I, 59): μείς, μηνός, ὁ, nom. sg.  
8. Νοῦν (I, 21): noun nn m, abyss of hell, depth of earth, sea, f νοῦνι; Ναῦνι; ἄβυσσος; βάθος; βυθός.355  
9. οὐαιέ (I, 29): oue (-y, oueie, -ie, -ei, -y(y)I, ouy(y)u, -you) vb intr be distant, far-reaching: μακρύνειν; 
μακρὰν ποιεῖν.356  
10. οὐραῖον (I, 1): rro (erro, ero, ouro, rra, erra, irra, era, rrw, erw, ourw), pl rrwou (errwou, erwou, 
rroou, rra(e)i, ourwou) nn m f king, queen: βασιλεύς; ἄρχων; τυραννίς; καῖσαρ; ἡγούμενος.357  
11. παραύ (I, 61): cf. Φαραὼ.  
12. σβῶ (I, 38): cbw (cbou), pl cbooue (-woue, cbaue, cboueie, cbwoui, cbaoui, cfaui) nn f doctrine, 
teaching: διδασκαλία; διδαχή; παιδεία; ἐπιστήμη.358  
13. Σῶθις (I, 3): Numenius Phil., Fragmenta, Fragment 31, line 41; Porphyrius Phil., De antro nympharum, 
Section 24, line 3; Hephaestion Astrol., Apotelesmatica, Page 66, line 7, Page 142, line 19, Page 179, line 
23.   
                               
349 Hesychius Lexicogr., Lexicon (Α – Ο) Alphabetic letter alpha, entry 3520, line 1.  
350 Novum Testamentum, Epistula Pauli ad Timotheum ii, 3.8.2.  
351 Crum, W. E., A Coptic Dictionary compiled with the help of many scholars (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1939): p. 28 a.  
352 Crum (1939): p. 27 b. 
353 Crum (1939): p. 714 a.  
354 Crum (1939): p. 102 a.  
355 Crum (1939): p. 226 b.  
356 Crum (1939): p. 470 b.  
357 Crum (1939): p. 299 a.  
358 Crum (1939): p. 319 b.  
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2. Bibliotheca Laurentiana Medicea, Florentiæ: Plutei 69: Codex 27 (*Laurenziano greco Pl. 69, 27) [E]. 
 
3. Bibliotheca Laurentiana Medicea, Florentiæ: Plutei 81: Codex 15 (*Laurenziano greco Pl. 81, 15) [F]. 
 
4. Bibliotheca Laurentiana Medicea, Florentiæ: Plutei ejusdem 81: Codex 20 (*Laurenziano greco Pl. 81, 20) [G]. 
 
5. Bibliotheca Veneta Divi Marci: Codex 391 (*Marciano greco 391) [V]. 
 
6. Bibliotheca Vaticana Romæ: Harpocration (*Vaticano greco 871) [H]. 
 
7. Bibliotheca Regia Parisiensis: Codex 192 (*Parigino Coisliniano greco 192) [A]. 
 
8. Bibliotheca Regia Parisiensis: Codex 2832 (*Parigino greco 2832) [B]. 
 
9. Bibliotheca Regia Parisiensis: Codex 2992 (*Parigino greco 2992) [C]. 
 
10. Bibliotheca Cardinalis Radulphi: Codex 49. 
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11. Bibliotheca Lugdunensis: Codex 102. 
 
12. Bibliotheca Augustana: Codex 100. 
 
13. Bibliotheca Cæsarea, Vindobonæ: Codex 498. 
 
14. Bibliotheca Cæsarea, Vindobonæ: Codex Morellianus. 
 
a. MS Monacense græc. 419 (*Monacense (già Augustano) greco 419) [M]. 
 
b. (*Vaticano greco 1011) [I]. 
 
c. (*Napoletano greco III E 5) [N]. 
 
d. (*Vaticano greco 1144) [L]. 
 
e. (*Atonitico del monastero di Lavra 1183). 
 
f. (*Atonitico 136 Lambros). 
 
g. (*Atonitico 3816 Lambros). 
 
h. (*Atonitico 6051 = Παντελεήμονος 544). 
 
i. (*Ateniese della Biblioteca Nazionale 390). 
 
j. (*Gerosolimitano 365). 
 
k. (*Gerosolimitano 514). 
 Hieroglyphic Semantics in Late Antiquity - 145 - 
 Mark Wildish - 145 - 
 
(ii) Editions of the Ἱερογλυφικά 
 
Among the thirteen Greek texts, two textual traditions stand out: those of Aldus and Hœschel; among the 
fourteen Latin, those of Trebazio and Mercier. There also appear five French texts, three Italian, two English, 
one Spanish, and one German. That is, there are known to me: 16 MSS, 27 editions (10 illustrated), 35 texts, & 
45 prints. 
 
1. Venice: Aldus Manutius 1505 
 
2. Augsburg: 1515 Basel: 1518; Paris: 1530; Basel: 1534; Venice: 1538; Lyon: 1542, 1626 
 
3. Bologna: Hieronymus Platonides 1517 
 
4. TREBATIUS, B., ANGELUS, J., & PHILIPPUS, (edd. & trans.), Ori Apollinis Niliaci Hierogliphica 
Orouapollōnos neilōon Hierouglyphika. [Paris] : [excussit Petrus Vidouaeus ... impensis ... Conradi Resch, 
bibliopolæ Parisiensis], [1521]. 
 
5. Paris: Jacques Kerver 1543 
 
6. Venice: Gabriel Giolito de’ Ferrari 1547 [1548] 
 
7. Paris: Jacques Kerver 1548 [1551] 
 
8. Paris: Jacques Kerver 1553 
 
9. Basel: Heinrich Petri 1554 
 
10. Valencia: Antonio Sanahuja 1556 
 
11. Paris: Galliot du Pré 1574 
 Hieroglyphic Semantics in Late Antiquity - 146 - 
 Mark Wildish - 146 - 
 
 
12. Augsburg: 1595 [1605], Augsburg: 1606; Frankfurt: 1614; Leipzig: 1626; Cologne: 1631; Frankfurt: 1678 
 
13. Rome: Aloisii Zanetti 1597 [1599] 
 
14. Paris: 1618 Cologne: 1622, 1631, 1654; Paris: 1634, 1647 
 
15. PAUW, J. C. de, CAUSSIN, N., HOESCHEL, D., & MERCIER, J. (edd. & trans.), Horapollinis Hieroglyphica 
græce & latine, cum integris observationibus & notis Joann. Merceri & David. Hoeschelii, et selectis Nicolai 
Caussini. Curante Joanne Cornelio de Pauw, qui suas etiam observationes addidit. (Trajecti ad Rhenum 
(Utrecht): Apud Melchior. Leonardum Charlois, 1727). 
 
16. Amsterdam-Paris: Musier 1779 [1782] 
 
17. LEEMANS, C., (ed.), Horapollonis Niloi Hieroglyphica (Amsterdam: J. Müller et Socios, 1835). 
 
18. CORY, A. T., (trans.), The Hieroglyphics of Horapollo Nilous (London: W. Pickering, 1839 [1840, 1987]. 
 
19. [Giehlow] 1915 
 
20. SBORDONE, F., (ed.), Hori Apollonis Hieroglyphica (Naples: Georg Olms, 1940 [2002]). 
 
21. VAN DE WALLE, B. & VERGOTE, J., (trans.), ‘Traduction des Hieroglyphica d’Horapollon’ in Chronique 
d’Égypte 18 (1943): 39-89, 199-239; addenda ibid., 22 (1947): pp. 251-59. 
 
22. BOAS, G., (trans.), The Hieroglyphics of Horapollo (New York: Princeton University Press, 1950 [1993]). 
 
23. [Rollet] 1968 
 
24. Madrid: Akal 1991 
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25. Milan: Rizzoli 1996 
 
26. Des Niloten Horapollon Hieroglyphenbuch. 1, Text und Übersetzung / hrsg. und übers. von Heinz-
Josef Thissen. München : Saur, 2001. XXIV-109 p. (Archiv für Papyrusforschung und verwandte 
Gebiete. Beiheft ; 6). [72-02793 
 
27. Trattato sui geroglifici / Horapollo l’Egiziano ; testo, trad. e comm. a cura di Franco Crevatin e 
Gennaro Tedeschi. Napoli : Università degli Studi di Napoli L’Orientale, 2002. 198 p. index. (Annali 
dell’Istituto Universitario Orientale di Napoli, Dipartimento di Studi del Mondo Classico e del 
Mediterraneo Antico, Sezione Filologico-Letteraria. Quaderni. N. S. ; 8). [73-03136 
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(iii) Testimonia 
 
PHOT. Bibl. 279 p. 536 a 8:  
 
STEPH. BYZ. s.v. Φενέβηθις·  
 
SUDA s.v. Ὡραπόλλων· 
 
P. Cair. Masp. III 67295 I 1, ii 24 (Antinoe, V AD). 
 
P. Bodl. I 73 3, 10 (reign of Heraclius). 
 
DAMASCIUS. Vita Isidori Reliquiæ. 
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(B) Secondary Texts 
 
(i) Greek Texts 
 
BERKOWITZ, L., & SQUITIER, K. A., Thesaurus Linguæ Græcæ Canon of Greek Authors and Words (3rd edition) (New 
York / Oxford: 1990). 
 
HORAPOLLO Gramm. {2052} 
 
1. Hieroglyphica (translatio Philippi) {2052.001} 
 
TREBATIUS, B., ANGELUS, J., & PHILIPPUS, (edd. & trans.), Ori Apollinis Niliaci Hierogliphica Orouapollōnos neilōon 
Hierouglyphika. [Paris] : [excussit Petrus Vidouaeus ... impensis ... Conradi Resch, bibliopolæ Parisiensis], [1521].  
 
PAUW, J. C. de, CAUSSIN, N., HOESCHEL, D., & MERCIER, J. (edd. & trans.), Horapollinis Hieroglyphica græce & 
latine, cum integris observationibus & notis Joann. Merceri & David. Hoeschelii, et selectis Nicolai Caussini. Curante 
Joanne Cornelio de Pauw, qui suas etiam observationes addidit. (Trajecti ad Rhenum (Utrecht): Apud Melchior. 
Leonardum Charlois, 1727).  
 
LEEMANS, C., (ed.), Horapollonis Niloi Hieroglyphica (Amsterdam: J. Müller et Socios, 1835).  
 
CORY, A. T., (trans.), The Hieroglyphics of Horapollo Nilous (London: W. Pickering, 1839 [1840, 1987].  
 
SBORDONE, F., (ed.), Hori Apollonis Hieroglyphica (Naples: Georg Olms, 1940 [2002]).  
 
VAN DE WALLE, B. & VERGOTE, J., (trans.), ‘Traduction des Hieroglyphica d’Horapollon’ in Chronique d’Égypte 
18 (1943): 39-89, 199-239; addenda ibid., 22 (1947): pp. 251-59.  
 
BOAS, G., (trans.), The Hieroglyphics of Horapollo (New York: Princeton University Press, 1950 [1993]).  
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2. Testimonia {2052.002} 
 
JACOBY, F., Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker (FGrH) #630. Leiden: Brill, 1923-1958 (repr. 1954-1969).  
 
Claudius AELIANUS Soph. {0545} 
 
3. De natura animalium {0545.001}  
 
HERCHER, R., Claudii Aeliani de natura animalium libri xvii, varia historia, epistolae, fragmenta, vol. 1. Leipzig: 
Teubner, 1864 (repr. 1971).  
 
ALCINOUS Phil. {0693} 
 
4. Epitome doctrinae Platonicae sive Διδασκαλικός {0693.001}  
 
LOUIS, P., Albinos. Épitom. Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1945. 
 
ALEXANDER Phil. {0732} 
 
5. In Aristotelis metaphysica commentaria {0732.004}  
 
HAYDUCK, M., Alexandri Aphrodisiensis in Aristotelis metaphysica commentaria [Commentaria in Aristotelem 
Graeca 1. Berlin: Reimer, 1891].  
 
AMMONIUS Phil. {4016} 
 
6. In Aristotelis librum de interpretatione commentarius {4016.003}  
 
BUSSE, A., Ammonius in Aristotelis de interpretatione commentarius [Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca 4.5. 
Berlin: Reimer, 1897].  
 Hieroglyphic Semantics in Late Antiquity - 151 - 
 Mark Wildish - 151 - 
 
 
ARISTOTELES et CORPUS ARISTOTELICUM Phil. {0086} 
 
7. Analytica priora et posteriora {0086.001}  
 
ROSS, W. D., Aristotelis analytica priora et posteriora. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964 (repr. 1968).  
 
8. De caelo {0086.005}  
 
MORAUX, P., Aristote. Du ciel. Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1965.  
 
9. Categoriae {0086.006}  
 
MINIO-PALUELLO, L., Aristotelis categoriae et liber de interpretatione. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1949 (repr. 1966).  
 
10. Ethica Eudemia {0086.009}  
 
SUSEMIHL, F., Aristotelis ethica Eudemia. Leipzig: Teubner, 1884 (repr. Amsterdam: Hakkert, 1967).  
 
11. Ethica Nicomachea {0086.010}  
 
BYWATER, I., Aristotelis ethica Nicomachea. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1894 (repr. 1962).  
 
12. Historia animalium {0086.014}  
 
LOUIS, P., Aristote. Histoire des animaux, vols. 1-3. Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1:1964; 2:1968; 3:1969.  
 
13. De interpretatione {0086.017}  
 
MINIO-PALUELLO, L., Aristotelis categoriae et liber de interpretatione. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1949 (repr. 1966).  
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14. Metaphysica {0086.025}  
 
ROSS, W. D., Aristotle's metaphysics, 2 vols. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1924 (repr. 1970 [of 1953 corr. edn.]).  
 
15. Poetica {0086.034}  
 
KASSEL, R., Aristotelis de arte poetica liber. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965 (repr. 1968 [of 1966 corr. edn.]).  
 
16. Rhetorica {0086.038}  
 
ROSS, W. D., Aristotelis ars rhetorica. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1959 (repr. 1964).  
 
CHAEREMON Hist., Phil. {2424} 
 
17. Fragmenta {2424.003}  
 
MÜLLER, K., Fragmenta historicorum Graecorum (FHG) 3. Paris: Didot, 1841-1870.  
 
VAN DER HORST, P., (ed.) Chæremon: Egyptian Priest and Stoic Philosopher, 2nd edn (Leiden: Brill, 1987).  
 
CLEMENS ALEXANDRINUS Theol. {0555} 
 
18. Paedagogus {0555.002}  
 
HARL, M., MARROU, H.-I., MATRAY, C., & MONDÉSERT, C., Clément d'Alexandrie. Le pédagogue, 3 vols. [Sources 
chrétiennes 70, 108, 158. Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1:1960; 2:1965; 3:1970].  
 
19. Stromata {0555.004} 
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FRÜCHTEL, L., STÄHLIN, O., & TREU, U., Clemens Alexandrinus, (vols. 2, 3rd ed. & 3, 2nd ed.) [Die griechischen 
christlichen Schriftsteller 52(15), 17. Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2: 1960; 3: 1970].  
 
CASTER, M., (ed.) Les Stromates (bk I) (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1951).  
 
LE BOULLUEC, A., (ed.) Les Stromates (bk V, 2 voll.) (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1981).  
 
CORPUS HERMETICUM Phil., Theol. {1286} 
 
20. Ὅροι Ἀσκληπιοῦ πρὸς Ἄμμωνα βασιλέα {1286.016}  
21. Fragmenta {1286.020}  
 
FESTUGIÈRE, A.-J., & NOCK, A. D., La Révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste (4 voll.) (Paris: Les Belles Lettres,1946-54; 
repr. 1972).  
 
COPENHAVER, B. P., Hermetica: The Greek Corpus Hermeticum and the Latin Asclepius in a new English translation, 
with notes and introduction (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).  
 
SCOTT, W., Hermetica, The Ancient Greek and Latin Writings which contain Religious or Philosophic Teachings ascribed 
to Hermes Trismegistus (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1925; reissued 1st vol. Shambhala: Boston, 1993).  
 
DAMASCIUS Phil. {4066} 
 
22. Vita Isidori (ap. Sudam, Hesychium, Photium et e cod. Vat. 1950) {4066.002} 
 
ATHANASSIADI, P., (ed.) Damascius: The Philosophical History text with translation and notes (Athens: Apamea, 
1999).  
 
ZINTZEN, C., Damascii vitae Isidori reliquiae. Hildesheim: Olms, 1967.  
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DEXIPPUS Phil. {2036} 
 
23. In Aristotelis categorias commentarium {2036.001} 
 
BUSSE, A., Dexippi in Aristotelis categorias commentarium [Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca 4.2. Berlin: 
Reimer, 1888].  
 
DIODORUS SICULUS Hist. {0060} 
 
24. Bibliotheca historica (lib. 1-20) {0060.001}  
 
FISCHER, K. T. (post BEKKER, I. & DINDORF, L.) & VOGEL, F., Diodori bibliotheca historica, 5 vols., 3rd edn. Leipzig: 
Teubner, 1:1888; 2:1890; 3:1893; 4-5:1906 (repr. Stuttgart, 1964).  
 
DIOGENES LAERTIUS Biogr. {0004} 
 
25. Vitae philosophorum {0004.001}  
 
LONG, H. S., Diogenis Laertii vitae philosophorum, 2 vols. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964 (repr. 1966).  
 
DIONYSIUS THRAX Gramm. {0063} 
 
26. Fragmenta {0063.004}  
 
LINKE, K., Die Fragmente des Grammatikers Dionysios Thrax [Sammlung griechischer und lateinischer 
Grammatiker 3. Berlin: De Gruyter, 1977].  
 
ELIAS Phil. {4020} 
 
27. Eliae (olim Davidis) in Aristotelis categorias commentarium {4020.002}  
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BUSSE, A., Eliae in Porphyrii isagogen et Aristotelis categorias commentaria [Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca 
18.1. Berlin: Reimer, 1900].  
 
EUSEBIUS Theol., Scr. Eccl. {2018} 
 
28. Praeparatio evangelica {2018.001}  
 
MRAS, K., Eusebius Werke, Band 8: Die Praeparatio evangelica [Die griechischen christlichen Schriftsteller 43.1 & 
43.2. Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 43.1:1954; 43.2:1956].  
 
EUSTATHIUS Theol., Scr. Eccl. {4117} 
 
29. Commentarius in hexaemeron [Sp.] {4117.022}  
 
MIGNE, J.-P., Patrologiae cursus completus (series Graeca) (MPG) 18, Paris: Migne, 1857-1866.  
 
GREGORIUS NYSSENUS Theol. {2017} 
 
30. Contra Eunomium {2017.030}  
 
JAEGER, W., Gregorii Nysseni opera, vols. 1.1 & 2.2. Leiden: Brill, 1960.  
 
HARPOCRATION Gramm. {1389} 
 
31. Lexicon in decem oratores Atticos {1389.001} 
 
DINDORF, W., Harpocrationis lexicon in decem oratores Atticos, vol. 1. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1853 (repr. 
Groningen: Bouma, 1969).  
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HECATAEUS Hist. {1390} 
 
32. Testimonia {1390.001}  
 
JACOBY, F., Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker (FGrH) #264. Leiden: Brill, 1923-1958 (repr. 1954-1969).  
 
33. Fragmenta {1390.002}  
 
JACOBY, F., Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker (FGrH) #264. Leiden: Brill, 1923-1958 (repr. 1954-1969).  
 
34. Testimonia {1390.003}  
 
DIELS, H. & KRANZ, W., Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, vol. 2, 6th edn. Berlin: Weidmann, 1952 (repr. 1966).  
 
35. Fragmenta {1390.004}  
 
DIELS, H. & KRANZ, W., Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, vol. 2, 6th edn. Berlin: Weidmann, 1952 (repr. 1966).  
 
HERODOTUS Hist. {0016} 
 
36. Historiae {0016.001}  
 
LEGRAND, Ph.-E, Hérodote. Histoires, 9 vols. Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1:1932; 2;1930; 3:1939; 4 (3rd edn.): 1960; 
5:1946; 6:1948; 7:1951; 8:1953; 9:1954 (repr. 1:1970; 2:1963; 3:1967; 5:1968; 6:1963; 7:1963; 8:1964; 9:1968).  
 
IAMBLICHUS Phil. {2023} 
 
37. De vita Pythagorica {2023.001}  
 
KLEIN, U. (post DEUBNER, L.), Iamblichi de vita Pythagorica liber. Leipzig: Teubner, 1937 (repr. 1975).  
 Hieroglyphic Semantics in Late Antiquity - 157 - 
 Mark Wildish - 157 - 
 
 
38. De mysteriis {2023.006} 
 
DES PLACES, É., (ed. & trans.) Les Mystères d’Égypte (Paris: Belles Lettres, 1966).  
 
CLARKE, E. C., DILLON, J., & HERSHBELL, J. P., Iamblichus: On the Mysteries (Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 
2003).  
 
TAYLOR, T., (trans.) Iamblichus On the Mysteries and Life of Pythagoras (Frome: The Prometheus Trust, 1999). 
 
JOANNES PHILOPONUS Phil. {4015} 
 
39. In Aristotelis categorias commentarium {4015.001} 
 
BUSSE, A., Philoponi (olim Ammonii) in Aristotelis categorias commentarium [Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca 
13.1. Berlin: Reimer, 1898].  
 
Flavius JOSEPHUS Hist. {0526} 
 
40. Contra Apionem (= De Judaeorum vetustate) {0526.003}  
 
NIESE, B., Flavii Iosephi opera, vol. 5. Berlin: Weidmann, 1889 (repr. 1955).  
 
Flavius Claudius JULIANUS Imperator Phil. {2003} 
 
41. Εἰς τὸν βασιλέα Ἥλιον πρὸς Σαλούστιον {2003.011}  
 
LACOMBRADE, C., L'empereur Julien. Oeuvres complètes, vol. 2.2. Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1964.  
 
MACARIUS Scr. Eccl. {2776} 
 Hieroglyphic Semantics in Late Antiquity - 158 - 
 Mark Wildish - 158 - 
 
 
42. Apocriticus seu Μονογενής {2776.001}  
 
GOULET, R., Macarios de Magnésie: Le monogénès (Tome II). Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 2003.  
 
MAGICA Magica, Nat. Hist. {5002} 
 
43. Papyri magicae {5002.001}  
 
HENRICHS, A. & PREISENDANZ, K., Papyri Graecae magicae. Die griechischen Zauberpapyri, vols. 1-2, 2nd edn. 
Stuttgart: Teubner, 1:1973; 2:1974.  
 
44. Papyri magicae (fragmenta Christiana) {5002.002}  
 
HENRICHS, A. & PREISENDANZ, K., Papyri Graecae magicae. Die griechischen Zauberpapyri, vols. 1-2, 2nd edn. 
Stuttgart: Teubner, 1:1973; 2:1974.  
 
45. Papyri magicae (ostraca) {5002.003}  
 
HENRICHS, A. & PREISENDANZ, K., Papyri Graecae magicae. Die griechischen Zauberpapyri, vols. 1-2, 2nd edn. 
Stuttgart: Teubner, 1:1973; 2:1974.  
 
46. Papyri magicae (tabulae) {5002.004}  
 
HENRICHS, A. & PREISENDANZ, K., Papyri Graecae magicae. Die griechischen Zauberpapyri, vols. 1-2, 2nd edn. 
Stuttgart: Teubner, 1:1973; 2:1974.  
 
MANETHO Hist. {1477} 
 
47. Fragmenta {1477.003}  
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MÜLLER, K., Fragmenta historicorum Graecorum (FHG) 2. Paris: Didot, 1841-1870.  
 
OLYMPIODORUS Phil. {4019} 
 
48. Prolegomena {4019.001}  
 
BUSSE, A., Olympiodori prolegomena et in categorias commentarium [Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca 12.1. 
Berlin: Reimer, 1902].  
 
49. In Platonis Alcibiadem commentarii {4019.004} 
 
WESTERINK, L. G., Olympiodorus. Commentary on the first Alcibiades of Plato. Amsterdam: Hakkert, 1956 (repr. 
1982).  
 
ORIGENES Theol. {2042} 
 
50. Contra Celsum {2042.001}  
 
BORRET, M., Origène. Contre Celse, 4 vols. [Sources chrétiennes 132, 136, 147, 150. Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1:1967; 
2:1968; 3-4:1969].  
 
PHILO JUDAEUS Phil. {0018} 
 
51. De aeternitate mundi {0018.029}  
 
COHN, L. & REITER, S., Philonis Alexandrini opera quae supersunt, vol. 6. Berlin: Reimer, 1915 (repr. De Gruyter, 
1962).  
 
52. Legatio ad Gaium {0018.031}  
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COHN, L. & REITER, S., Philonis Alexandrini opera quae supersunt, vol. 6. Berlin: Reimer, 1915 (repr. De Gruyter, 
1962).  
 
PHYSIOLOGUS Nat. Hist. {2654} 
 
53. Physiologus (redactio prima) {2654.001}  
 
SBORDONE, F., Physiologus. Rome: Dante Alighieri-Albrighi, Segati, 1936 (repr. Hildesheim: Olms, 1976).  
 
54. Physiologus (redactio secunda quae vocatur Byzantina) {2654.002}  
 
SBORDONE, F., Physiologus. Rome: Dante Alighieri-Albrighi, Segati, 1936 (repr. Hildesheim: Olms, 1976).  
 
55. Physiologus (redactio tertia quae vocatur pseudo-Basiliana) {2654.003}  
 
SBORDONE, F., Physiologus. Rome: Dante Alighieri-Albrighi, Segati, 1936 (repr. Hildesheim: Olms, 1976).  
 
56. Physiologus (diversarum versionum capita disiecta in vulgare lingua) {2654.010}  
 
SBORDONE, F., Physiologus. Rome: Dante Alighieri-Albrighi, Segati, 1936 (repr. Hildesheim: Olms, 1976).  
 
PLATO Phil. {0059} 
 
57. Philebus {0059.010}  
 
BURNET, J., Platonis opera, vol. 2. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1901 (repr. 1967).  
 
DIÈS, A., (ed. & trans.) Œuvres Complètes (t. 9, 2e ptie) (Paris: Belles Lettres, 1949).  
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58. Phaedrus {0059.012}  
 
BURNET, J., Platonis opera, vol. 2. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1901 (repr. 1967).  
 
ROBIN, L., (ed. & trans.) Œuvres Complètes (t. 4, 3e ptie) (Paris: Belles Lettres, 1944).  
 
59. Leges {0059.034} 
 
BURNET, J., Platonis opera, vol. 2. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1901 (repr. 1967).  
 
PLOTINUS Phil. {2000} 
 
60. Enneades {2000.001} 
 
HENRY, P., & SCHWYZER, H.-R., Plotini opera, 3 vols. Leiden: Brill, 1:1951; 2:1959; 3:1973.  
 
BRÉHIER, E., (ed. & trans.) Ennéades (Paris : Belles Lettres, 1924-1931).  
 
PLUTARCHUS Biogr., Phil. {0007} 
 
61. De Iside et Osiride (351c-384c) {0007.089}  
 
SIEVEKING, W., Plutarchi moralia, vol. 2.3. Leipzig: Teubner, 1935 (repr. 1971).  
 
GRIFFITHS, J. G., (ed. & trans.) Plutarch’s De Iside et Osiride (Cambridge: University of Wales Press, 1970).  
 
PORPHYRIUS Phil. {2034} 
 
62. Vita Pythagorae {2034.002} 
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NAUCK, A., Porphyrii philosophi Platonici opuscula selecta, 2nd edn. Leipzig: Teubner, 1886 (repr. Hildesheim: 
Olms, 1963).  
 
63. De abstinentia {2034.003} 
 
NAUCK, A., Porphyrii philosophi Platonici opuscula selecta, 2nd edn. Leipzig: Teubner, 1886 (repr. Hildesheim: 
Olms, 1963).  
 
64. In Aristotelis categorias expositio per interrogationem et responsionem {2034.007} 
 
BUSSE, A., Porphyrii isagoge et in Aristotelis categorias commentarium [Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca 4.1. 
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